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ABSTRACT
Despite a growing body o f research on venture capital firms, the process by which 
venture capital firms invest across borders remains unclear. This three-essay dissertation 
integrates the literature on venture capital firms, social network theory, and international 
alliances to examine following research questions:
1) How do network characteristics (i.e., structure and composition) o f the 
international venture capital firms and their potential partners impact their 
syndication behavior?
2) What configurations o f the ventures’ and the international venture capital 
firms’ attributes is associated with syndication in emerging markets? and
3) Does the host country influence the international venture capital firms’ 
syndication behavior and performance?
While there is a plethora of empirical studies on domestic venture capital 
activities and cross country comparison o f the venture capital industry, there is a lack of 
research that looks at the process of the venture capital firms’ international investments 
and explores the factors that influence the process of such investments. Essay I addresses 
this gap by developing a theoretical framework examining how network structure and 
composition o f the both focal foreign venture capital firms potential partners operating in 
the host country can impact their syndication behavior. The major network constructs
constituting the framework are network centrality, density, and diversity. The theoretical 
argument suggests that all o f these factors can play a significant role in the venture 
capital firms’ decision with regard to syndication. The major contribution o f this essay is 
introducing the network attributes as the antecedent mechanisms impacting the 
syndication likelihood. Also, this study expands the level o f the analysis in this literature, 
from the firm to its network.
Essay II examines how venture s’ risk factors (information asymmetry and 
technical complexity) and venture capital firms attributes (social status in the home and 
host countries and general and host country experiences) configure in syndicated deals 
applying fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. The results show that the venture 
riskiness is a more important factor driving the syndication decision compared to the 
venture capital firm’s capabilities (identified through the social status and experience). 
Further, the venture capital firms’ capabilities do not substitute the syndication. In other 
words, even firms with high social status and significant experience are willing to 
syndicate their investments. Finally, I found that while syndication is not systematically 
associated with high performance, lack o f syndication is associated with low 
performance. This result reveals the vital role o f partner selection in the venture capital 
syndications. Theoretically, my results lend more support to the assumption that 
syndication is not significantly contingent upon the venture and venture capital attributes, 
and other motivations such as portfolio diversification and future reciprocation are more 
likely to drive the syndication decision.
Essay III aims to examine whether venture capital firms alter their syndication 
strategy according to the host country attributes. The second research question in this
essay is whether the performance o f international venture capital firms systematically 
varies when they invest in different countries. Results provide support for the overall 
significant country effect on the syndication decision. Whether venture capital firms 
syndicate their investment or not is systematically and partially explained by the host 
country characteristics. The type o f partner (domestic versus home country) also partially 
depends on the host country. Interestingly, the host country explains more variation of 
syndication with home country partners compared to domestic firms. Further, I found that 
the performance o f the venture capital firms’ international investments varies with the 
variation o f the host country. The host country effect is significantly greater when the 
foreign firms only syndicate with the domestic partners. There are also more fine grained 
analyses whose results have been presented in this essay. Thus, this essay contributes to 
the theory and practice by revealing the significant effect o f the host country on the 
international venture capital firms strategy and performance. Results of this essay open 
new venues for future studies and shed light on the plausible directions for the future 
research investigating the phenomenon of the venture capital firms’ internationalization.
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Venture capital (VC) firms invest in high-potential private companies with the 
goal to exit successfully from the venture (in the form o f public offering, merger, or 
acquisition) and earn a return on their investment (Aizenman & Kendall, 2012; Brander, 
Amit, & Antweiler, 2002). In addition to providing the capital, VC firms add value to 
new ventures through managerial inputs (Hellmann & Puri, 2000,2002).
This dissertation focuses on VC syndication decisions. In contrast to the solo 
investment in a new venture, syndication has been defined as the situation where two or 
more VC firms invest in a venture together1 (Brander et al., 2002). Syndication is one of 
the most critical strategic decisions that VC firms make in managing their investments 
(Lemer, 1994). VC firms may seek partners for many reasons such as capital and local 
market knowledge and connections. While in the past, the VC literature has examined 
syndication decisions using social network theory (Guler & Guillen, 2010), the 
antecedent mechanisms through which social networks influence the syndication decision 
have not been examined. In addition, despite the growing internationalization o f the VC 
industry, there is a lack o f studies looking at the VC firms’ internalization process 
(Wright, Pruthi, & Lockett, 2005; Jaaskelainen, 2012).
Prior studies have focused on comparing the VC industry across different 
countries rather than the processes through which VC firms invest abroad and manage 
such investments (e.g. Black & Gilson, 1998; Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 
2006; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Megginson, 2004). This three-essay dissertation seeks to
1 This can occur at the same round or different rounds o f  investments.
2address these gaps in the VC literature. As there has been a rise in developed country VC 
firms’ investment in emerging markets (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008), I develop and test 
my theoretical framework within this context.
In the first essay, I develop a theoretical framework that illustrates how network 
structure (i.e. social status) and composition (i.e. network density and diversity) impact 
VC firms’ syndication decision. Expanding upon the duality rationale introduced by 
Ahuja (2000), I argue that the underlying mechanisms driving syndication involve an 
interaction between the motivation and attractiveness o f all parties. Next, I describe how 
network structure and composition can influence this underlying mechanism and 
consequently impact the likelihood o f syndication. In contrast to previous studies that 
have tended to focus only on the potential partner, in this essay, I expand the level of 
analysis to include the partner’s network. That is, I argue that a VC firm’s syndication 
decision is also influenced by the attributes o f the partner’s network.
In Essay 2 ,1 examine whether during international expansion, social status of VC 
firms at home and host countries influence their syndication decision. The main research 
question that this essay seeks to answer is whether social status, with the advantages that 
it offers, can substitute for syndication, or it complements the syndication’s benefits. Pior 
research offers two major perspectives about the syndication process: while some believe 
that VC firms have natural tendency towards syndication (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 
2010; Lemer, 1994; Manigart et al., 2002), others have claimed that syndication depends 
on the venture and VC firm’s characteristics (Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Hopp & Rieder, 
2011; Jaaskelainen, 2012). I examine how venture riskiness (e.g., asymmetric information
3and technical risks) and social status o f the VC firm in home and host countries influence 
syndication.
Further, I investigate the performance implications o f the syndication and social 
status. I develop competing propositions to examine whether certain configurations of 
social status in the home and host countries and venture characteristics can lead to 
superior performance regardless o f syndication, or syndication is a necessary condition 
for superior performance. I employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to 
address the research questions. The premise o f fsQCA is that in most cases, a 
combination o f multiple conditions leads to an outcome in social sciences instead o f each 
independent variable influencing the outcome individually (Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 
2012). It allows us to explore certain configurations o f causal conditions leading to the 
high and low levels o f an outcome variable (Ragin, Drass, & Davey, 2006; Ragin, 2000). 
Results yield a certain set o f configuration among the causal conditions that are 
associated with syndication and superior performance in VC firms’ international 
investments. This empirical study is based on a sample of the first round investments 
made by U.S. VC firms in China from 1995 to 2005.
In the third essay, I examine the impact o f the host country on syndication 
decision and performance of the international VC firms. Due to the lack o f research on 
VC firms’ internationalization, the role o f the host country in refining their strategies and 
performance remains unclear (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Therefore, the first step to 
open this venue of research is to examine whether and to what extent the host country has 
a significant impact on international VC firms’ strategic behavior and performance. 
Institutional theory and liability o f foreignness in international business literature
4maintain that institutional and cultural differences and unfamiliarity with the local market 
cause foreign firms to ally with others (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006). Thus, depending on 
the host country characteristics and its institutional and cultural distances from the home 
country, foreign VC firms may encounter different levels o f pressure to syndicate in order 
to mitigate their liability o f foreignness. Addressing this phenomenon, the overarching 
research question in this essay is whether and how much of variation in the syndication 
decision and performance of the international VC firms are explained by the host country 
characteristics. To provide more fine-grained analysis, I also ask following questions: 
Does the amount o f variance explained by the host country differ for syndication with 
domestic versus home country firms? Does the country effect on VC firms’ performance 
vary for stand-alone versus syndicated deals? Does the country effect on VC firms’ 
performance vary for syndicated deals with different partners (domestic vs. home country 
partners)?
I use Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to conduct a variance decomposition 
analysis in order to examine the explanatory power o f the host country in VC firms’ 
strategic behavior and performance. The hypotheses are tested using a sample of 
investments by U.S. VC firms in 53 different countries. The results show that the host 
country significantly influences the general decision to syndicate as well as the 
performance o f the international VC industry. Further, the host country effect is different 
in magnitude for syndications formed with home country firms compared to those with 
domestic firms. When limiting the sample to the deals in which US VC firms had at least 
one domestic partner, country effect does not significantly and systematically explain 
performance differences across various countries. However, when I limited the sample to
5the deals that had merely syndicated with domestic firms, country effects became 
significant. These findings show that the country characteristics are more influential 
when U.S. VC firms do not have any partners other than domestic firms to compensate 
for the institutional and cultural differences among the home and host countries. In other 
words, they are more powerful and dominant when they have other partners (i.e., from 
home or other similar countries) in addition to the domestic firms. That can be a 
defensive strategy against information asymmetry and unfamiliarity with domestic firms.
Overall, the findings o f this dissertation make several theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the literature on the VC syndication, particularly internationalization of 
VC firms as well as the international alliance literature. I introduce a more fine-grained 
application o f social network theory to this literature as the primary theoretical 
contribution. Although prior VC studies have incorporated social network perspective 
into their theoretical frameworks (e.g., Abell & Nisar, 2007; Echols & Tsai, 2005; Guler 
& Guillen, 2010; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007), their main focus has been on the 
domestic VC industries, and the structural dimensions o f the social network theory (e.g., 
social status and network centrality). In this dissertation, I address this gap by including 
both network structure and composition dimensions and by concentrating on international 
VC firms. Also, I expand the level o f analysis from dyads o f VC firms to their network. 
With that regard, the major theoretical contribution o f this dissertation is that since 
networks have several tangible and intangible resources to offer, they should be 
considered in examining the partnerships among VC firms in addition to the focal VC 
firms’ qualifications. Thus, decision to syndicate with a VC firm must be examined based 
on both the potential partner’s qualification and its network.
6From the empirical stand point, essays 2 and 3 rely on data from actual 
investments made by VC firms overseas to examine the presented theoretical framework. 
Essay 2 introduces a new method, Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(FSQCA), to the VC literature. This opens a new methodological venue for future 
studies. Due to the advantages that FSQCA has to offer in conducting rigorous qualitative 
studies even with small sample sizes, it can be applied in the VC literature in opening the 
black box of VC firms’ strategic behaviors such as syndication. Finally, essay 3 is the 
first step to start an entirely new research stream in the VC literature. Future studies are 
encouraged to explore specific country level factors that impact foreign VC firms’ 
operation and performance. Also, comparing the type and magnitude o f the host country 
effects on foreign and domestic firms is warranted.
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9CHAPTER 2
ESSAY I: INTERNATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL SYNDICATION: THE 
IMPACT OF NETWORK STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION
2.1 ABSTRACT
Syndication is a popular strategy among the venture capital firms. How the venture
capital firms make this strategic decision in an international setting and factors that
influence it have been neglected in the past venture capital research. This paper examines
the role o f the venture capital firms’ and their potential partners’ network structure and
composition on the syndication decision. This paper examines the syndication decision in
the context o f investments made by the developed country venture capital firms in
«
emerging markets due to the increasing trend o f such investments. I adopt Ahuja’s 
opportunity/inducement framework. The major theoretical contribution is that the 
interplay between network characteristics and willingness/attractiveness o f the partners 
influences the likelihood o f syndication between them. Accordingly, a conceptual 




VC firms are characterized as companies investing in high potential 
entrepreneurial ventures and providing them with finance, business skills, and 
connections with suppliers and customers (Lockett & Wrigh, 2001). Syndication is one of 
the most common strategies that VC firms use to manage their investment. Prior studies 
have defined the syndication as the investments made by two or more VC firms in the 
same round in a venture (Bygrave, 1987; Lemer, 1994). Some also have expanded the 
definition to the situations in which different VC firms have joined a venture at different 
stages or in different rounds (Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002). Due to its strategic 
importance, syndication has attracted the attention o f business scholars (Jaaskelainen, 
2012). Prior studies have explored the motivations behind the syndication decision from 
different perspectives. For example, risk sharing (Lockett & Wright, 2001; Wilson,
1968), resource based view (Busenitza, Fiet, Moesel, 2004; Sapienza, 1992), social 
network, and deal flow and future reciprocity o f the partners (Lockett & Wright, 2001; 
Wright & Lockett, 2003) are some perspectives used to understand and explain the 
syndication behavior.
Within the social network perspective, some have focused on the structure o f the 
VC firms’ network (Bygrave, 1987, 1988), while others have examined the performance 
effects o f the VC firms’ network. For instance, the position o f the VC firms in their 
syndication network has been identified to have a positive impact on their performance at 
the fund level and on the individual venture’s performance (Abell & Nisar, 2007; Echols 
& Tsai, 2005; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). Also, previous studies have explored
11
how VC firms’ network characteristics influence their decision to expand internationally 
(Guler & Guillen, 2010a).
Due to extensive interactions among the VC firms and because syndication is a 
common strategy for them, the VC industry is recognized as a highly social industry 
(Guler & Guillen, 2010a), which makes it an appropriate context to apply social network 
theory. Despite several studies using social network perspective in the VC context, there 
are two major gaps in the literature: first, antecedent mechanisms through which social 
networks influence the syndication decision remains unclear. Second, most o f the prior 
studies are concentrated on the focal VC firm’s network and mostly the position of the 
VC firms in its network (Abell & Nisar, 2007; Echols & Tsai, 2005; Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). Thus the partner’s network as well as other network 
characteristics particularly network composition remains under-researched. I address 
these gaps in the literature in this study.
I examine how network structure and composition function as the antecedents of 
the VC firms’ syndication decision. Further, I expand the level of analysis from dyadic 
relationships in syndication to include the partner’s network. I discuss how partner’s 
network features, beyond its individual characteristics, can impact other VC firm’s 
decision with regard to form syndications with them. Also, VC activities have been 
expanding from the U.S. —  where it originated—  to other countries around the world 
from mid-1990’s (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). Witnessing the positive impacts o f the VC 
industry on the economy of pioneer countries, other countries started to encourage local 
VC activities and at the same time facilitate the inflow of VC investments from other 
countries (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). The untapped investment opportunities and
12
reforms undertaken by the governments in emerging countries have made them the 
investment destination for many VC firms from developed countries (Ahlstrom &
Bruton, 2006). Despite its growing popularity, internationalization o f the VC firms is still 
under-researched in the VC literature (Jaaskelainen, 2012; Wright, Pruthi, & Lockett, 
2005). To respond to this gap, I examine the syndication behavior o f the international VC 
firms from developed countries investing in emerging markets as the context o f my study.
Due to the general similarity between the syndication o f the VC firms and 
alliances in other industries (Wright & Lockett, 2003), I employ the findings o f previous 
studies on the international alliances and particularly those that have examined alliances 
between firms from developed and emerging countries (e.g., Dacin, Hitt, & Levitas,
1997; Hitt et al., 2000; Yan & Gray, 1994) to develop my conceptual framework. I build 
on the dual rationale for alliances introduced by Ahuja (2000). He argued that for a firm 
to form an inter-organizational link, it needs to have the motivation and opportunity for 
such relationship at the same time. I use the same logic in the VC firms’ syndication and 
develop it in some aspects. First, while previous studies have mostly focused on one side 
o f the inter-firm links (that is, the focal firm), I address the motivation and attractiveness 
o f both sides examining the syndication likelihood between them. Second, analyzing 
prior studies on international alliances (mainly between developed and emerging country 
firms), I classify the motivation and attractiveness factors into two groups: business- 
related and context-related factors. Whereas the former refers to the situations that a firm 
allies with others in order to gain advantages directly related to the technical aspects of 
the business, the latter occurs in instances that the environment and context o f the host 
country impose the need for alliance to the firm. For instance, liability o f foreignness
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(LOF) is one o f the context-related factors that may lead an international firm towards an 
alliance while it might be able to handle the actual business operation alone (Zaheer, 
1995). Finally, in addition to the individual partner’s attributes, I introduce the partner’s 
network features as the influential factors on its motivation and attractiveness.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the basic 
concepts o f the VC industry and its internationalization history. Thereafter, reviewing 
literature on the VC firms’ syndication, social network, and international alliances, 
theoretical perspective and the propositions on the international VC firms’ syndication 
based on the dual rationale are developed. Finally, overall conclusion and implications 
for researchers and practitioners are discussed.
VC INDUSTRY
The VC industry grew rapidly in the United States in mid-1990s. The origins of 
the VC industry can be traced back to 1958 when investors provided funds to general 
partners or venture capitalists to invest in entrepreneurial ventures (Guler & Guillen, 
2010a). After that, limited partnership became the dominant form of incorporation in the 
U.S. Contemporary VC firms have between two and over 30 general partners. The 
amount of capital invested in ventures can be from $10 million to several billion dollars 
(Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1997).
The VC industry has been one o f the major drivers o f innovation and growth of 
high-technology industries in the U.S. economy. As of 2010, venture- capital-backed 
companies represented 11% of the total U.S. private sector employment and 21% of the 
U.S. GDP (National Venture Capital Association, 2011). While the VC sector in the U.S. 
has been large and active for many years, there had been very little growth in VC activity
14
in other countries until the mid-1990s. Since that time, the internationalization o f the VC 
sector has been driven by general factors driving globalization as well as historical facts 
specific to the VC industry (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008).
There are several factors that contributed in the internalization o f the VC industry. 
With saturation o f the developed markets, many VC firms have turned to emerging and 
less developed countries as attractive and growing markets with untapped investment 
opportunities (Gompers & Lemer 1998). Regulatory reforms by the governments in those 
countries have also facilitated the foreign investments by VC firms. Significant role of 
the VC investments in the economic growth of the pioneer countries such as U.S. has also 
encouraged emerging country governments to facilitate the inflow of foreign funds by 
international VC firms (Wright et al., 2005). As a result, the flow o f international VC 
funds across the countries has increased (Baygan & Freudenberg, 2000). However, the 
U.S. is still a dominant player in the VC industry and most of the international 
investments are made by the U.S. VC firms (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). China has 
emerged as an international host market, and now has the second largest amount of 
private capital in Asia including about one-third o f all capital under management in Asia 
(Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). It is the dominant net importer o f VC funds, followed by 
Sweden, Canada, the UK, India, and France (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008).
2.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
VC Firms Syndication
Syndication is an important and popular1 strategy among VC firms (Lockett, & 
Wright, 2001). While some scholars have defined syndication as the situation in which
1 According to Jaaskelainen (2012) the rate o f  syndicated investments in VC industry ranges between 40- 
80% o f  all investments. VC firms in different countries have different desires toward syndication. For
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two or more VC firms invest in a venture at the same investment round (e.g. Lemer,
1994), others have offered a broader definition which includes ventures backed with 
different VC firms that have invested in different rounds (e.g. Brander et al., 2002). 
Syndication in the VC industry to some extent resembles the alliances in other industries 
(Wright & Lockett, 2003). However, there are some unique aspects that distinguish the 
syndication from typical alliances (Wright & Robbie, 199). Unlike traditional alliances or 
joint ventures, in a syndication, VC firms come together and invest in a legal entity that 
already exists. Further, VC firms do not engage in the day-to-day operation o f the venture 
and mostly have a supportive monitoring role. Finally, in addition to helping the venture 
to succeed in its business, the ultimate goal of the VC firms is to exit the venture in the 
form of IPO or merger and acquisition (M&A). Due to the fact that VC firms do not 
engage directly in the venture’s operation and are to support the venture with providing 
resources and connecting them to experts in the field, network of the VC firms can play a 
vital role in bringing them those connections and increasing their access to the required 
resources.
Prior studies offer three different rationales for the syndication decision: risk 
mitigation, resource sharing and reciprocal deals in the ftiture. First, from a traditional 
finance perspective, sharing the investment risk is one o f the explanations for VC firms’ 
syndication (Lockett & Wright, 2001). From this view, VC firms syndicate to mitigate the 
potential risks stemming from the venture or the market (Ruhnka & Young, 1991). In
instance in 2001 the share on syndicated investments in U.S. (between 40-50%) was more than three times 
as much as that in U.K.
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some cases, lack o f sufficient information1 about the venture increases the risk o f the 
investment. Through adding more counterparts to the deal, VC firms try to improve the 
due diligence in selection process and invest in more promising ventures (Lemer, 1994). 
Further, VC firms may engage in syndication to diversify their investment portfolio and 
therefore reduce their risk by putting their eggs in different baskets (Wilson, 1968). In 
this case, syndication is a general financial risk sharing strategy independent from the VC 
firm and venture characteristics.
Second, VC firms syndicate to share resources. VC firms do not function just as a 
financial resource provider for the entrepreneurial firms. They are presumed to create 
value in the venture through their managerial expertise and other resources and 
connections that they have access to which goes beyond the financial resources (Brander 
et al., 2002). To perform more effectively in value adding process2, VC firms bring other 
counterparts to the deal to benefit from their specific experiences, skills, and resources in 
the venture’s operation area (Busenitz et al., 2004; Sapienza, 1992). In this case, 
syndication is a strategy to enhance the venture’s performance that ultimately makes it 
more marketable at the time of exit.
Finally, some of the prior studies have identified future reciprocity as another 
motivation for VC firm to syndicate their investments. This argument is based on the 
importance o f securing prospect deals to invest in the future specially in unfavorable 
conditions (e.g. macro-economic conditions) when finding promising deals is difficult 
(Hochberg et al., 2007; Lemer, 1994). In essence, VC firms may invite other counterparts
1 The lack o f  information can be because the venture is young or in lower stages o f  development and thus, 
has short track record for the VC firms to rely on in investment decision (Gompers & Lemer, 2002; Hopp 
& Rieder, 2011).
2 Value-added activities o f  VC firms can be classified in following categories: financial, administrative, 
marketing, and strategic/management (Cumming, Fleming, & Suchard, 2005; Sapienza, 1992).
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to their deal (syndicate their deals) hoping that those counterparts will do the same in the 
future.
Alliances and Syndication
Alliances are cooperative arrangements between two or more firms to achieve the 
strategic objectives o f the partners (Das & Teng, 1998). Given the similarity between 
syndication and inter-firm alliances (Wright & Lockett, 2003), some of the findings of 
the prior studies on alliances can be applied in the syndication context as well. Specific 
context o f this study is international investments o f developed country VC firms1 in 
emerging markets. Increasing trend of the investment outflow mainly from developed 
countries towards the emerging markets has enhanced the likelihood of co-operation 
between firms from these countries (Hitt et al., 2000). The emergence o f the inter-firm 
relationships between developed and emerging country companies has encouraged 
scholars in alliance literature to focus specifically on the dynamics of such relationships. 
As a result, there are several studies that have investigated this phenomenon from 
different perspectives. One o f the streams in this literature is concentrated on the 
motivations and inducements of the firms from different origins (developed vs. emerging 
markets) for creating such alliances. The main idea here is that evolving in different 
environments, firms from these countries have different motivations and needs of 
forming alliances (Glaister & Buckley, 1996).
From an institutional perspective, the developed countries are characterized by 
strong rule o f law and economic stability, while institutions in emerging markets are 
weak. As a result, such markets are characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity which in 
turn generate political risks for the firms investing in such markets (Diamonte, Liew, &
1 Hereafter is called focal VC firms
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Stevenset, 1996; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Pedersen & Thomsen, 1997). 
The lack o f institutions and risk make the emerging economies hostile markets for the VC 
firms from developed countries, as their previous experiences are not quite applicable.
The technology gap between developed and emerging markets also influences 
inducements o f different parties for alliance formation. Most o f the contemporary 
industries have emerged in developed countries which has created a technology gap 
among different countries in the world (Svetlicic & Rojec, 1994). Consequently, 
compared to the rich, resource-endowed counterparts in the developed countries, firms in 
emerging markets have less access to advanced resources and sophisticated technologies. 
Relying on this rationale, previous studies have explored distinct motivations that 
developed and emerging market firms have when they form alliances (Dacin et al., 1997; 
Dong & Glaister, 2006; Gillespie & Teegen, 1995; Hitt et al., 2000; Yan & Gray, 1994). 
Table 1 offers a summary of these studies.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
As Table 1 illustrates, firms from similar markets share similar motivations in 
alliance formation. In fact, the developed economy firms mainly use alliances to cover 
their disadvantages resulting from the lack o f local market knowledge and also 
institutional distances with emerging markets (Beamish, 1987; Hitt et al., 2000). Thus, 
what they wish to receive from their local partners are local market knowledge and 
information, customer information, access to different geographical markets in the host 
country, and institutional connections required to succeed in the business operation in 
emerging markets (De Mattos, Neto, & Sanderson, 2001; Gillespie & Teegen, 1995). On 
the other side, for the emerging market firms, alliance with the developed country firms is
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a great opportunity for access to advanced resources and technologies, and connecting to 
the foreign markets (Dong & Glaister, 2006; Hitt et al., 2000; Raveed & Renforth, 1983).
I use these findings to develop dual rationale o f alliances.
Dual Rationale of Inter-Firm Relationships
Ahuja (2000) in his analysis o f inter-firm alliances introduced dual rationale for 
collaboration among firms. He argued that to form an alliance, a firm needs to have an 
inducement to engage in that relationship, and at the same time the opportunity to create a 
partnership. He identified three types o f capital that can influence the inducement and 
opportunity of the firms to engage in alliances: technical, commercial, and social. Other 
studies have also applied this rationale to explore the factors that make a firm an 
attractive alliance partner to others and consequently increase the alliance likelihood 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Bae & Insead 2004; Rothaermel, 2002). In the context o f VC 
industry, Dimov and Milanov (2010) followed the same logic and examined the interplay 
between need and opportunity in the VC firms’ syndication. They found that in the novel 
investments where the egocentric uncertainty is high, the VC firms are more willing to 
syndicate the investment, with their reputation and status increasing their opportunity to 
find better partners.
I build on this logic and develop it in two major ways: first, I divide both 
motivation and attractiveness into two categories as business-related and context-related 
categories. This categorization is based on what prior studies have found in the 
international alliances between developed and emerging country firms. The context- 
related motivations stem from institutional and cultural differences between the home and 
host countries. According to the previous studies summarized in Table 1, the firms from
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developed economies mainly use alliances to cover their disadvantages resulting from the 
lack o f local knowledge as well as institutional distances with emerging markets. Indeed, 
it is the context of the investment that leads them to ally with other firms to share the risk 
deriving from LOF. On the other hand, emerging market firms usually ally with the 
developed country counterparts to cover the technological gap existing between 
developed and emerging countries. According to that, I call those motivations business- 
related since they are mostly related to the technical aspects o f the business.
The general motivations o f VC firms to form syndication were mentioned in the 
previous section. Improving the value added process and pooling the resources are two o f 
the common VC firms’ motivations. In such cases, VC firms engage in the syndication 
because they want to benefit from the expertise and resources o f the counterparts. I label 
such instances where the technical aspects of the business lead the VC firms towards 
syndication, as business-re/ateJ motivation. However, there are other instances, 
especially in the international settings, when syndication is motivated by the risks that the 
VC firms perceive in the context o f the investment. The unfamiliarity with the local 
market and cultural distance with the local entrepreneurs make the deal selection process 
difficult. I call such factors context-related motivations. In such situations, having 
extensive experiences and knowledge about the host country, local firms have context- 
related attractiveness in the eyes o f the focal firms. In addition, the VC industry is much 
more experienced and advanced in the developed countries such as U.S. than it is in the 
emerging markets (Wright et al., 2005). That makes the VC firms from developed 
countries attractive to the local firms in emerging markets from the business-related 
aspects. Therefore, matching needs (motivations) o f one side and capability o f the other
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side to fulfill those needs (attractiveness) enhances the likelihood of the alliance between 
them.
Network Characteristics
This study seeks to examine how networks impact the syndication decision o f the
VC firms. To answer this question, I consider the network’s structure and composition.
Network structure refers to the “pattern o f relationships that exist among a set o f actors”
(Phelps, 2010: 890). Network composition implies the characteristics o f the actors in a
network such as their resource endowments (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).
Network Structure and Social Status. Social status includes an actor’s set o f direct ties.
So, it can illustrate the structure of the relationships in a network and relative position of
actors in this structure (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). It implies the prestige of an actor by
showing its standing in its network (i.e. syndication network) relative to the others (Burt,
1982). Podolny (2005: 11) clearly describes this implication:
“The concept of status invokes the imagery of a hierarchy o f positions - a 
pecking order - in which an individual’s location within that hierarchy shapes 
others’ expectations and actions toward the individual and thereby determines the 
opportunities and constraints that the individual confronts”
One o f the common ways o f defining the social status is the position of the firm in 
its network relative to the other actors; that is, to what extent existing ties make the focal 
firm’s position central in the network (Podolny, 2001). From this perspective, the focal 
firm’s social status is also a function of the social status o f the other actors to which it is 
related (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). In other words, affiliation with firms with 
higher social status enhances the status o f the focal firm. The high social status creates 
several benefits for the firm: firms with high social status are more attractive partners, 
since affiliation with them can enhance the status o f the partner as well (Podolny, 1993).
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Co-operation with other firms -  the basis o f the social status -  gives the focal firm 
visibility and thereby enhances the firm and its actions’ legitimacy in other actors’ view 
(Eisenhardt, & Schoonhoven, 1996). Further, capturing the level o f the firm’s 
embeddedness in its network (Ahuja, 2000), status shows the magnitude and likelihood of 
access to different resources existing in the network such as information, human capital, 
advices, and financial resources (Bothner, Kim, & Smith, 2012; Hoang & Antocic, 2003; 
Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001; Stuart et al., 1999). Firms with higher status 
enjoy superior access to these resources.
Acknowledging these benefits, prior studies in the VC literature have examined 
the impact o f the VC firms’ social status' on their operation. For instance, Podolny 
(2001) found that the value of social status increases in cases where there is a high 
altercentric uncertainty. Altercentric uncertainty refers to the situations in which the focal 
firm’s partner does not have sufficient information to assess the quality o f the focal firm. 
Social status has also been identified to positively impact the ultimate performance o f the 
VC firms in terms o f having more successful exits in their investments (Abell & Nisar, 
2007; Hochberg et al. 2007).
Network Composition. Diversity and density are two constructs that have been used in 
prior studies focusing on the social networks (Phelps, 2010). Network diversity2 implies 
the extent to which a network can expose the focal actor to different and various 
resources, knowledge, and information (Houston et al., 2004). In a general perspective, 
diversity can be an attribute of any system with different elements (Stirling, 2007). 
According to this perspective, Phelps (2010: 894) defines diversity as follows:
1 Prior studies have used the terms network position, network centrality, and social status interchangeably.
2 Network efficiency has also been equivalently used in some studies (e.g. Baum et al. 2000) instead o f  the 
term diversity.
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“Diversity refers to the extent to which a system consists o f uniquely different 
elements, the frequency distribution of these elements, and the degree of 
difference among the elements.”
According to this general definition, diversity in the networks refers to the extent 
to which the actors in a network have unique “skills, knowledge, and capabilities” 
(Houston et al., 2004: 253). Diversity in a network lowers the level of redundancy. 
Redundancy indicates the fact that actors in a network possess similar resources (tangible 
and intangible such as information) and capabilities (Burt, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1994). 
Redundant configuration of a network decreases the likelihood o f access to the novel 
information and knowledge which is necessary for creativity and innovation (Uzzi, 1996,
1997). Redundancy in a firm’s network occures if managers expand their network 
without considering the diversity o f new actors’ resources, capabilities, and skills (Baum, 
Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). The extent to which new actors are distinct from the 
existing ones can increase the likelihood of providing new information, knowledge, and 
other resources to the network (Lee, 2007). Relying on this characteristic o f diverse 
networks, prior studies have found that affiliation to a diverse network can enhance the 
firm’s performance and its likelihood of survival (Baum et al, 2000; Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996).
Network density is the extent to which there is interconnectedness among 
different actors in a network (Coleman 1988, Houston et al., 2004). The idea o f density is 
related to the seminal piece by Granovetter (1973) in which he distinguished between 
weak and strong ties among the actors in a network. Strong ties refer to a direct and 
robust relationship between two actors and weak ties refer to an indirect relationship in 
which there is no serious exchange between the actors (Granovetter 1973). Dense
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networks are those networks consisting o f more strong and direct ties which are highly 
interconnected while networks with lower level of density1 include weak and absent 
relationships among the actors (Sparrowe et al., 2001). One of the main differences 
between dense and sparse networks is the quality and diversity o f the exchanged 
resources among the actors. In dense networks, similar resource pool (e.g. knowledge and 
information) among all firms is likely (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999), because strong ties are 
usually created among actors which are similar to each other (Granovetter, 1973). Hence, 
higher level o f density in a network decreases the likelihood o f access to diverse and 
novel resources. However, since it facilitates the circulation o f the same knowledge and 
information among different actors, the quality o f the information flowing in the network 
is higher and it is more reliable (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003).
Further, repeated interactions among the same actors in a dense network lead to 
creation o f a common language among them and enhance their understanding o f “each 
other’s motives, processes, and routines” (Lee, 2007: 20). Trust is another characteristic 
of the dense networks. From the social capital perspective, stronger relationship between 
the actors (firms or individuals) and repeated interactions among them can strengthen the 
social capital in the network (bonding social capital) and consequently, enhanced social 
capital creates and sustains trust among the actors (Coviello, 2006). Density can also 
promote co-operation in a network through facilitating the exchange of norms throughout 
the network (Houston, Walker, Hutt, & Reingen, 2001). One of the unique advantages of 
the dense networks is the lower level of opportunistic behaviors by the actors. Density 
facilitates diffusion o f the information in the network and establishes trust among the 
actors. Thus, firms avoid behaviors that can negatively affect their reputation in the
1 They are also called “sparse networks” (Rowley, 1997).
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network because they know that any positive or negative signals will spread in the 
network fast (Houston et al, 2001). In this case, network density functions as a deterrent 
system which prevents opportunistic behaviors by the actors and therefore reduces the 
cost o f monitoring, control and coordination in an alliance (Rowley, Behrens, & 
Krackhardt, 2000; Phelps, 2010).
2.4 SYNDICATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING 
When investing abroad, VC firms have different potential syndication partners in 
terms o f their nationality. They can syndicate with the local firms, with the other firms 
from their home country operating in the host market, and with the firms from other 
countries operating in the host country. Drawing on the insights from the social network 
theory, prior findings in the international alliance literature, and existing theoretical 
perspectives on the VC firms’ syndication, in the following sections, syndication 
likelihood with each o f these three groups o f partners will be discussed.
Syndication with local VC firms
To discuss the syndication likelihood between the focal VC firms and each set of 
the potential partners, I analyze the interplay o f motivation and attractiveness o f each 
party. I introduce the network characteristics’ impact on the VC firms’ attractiveness and 
motivation to syndicate with others. As Table 2 shows, although there are several studies 
applying social network theory in the VC literature, the role o f networks as the 
antecedent to syndication decision is missing in the literature. When entering a foreign 
market, VC firms suffer from the LOF (Zaheer, 1995). The cultural distance between the 
focal VC firm and the entrepreneurs in the emerging markets aggravates the information 
asymmetry problem which commonly exists between these two parties in the VC
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investments (Wright et al., 2005). Further, the weak institutional environment and 
investor protection in the emerging markets reduce the reliability o f information provided 
by the entrepreneur (Manigart et al., 1997; Manigart et al., 2000), which in turn increases 
the risk of the VC firm’s investment and evokes more due diligence in the deal selection 
stage (Lockett, Wright, Sapienza, & Pruthi, 2002). As discussed earlier, one of the 
primary reasons why the VC firms syndicate their investment is improving the deal 
selection process. Adding more counterparts allows the VC firms to tap into their 
expertise in evaluating the deals (Lemer, 1994). High information asymmetry and 
cultural distance makes the selection process more critical for the foreign VC firms in the 
emerging markets.
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
These factors increase the context-related motivation of the focal VC firms to 
syndicate with the local counterparts. The focal firm’s willingness is not sufficient to 
form the syndication. According to the duality rationale, the focal firm should also be 
attractive to the other party. The VC firms from developed countries are more 
experienced and capable in handling the investments. In contrast, the VC industry is 
relatively young in emerging economies and the VC firms in these countries have less 
experience compared to the developed country firms (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006). The 
difference in the experience has a more pronounced impact on the post investment 
activities where the focal VC firms seek to add value to the venture (Zider, 1998). In 
addition, the success o f the VC firms is determined by their ability to exit the venture 
through IPO or M&A (Hochberg et al., 2007). A successful exit requires an efficient 
financial market and a stable institutional environment that minimizes the corruption and
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safeguards the investments (Wright & Robbie, 1998). The lack o f efficient financial 
markets, unpredictability, volatility, and the fact that many of the markets for goods and 
services are in a nascent stage add to the investment risk o f the both local and foreign VC 
firms in emerging markets.
In this situation, having a partner with more experience in the VC industry which 
also provides access to the developed market resources increases the likelihood of 
success. Such a partner not only can directly contribute to the venture’s growth and 
performance but is also able to add to the exit options in other markets rather than relying 
only on the local market. These capabilities make the focal VC firms attractive partners 
for the local firms from the business-related aspects. The combination o f context-related 
motivation of the focal VC firms to partner with the local firms and the business-related 
motivation o f the local firms to partner with the focal VC firms increases the likelihood 
o f the syndication between them.
However, this equation holds till the focal VC firm takes root in the local market. 
In the international alliances where the local partner’s main contribution is providing 
local market’s information and connection, foreign partner will lose interest in the 
alliance as soon as they can establish their own connections and accumulate the 
experience of operating in the local market (Child, Faulkner, & Tallman, 2005). The host 
country social status can provide the focal firm with these advantages, as it facilitates 
access to the information and other resources in the network. Access to the deal 
information is one o f the motivations of the focal VC firms o f syndication with the local 
peers (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Social status in the host country can cover this need for 
the focal VC firms. Another motivation behind the syndication with the local
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counterparts is improving the deal selection. The selection stage is especially problematic 
in the emerging markets where the information asymmetry and cultural and institutional 
distances are high between the focal firms and the local entrepreneurs. However, the 
firms with high social status can easily ask for other actors’ advice (Flynn, 2003), which 
can facilitate the deal selection process. Thus, the social status can decrease the focal VC 
firm’s motivation to syndicate. Further, due to the advantages o f an investor with a high 
status, entrepreneurs are willing to grasp the opportunity o f working with them even at a 
discount (Hsu, 2004). This can mitigate the agency problems between the focal VC firm 
and the entrepreneur since the entrepreneur may be more willing to provide transparency 
to attract the VC firm. Hence, the need for a local partner to take care o f this problem is 
reduced.
In addition to the advantages o f social status, disadvantages and problems of 
inter-firm collaborations also may encourage the focal firm to avoid the syndication. The 
agency problems and the information asymmetry also exist between the VC firms. It 
becomes even more severe in the cases o f high cultural and institutional distances 
between the partners (which would be the case in the syndication between developed and 
emerging market VC firms) (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). Further, when VC firms 
syndicate, they have to give up a potential profit and share that with other partners 
(Brander et al., 2002). If they can handle the investment alone, sharing the profit with 
others would seem meaningless. Figure 1 provides an organizing framework for such 
dynamics.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
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In sum, I expect up to a certain point of social status, the mutual motivation and
attractiveness o f the focal and local VC firms increase the syndication likelihood between
them. However, after the focal VC firm reaches a high level o f social status, it loses the
context-related motivation of syndication with local firms. Also, the local firms cannot
bring business-related contribution to the deal either due to their lack of experience
compared to the focal firms or due to the underdevelopment o f many industries in the
emerging markets. Thus, the alliance likelihood between them starts to decrease after this
point. According to this dynamic, I propose that:
Proposition 1: There is a curvilinear (inverted U) relationship between focal VC 
f ir m ’s social status in the host country and likelihood o f  its syndication with local 
firms. With increasing social status, the likelihood o f  syndication will first 
increase and then decrease.
For the focal VC firm from a developed country, the social status in the home 
country indicates its access to the advanced resources and technologies available at home. 
In addition to that, reaching to the top o f the network in a market characterized by fierce 
competition and long history o f the VC activities (such as U.S.) signals the 
trustworthiness and quality o f the focal firm (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). Further, having an 
established position and contacts in the home country network enables the focal VC firm 
to count more on the home country for its emerging market investments’ exit. A well- 
established financial market is required for the venture exit through IPO (Black & Gilson,
1998). These markets are much more efficient in developed countries which increases the 
chance of IPO for the venture (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006). Also, due to the fact that most 
o f the industries are more advanced in developed countries relative to emerging 
economies (Hitt et al., 2000), high social status in the home enhances the chance of the 
focal VC firms to find a home country incumbent firm operating in the venture’s industry
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to buy the venture. Thus, they are also more likely to be able to exit the venture through 
M&A. These factors add to business-related attractiveness of the focal VC firm.
Similar to the entrepreneurs who are willing to give a discount to work with an 
experienced VC firm (Hsu, 2004), the local VC firms are also aware o f the benefits that 
the focal VC firm with high social in a developed country can offer. Partnering with such 
firms not only increases the likelihood o f success in current investment but also can 
connect the local VC firms to the focal firm’s network outside the host country and 
creates more value for them in the long run. Considering that, I expect that the focal firm 
will receive more and more attractive syndication offers. That increases the likelihood of 
the syndication between local and focal firms compared to those developed country VC 
firms that do not have such high social status in home. However, similar to the arguments 
leading to the first proposition, after reaching a high level o f social status in the host 
country, focal VC firm will lose its context-related motivation for partnership.
The social status is obtained through extensive interactions with other firms in 
previous investments (Guler & Guill&i, 2010a). Thus, high social status can also reflect 
the general experience o f the firm in the VC industry and managing different 
investments. Successful past experiences of a firm enhance its absorptive capacity and 
facilitate its operation in the future (Zahra & George, 2002). Foreign firms with higher 
absorptive capacity are more able to capture the ways o f doing business successfully in a 
host country. Thus, focal firms with high level of social status in home will became 
stronger players in the host country after reaching to the top of the host country network 
compared to those that do not have that position in the home country. As a result, their 
motivation to syndicate after reaching to the high social status in the host country will
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drop more substantially. Following proposition reflects the impact o f the home country
social status on the syndication likelihood between the focal and local VC firms:
Proposition 2: Home country social status o f  the focal VC firm  will amplify the 
curvilinear relationship between its host country social status and the likelihood 
o f  its syndication with the local firms. That is, the impact o f  the home country 
social status would steepen both sides o f  the curve.
Characteristics o f the local firms can also change the dynamic of the syndication 
between them. For example, considering its implications, the local firm’s social status 
can be one o f the influential characteristics that determine the likelihood o f syndication. 
High status firms in the host country have richer resource pool that can utilize in their 
current investment, which in turn contributes to the performance of the syndicated deals 
with other firms (Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007). They can also attract other big players to 
the syndication when needed and thereby improve the investment performance especially 
in investments with higher risk and uncertainty (Hochberg et al., 2007; Piskorski, 2004). 
In addition, social status substantially increases the local firm’s access to the deal flow. 
Access to the future promising deals and the partner’s future reciprocity are among the 
reasons why the VC firms syndicate their investment (Lockett & Wright, 2001). From 
these perspectives, a local firm with high social status could be a desirable partner for the 
focal firms to syndicate with.
In sum, high social status increases a local firm’s attractiveness from the focal VC 
firms’ perspective. With high social status, the local partner does not just make them 
familiar with the host market (context-related attractiveness); it can also contribute to the 
actual business in the current investment (business-related attractiveness). Also, it can 
bring promising investment opportunities to the focal firms in the future. Hence, by 
increasing the local firm’s attractiveness, social status o f the local firm intensifies the
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syndication likelihood between the local and focal firms. This holds true even after the
focal firm reaches to a higher position in its host country network. What diminishes the
focal firm’s motivation is the fact that local firms may be only attractive from the
context-related matters and after mastering the host country, the focal VC firms lose the
context-related motivation for syndication. However, a local partner with high social
status has also business-related attractiveness which adds to its values. Consequently, the
impact of the local firm’s social status would be as follow:
Proposition 3: Social status o f  the local firms will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between the focal VC f ir m ’s social status in the host country and 
likelihood o f  its syndication with the local firm s in such way that the positive 
relationship before inflection point becomes stronger and the negative 
relationship after inflection point becomes weaker.
Diversity o f the local firms’ network can also influence the syndication likelihood 
between them and the focal firms. Mariotti and Piscitell (1995) explained how 
investments in various locations within the borders o f a single host country differ for the 
foreign investors. Their main argument is that investment in various geographical 
locations o f a country requires gathering information and forecasts about the specific 
conditions of each location. In spatial economic systems, the quality information may not 
be equally available in various locations1 (Friedmann, 1972). Compared to local firms, 
foreign investors have lower access to the information. Further, monitoring and 
controlling the investments in different locations are very costly especially in the case o f 
greater spatial and cultural distances. However, there might be promising investment 
opportunities in different areas that lack o f access to the information prevents the focal 
VC firms from becoming aware o f them. In this case, having a local partner with a
1 This is the idea o f  existing core and periphery areas in a country where core areas have accumulated 
advantages over time and thus, the high quality economic information is more available.
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geographically diverse network can mitigate this disadvantage for the focal firms. Such 
partner is capable o f connecting the focal VC firms to different regions in the host 
country and expanding their deal pool which in turn increases the likelihood o f selecting 
more promising deals to invest in. Also, having local partners in different locations 
reduces the monitoring and controlling costs after the investment.
Another advantage o f having a partner with diverse network is due to the fact that 
many of the VC firms are specialized in investing in particular industries (Barry, 1994; 
Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993). By focusing on some specific industries, VC firms are able 
to better understand the ventures’ operation in those industries and concentrate more on 
developing required contacts (with customers, suppliers, and experts) in those specific 
industries (Bygrave, 1987). Hence, access to other VC firms that can complement their 
domain o f specialty expands their investment options. Otherwise, focusing in some 
narrow investments may not bring them many investment opportunities since most o f the 
industries are not mature in the emerging markets and the number o f prospect ventures 
may not be noticeable in each individual industry (DeCastro & Uhlenbruck, 1997). 
Partner’s network is one o f the ways to gain that access. A local firm that has a diverse 
network consisting o f other VC firms with different investment expertise in various 
industries is quite attractive to the focal VC firms from this perspective.
Overall, network diversity makes the local firm more than a simple provider o f 
local market information or an alleviator o f agency problem between the focal VC firm 
and the entrepreneurs (context-related attractiveness). Affiliated with such networks, a 
local firm can contribute to the focal VC firm’s business in current and future 
investments and provide the focal firm with more investment opportunity. By and large,
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network diversity adds to the local firm’s attractiveness and functions similar to the local
firm’s social status whose positive impact on syndication likelihood sustains even in high
levels o f focal firm’s host country social status. Accordingly, it is expected that:
Proposition 4: Network diversity o f  the local firms will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between the focal VC firm 's social status in the host country and the 
likelihood o f  its syndication with the local firm s in such way that the positive 
relationship before inflection point becomes stronger and the negative 
relationship after inflection point becomes weaker.
One o f the problems that firms face when they form alliances is the information 
asymmetry between alliance partners (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Cultural and institutional 
distances in international alliances make this problem worse between the local and 
foreign firms (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). Similarly, the VC firms face an agency 
problem not only with the entrepreneur (venture) but also with their syndication partners 
(Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). The problem is more severe in emerging markets because 
business practices and norms are far different from those that the focal firms are 
accustomed to (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Hitt et al., 2000). In addition, weak institutions 
in emerging markets do not provide sufficient protection for the foreign investors 
(Ruhnka & Young, 1991). This gives rise to the problem of opportunistic behaviors by 
local partners that have information advantage over the focal firms. Further, collusion 
between the local VC firm and entrepreneurs is more likely when the focal firm partners 
with the local VC firms (Dessi, 2005).
As mentioned, density is the characteristic o f the networks in which actors are 
highly interconnected (Coleman 1988, Houston et al., 2004). Ties among actors in dense 
networks are usually strong and actors have repeated interactions with each other (Lee, 
2007). These frequent interactions strengthen the trust between actors (Coviello, 2006). 
Density also facilitates the circulation o f information in the network (Phelps, 2010).
35
Thereby, it creates a non-contractual sanction against opportunistic behaviors. Actors
know if they commit unethical actions in their relationships with another actor, others
will soon find out and that may impede the future co-operations with the focal actor.
According to these implications of the dense networks and considering the
potential lack of trust between the focal VC firms and local counterparts, syndicating
with a partner that is affiliated with a dense network can mitigate the risk o f the agency
problems between them. Specially, when the focal firm has not developed its network in
the host country and has high context-related motivations to syndicate with local firms. In
that case, having a dense network adds to the local firm’s attractiveness. Consequently,
syndication between the local and focal firms becomes more likely. However, network
density o f the local partner is attractive up to the point that the focal VC firm does not
have an established status in its host country network. After that point, as discussed, focal
firms would lose its context-related motivations. Since the needs emerging from context-
related factors are not strong any more the subsequent outcome which was syndication
with local firms is less likely either. This takes us to the next proposition:
Proposition 5: When focal VC firm  have low social status in host country, density 
o f  the local firm s ’ network will increase the likelihood o f  syndication between 
focal and local firm.
Syndication with VC firms from home/another developed country
When firms invest abroad especially in emerging countries, differences in 
business practices and institutional environments give rise to their perceived risk. In such 
situations, alliance is a common strategy to share the risk o f investment with others (Lane 
& Beamish, 1990; Osborn & Hagedoom, 1997; Parkhe, 1991). This assumption also 
holds for the VC firms (Wright et al., 2005). Among different choices that the focal VC 
firms have to syndicate and share the risk stemming from unfamiliarity with the local
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market, there are other VC firms from home country or other developed markets 
operating in the host country.
In spite of all the benefits of partnering with the local firms including their 
providing the local market information and connections, such relationship also has some 
disadvantages and risks. Lack o f familiarity and cultural distance between developed and 
emerging country firms can create distrust between them and jeopardize their co­
operation (Baum, Cowan, & Jonard, 2010; Pothukuchi et al., 2002). In addition, there are 
critical differences between the VC firms from developed and emerging countries in the 
way that they manage their investments (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Pruthi, Wright, & 
Lockett, 2003). It includes the deal selection process and the sources that they use to 
evaluate the venture, monitoring venture’s activities, and preferred exit methods. Further, 
the information asymmetry among the VC partners is more pronounced in cases that 
firms from two different backgrounds (i.e. developed and emerging markets) syndicate 
(Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). It makes the collaboration between the VC partners more 
difficult.
These disadvantages of partnering with the local firms despite their benefits, may 
lead the focal VC firms to share the general risk o f investing abroad with other 
counterparts from home/another developed country with whom they have more in 
common. The similarity o f investment philosophy and likelihood o f more contacts 
between these firms can create trust between them (Gulati, 1995), and consequently 
increases the likelihood of syndication between them. For instance, Sapienza, Manigart, 
and Vermeir (1996) found that VC firms from the U.S. and U.K. to a great extend put 
similar efforts in value-adding activities. These similarities between the VC firms in
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terms of managing the investment reduce the likely tensions between the partners and add 
to the likelihood o f syndication success.
The underlying motivation for the focal firm to syndicate with other VC firms 
from home/another developed country is primarily the risk that managers perceive due to 
the lack o f familiarity, contact, and experiences in the local market. Thus, as long as they 
have those motivations one can assume they form such syndications. However, as 
discussed earlier, social status with the advantages and benefits that bears, can 
significantly reduce the syndication motivations arising from the lack o f familiarity and 
required connections in the local market. The impact o f the social status on different 
types o f motivation and attractiveness o f the focal firm in relation to the VC firms from 
home/another developed country has been summarized in Figure 2.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, as long as the focal firm does not have an established network in the host
country, managers are willing to syndicate with other VC firms from home/another
developed country to mitigate and share the risk o f investment in a new market. Then,
reaching a high social status in the host country network and its benefits reduce their
perceived risk o f investment and consequently decrease their motivation for such
syndications. Following proposition describes this relationship:
Proposition 6: There is a curvilinear relationship between focal VC f ir m ’s social 
status in the host country and likelihood o f  its syndication with other firm s from  
home/another developed country operating in the host market. With increasing 
level o f  social status, the likelihood o f  syndication will first increase and then 
decrease.
In the case o f home country potential partners, since both parties in this 
relationship are form the same country, their home country network is very likely to 
impact their relationship in the host market. High social status in the home country (i.e. a
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developed country) implies the quality and reliability o f the focal firm in the eyes of the 
other home country VC firms (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). Affiliation with a high status 
firm will enhance the status o f the potential partner in the home country network as well 
(Podolny, 2001). In addition, it increases the likelihood of investment success through the 
mechanisms that discussed in the previous section. However, it will be attractive to those 
home country VC firms whose social status is lower than that o f the focal firm. By 
syndicating and affiliation with the high social status focal firm, not only they can enjoy 
its benefits in the host country but also they can use it as a trustworthiness signal in the 
home country for their future investments in the home market. Accordingly, home 
country social status o f the focal firm adds to its attractiveness in relation to other VC 
firms from the home country operating in the host market.
As mentioned earlier, I consider the motivation and attractiveness o f both parties 
in my analysis o f the syndication likelihood between them. I already discussed the 
general motivation o f the focal firm to syndicate with the home country VC firms as 
mitigating the risk o f the investment. Home country counterparts are attractive choices 
because they share similar investment philosophy and therefore are more trustable. In 
such cases, home country social status o f the focal firm increases the likelihood of 
syndication through adding to the attractiveness o f the focal firm from other home 
country VC firms’ perspective. In the cases o f potential partners that are from another 
developed country, home country social status o f the focal firm signals its capabilities 
and trustworthiness. Specially, because it has been achieved in a developed market where 
the VC industry is more mature and competition is more intense. It also brings the 
possibility of future investments in the focal firm’s country. Thus, in general, a focal firm
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with higher social status in the home network is more attractive than those that do not 
have this advantage.
However, similar to the argument made in the previous section, focal firms with 
high social status in the home country have higher absorptive capacity and more support 
from their home country network as a resource-endowed developed market compared to 
those with lower status because of their extensive experiences (Zahra & George, 2002). 
Thus, after reaching a high centrality in the host country network, their motivation is 
expected to decline more severely than that of the VC firms with lower home country 
social status and consequently the syndication likelihood will decrease more. Following 
proposition describes this moderation effect o f the focal firms’ home country social 
status:
Proposition 7a: I f  home country social status o f  the focal VC firm  is higher than 
that o f  the potential partner from  home country, it will amplify the curvilinear 
relationship between its social status in the host country and likelihood o f  their 
syndication in such way that the relationship on both sides o f  the curve becomes 
stronger.
Proposition 7b: Home country social status o f  the foca l VC firm  will amplify the 
curvilinear relationship between its social status in the host country and 
likelihood o f  its syndication with firm s from  another developed country in such 
way that the relationship on both sides o f  the curve becomes stronger.
Finally, the host country status of the potential partner can also add to its 
attractiveness. A VC firm from home/another developed country with a high social status 
in the host market can deliver similar values as the local counterparts do. In addition, 
syndication with such VC firms does not have the mentioned potential problems that 
partnership with the local firms may impose to the focal firm. Hence, higher social status 
o f a VC firm from home/another developed country makes it an attractive syndication 
choice for the focal firm. Its attractiveness will not diminish even after the focal firm
40
masters the host market because o f the values that a high status partner can creates
beyond the context-related factors- mentioned in the previous section.
However, the focal firm also needs to be attractive to the potential partner with a
high social status in the host market so that one can expect the matched motivation and
attractiveness between the two firms lead them to syndicate. For the potential partners
from the home country, the focal firm’s high social status in the home country network
can create that attractiveness. Although both firms are operating in a foreign market, but
usually the international VC firms (from developed countries) handle more investments
in their home market compared to those in other countries (Wright et al., 2005). Thus,
having a partner that is well networked in the home country, not only the potential home
country partner can enjoy its affiliation with the focal firm in the home country deals but
also it assures the partner that the focal firm will use its home country network if needed
in their joint investment in the emerging market.
If the potential partner is from another developed country and has a high status in
the host market, then home country social status of the focal VC firm can better attract
the potential partners that operate in the focal firm’s home country. In that case, although
the potential partner may not considerably benefit from the syndication with the focal
firm in the host country since it already has an established status in that market, it can
exploit their relationship in the focal firm’s home country and count on the future
reciprocation o f the focal firm in its home country deals. Taken together, next two
propositions explain this dynamic:
Proposition 8a: I f  the focal VC firm  has higher home country social status than 
the partner from  the home country, the host country social status o f  the partner 
will moderate the curvilinear relationship between the focal VC f ir m ’s social 
status in the host country and the likelihood o f  their syndication in such way that
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the positive relationship before inflection point becomes stronger and the negative 
relationship after inflection point becomes weaker.
Proposition 8b: I f  (a) the focal VC firm  has a high home country social status and 
(b) the developed country potential partner operates in the focal f ir m ’s home 
country, then the host country social status o f  the partner will moderate the 
curvilinear relationship between the focal VC f ir m ’s social status in the host 
country and likelihood o f  their syndication in such way that the positive 
relationship before inflection point becomes stronger and the negative 
relationship after inflection point becomes weaker.
Syndication with VC firms from other countries
Another potential syndication partner for the focal developed country firms is 
firms from countries similar to the host market investing in the host country. The first 
question here would be what makes the firms from such countries an attractive 
syndication partner for the focal VC firms. Spatial and cultural proximity to the host 
country can make the other foreign VC firms attractive to the focal firms. Geographical 
distance increases the cost o f investment for the VC firms (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). 
Travel costs especially after investment to monitor the venture is an example o f the costs 
increased by the geographical distance. Having a partner close to the venture can reduce 
these costs for the focal firm. Cultural proximity includes aspects such as similarity in 
language, legal and institutional systems and environment (Tykvova & Schertler, 2011).
As discussed, the major problem that the focal VC firms face when they invest in 
emerging markets is LOF which includes unfamiliarity with the local market, differences 
between business practices in the home and host countries due to different institutional 
environments, and difficulties in communication with the entrepreneurs because of the 
cultural distance. Similar to the local VC firms, a partner with more familiarity and 
cultural proximity to the host country can help the focal VC firms to overcome these 
challenges. On the other side, like the local firms, these foreign VC firms can also enjoy
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the benefits o f having a developed country VC partner to learn from, utilize their
experience and resources to succeed in their joint investment, and become connected to
their networks outside the host country. All of these opportunities make the focal firm
attractive to the VC firms from countries similar to the host market.
However, according to the dual rationale that I have been following in previous
sections, once the focal VC firms build their own network and make sure that they can
successfully operate in the host country, they may establish local facilities to handle their
investments (Guler & Guillen, 2010b; Klonowski, 2006). Meanwhile, they also learn how
to operate in the host country and adapt to the new environment. As a result, I expect that
their motivation will drop as soon as they get to a central position in the host country
network. Although, they might be attractive to the other side, they do not have strong
motivation for syndication and due to the priority o f the motivation over the
attractiveness, the likelihood of syndication between them is expected to have following
relationship with host country social status of the focal firm:
Proposition 9: There is a curvilinear relationship between the focal VC f ir m ’s 
social status in the host country and the likelihood o f  its syndication with the firms 
from  other countries close to the host market (spatially or culturally), operating 
in the host market. With increasing level o f  social status, the likelihood o f  
syndication will first increase and then decrease.
The focal VC firms’ relationship with firms from countries similar to the host 
market to a great extent resembles their relationship with the local firms because they are 
presumed to deliver similar values to the focal firm. Also, they have evolved in similar 
environments (countries). Thus, mentioned problems of trust, differences in investment 
philosophy, and information asymmetry -that existed with local firms- are also in place 
with these firms. Thus, similarly, while home country social status o f the focal firms 
makes them attractive at first and increases the syndication likelihood between them and
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firms from similar countries to the host market, it again boosts the decrease in their
willingness to syndication. Similar to the case o f the local firms, I expect that:
Proposition 10: Home country social status o f  the focal VC firm  will amplify the 
curvilinear relationship between its host country social status and the likelihood 
o f  its syndication with firm s from  other countries close to the host market 
(spatially or culturally) in such way that the relationship in both sides o f  the curve 
before and after the inflection point become stronger (curve becomes steeper).
Similar to the argument made for the cases o f syndication with the local firms,
social status and network diversity o f these potential partners in the host country make
them more attractive to the focal VC firm even after the focal firm establishes its own
network. The general reason that I mentioned for such expectation was the business-
related values that such partners with such network features can deliver in addition to
their context-related attractiveness. Thus, I expect the same impacts from host country
social status and network diversity o f the VC firms from similar countries to host market
on their syndication likelihood with the focal VC firms as I did for the local firms. Hence,
following relationships are expected:
Proposition 11: Host country social status o f  the VC firm s from  other countries 
close to the host market (spatially or culturally) will moderate the curvilinear 
relationship between the focal VC firm 's social status in the host country and  
likelihood o f  their syndication in such way that the positive relationship before 
inflection point becomes stronger and the negative relationship after inflection 
point becomes weaker.
Proposition 12: Network diversity o f  the VC firm s from  other countries close to 
the host market (spatially or culturally) will moderate the curvilinear relationship 
between the focal VC f ir m ’s social status in the host country and likelihood o f  
their syndication in such way that the positive relationship before inflection point 
becomes stronger and the negative relationship after inflection point becomes 
weaker.
I discussed earlier that network density o f the partner can influence the focal 
firm’s syndication decision up to the point that they perceive they master the local market 
and have connections required for success in the host country (relying on their social
status). The reason is that similar to my argument for the local counterparts, there may be
distrust between the focal VC firm and firms from countries similar to the host country
due to the information asymmetry that exists between local and non-local investors
(Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). Plus, the lack of support for foreign investors from the weak
institutional environment o f the host country aggravates this problem (Ahlstrom &
Bruton, 2006). Density o f the partner’s network functions as a safeguard against its
opportunistic behaviors (Phelps, 2010). Thus, it can increase the level o f trust between
the focal VC firm and the partner and consequently makes the partner more attractive.
However, it does not add to the business-related attractiveness o f the partner and a
partner even with a dense network remains to be attractive mostly from the context-
related aspect. In this case, once the focal VC firm can rely on itself to gain the local
market information and gets familiar with the business practices there, its motivation for
syndication with such partner will fall. Accordingly, density influences the syndication
likelihood before that point. Overall, I expect that:
Proposition 13: At lower level o f  the focal VC f ir m ’s host country social status, 
network density o f  the firm s from  other countries close to the host market 
(spatially or culturally) will increase the likelihood o f  the syndication between 
them and the focal VC firm.
Presence o f the focal VC firm in a potential partner’s country may also impact the 
managers’ decision regarding syndication with that firm. One of the general motivations 
of the VC firms for syndication is access to the future deal flow and the partner’s future 
reciprocity (Lockett & Wright, 2001). VC firms invite others to their deal so that they do 
the same in the future. The fact that the focal VC firm has ongoing investments in a 
foreign VC firm’s country makes that firm more attractive. The focal firm can benefit 
from establishing an inter-firm relationship (i.e., syndication) with such partner even in
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the partner’s home country. Relationships established in a network can be exploited even 
outside that network (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). Therefore, if  the focal firm establishes a 
link with such partner, it can expect to benefit from that relationship even in the partner’s 
home country in form of either assistance in its ongoing investments or invitation to 
future deals.
Altogether, such advantage adds to the partner’s attractiveness and enhances the
image of the partner in the focal firm’s view from a syndication partner just to share the
primary risk o f the investment in the local market to a partner that can bring the focal
firm other business-related advantages. In such cases, the attractiveness o f the partner
does not fade with focal firm’s enhancing social status. It results in such moderation
impact that the last proposition describes:
Proposition 14: The focal f ir m ’s presence in the home country o f  VC firm s from  
other countries close to the host market (spatially or culturally) will moderate the 
curvilinear relationship between its social status in the host country and their 
syndication likelihood in such way that the positive relationship before inflection 
point becomes stronger and the negative relationship after inflection point 
becomes weaker.
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This research extends previous studies on the VC firms’ syndication including 
both parties’ characteristics and desires in examining the syndication likelihood. I define 
two types o f factors that influence the willingness-attractiveness for syndication 
formation: context-related and business-related factors. I discuss how interplay o f these 
factors determines the likelihood of syndication between VC firms. More specifically, I 
address the impact o f the network structure (social status) and network composition 
(density and diversity) on these factors and ultimately on the syndication likelihood. In 
addition to this theoretical contribution, this paper is a response to the call for more
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research on the international VC firms (Guler & Guillen, 2010a, 2010b; Lu & Hwang, 
2010; Wright et al., 2005). I specifically focus on the emerging market investments of 
developed country VC firms because o f growing trend o f such investments (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2006).
I discuss how networks that have been identified to impact the performance 
(Hochberg et al., 2007), can also influence the syndication decision as an antecedent 
mechanism. Social status in the host country provides the information and connections 
that a VC firm needs to operate in the market, and reduces its motivation for syndication 
with others. I also discuss how social status in the home brings the developed country VC 
firms more access to the advanced resources available in such markets and indicates the 
quality o f the firm. Consequently, the VC firms with such characteristics are more 
attractive to other counterparts. However, after reaching to such position in their network 
that enables them to do the business independently from the others, they lose syndication 
motivation more than those without such status in the home country. Moreover, the social 
status o f a potential partner can also alter the decision o f the focal firm towards 
syndication by adding to the partner’s business-related attractiveness.
I also describe the advantages that partner’s network can create and thereby 
increases to the partner’s attractiveness. Density impedes opportunistic behaviors in the 
network. Hence, it makes the potential partner more attractive to the focal developed 
country VC firm before it establishes its network when it suffers from the lack o f trust 
and familiarity with the local VC firms. On the other hand, a diverse network enables a 
potential partner to provide the focal VC firm with more than context-related benefits and
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therefore adds to the partner’s business-related attractiveness such that it will not 
diminish even after the focal firm’s reaching a high status in the host country.
Following the same rationale, 1 examine the syndication between focal developed 
country VC firms and all possible potential partners by grouping them based on their 
similarities in terms of the values that they can deliver to the focal VC firm. From this 
perspective and to my knowledge, the conceptual framework that this study offers is 
among the most comprehensive ones available in the syndication literature. Although, 
there are several studies examining the syndication between VC firms, they have mostly 
examined the syndication behaviors o f domestic firms or domestic and foreign VC firms 
(e.g. Brander et al., 2002; Bygrave, 1987; Kogut, Urso, & Walker, 2007; Lemer, 1994;
Lu & Hwang, 2010).
Finally, while this study focuses on the VC firms, the conceptual framework and 
propositions developed in this paper can be used in the international alliance literature as 
well. Investing in emerging markets has been a common trend in many industries 
(Barbopoulos, Marshall, Maclnnes, & McColgan, 2013; Meyer & Nguyen, 2005) and 
alliances are one of the most common strategies for the foreign firms to overcome the 
difficulties o f investing in such markets (Lane & Beamish, 1990; Osborn & Hagedoom, 
1997; Parkhe, 1991). This study offers a new insight (network perspective) to analyze the 
international alliances and expands the level o f analysis from the firms to their networks.
Similar to any other conceptual studies, one o f the first opportunities for future 
research is to examine the propositions developed in this study, using empirical design 
and data from the VC firms activities. Further, this study opens a new avenue to analysis 
o f inter-organizational relationships by expanding the level o f analysis from dyadic
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relationships to the networks o f the individual firms. The fact that in addition to the firms, 
their network can also impact their collaboration decision can be utilized not only in the 
VC literature but also in the alliance literature in general. Thus, fixture studies can adopt 
the logic introduced in this paper and apply it to the context o f alliances in different 
industries. Whereas, I focus on the international VC firms in this article, examining the 
impact o f the networks’ structure and composition on domestic VC firms’ syndication 
behavior in a single country or among the VC firms from different regions o f a country 
can be plausible avenue for future research.
Networks -especially in industries with more interaction among the firms- can 
influence different functions o f the firms (Gulati, 1998). In this study, I explored the 
impact o f the VC firms’ network on their syndication behavior. Future studies, can 
examine the effects o f the similar network constructs on other major decisions that the 
VC firms make. For instance, studying following questions can enhance our 
understanding about how VC firms are influenced by their network: Do VC firms in more 
diverse networks invest in more variety of the ventures? How does a VC firm’s network 
evolve? Considering the importance o f the social status, what are the antecedents o f the 
social status and what makes VC firms especially in international markets central?
Prior studies have claimed that too much diversity in a network may impede the 
firms from integrating the available knowledge into their internal reservoir and even 
sometimes may challenge the collaboration between firms because they may want to 
protect their unique resources (Swaminathan & Moorman, 2009). Also, a great extent o f 
density may make the network a close circle without required interactions with outer 
world (Phelps, 2010). Considering that and the trade-off between the dense and diverse
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networks -form er strengthens the trust and collaboration and latter brings more 
opportunities- is there a point that VC firms can optimize their benefits from these 
different compositions?
Achieving and then maintaining a high social status in the network can also be 
costly. Social status is mainly obtained from previous partnerships with other actors in 
the network (Guler & Guillen, 2010a). In spite of all the benefits that inter-organizational 
collaborations provide a firm, working with other partners can always become difficult 
and impose different costs to the firm due to the problems such as lack of trust, 
opportunistic behaviors, and difference between different firm’s practices (Hagedoom, 
2002; Nooteboom, 1999). Therefore, there is a trade-off between the costs o f achieving 
and maintaining a high status and the advantages that the status creates for the firm.
Future studies, can also examine this cost-benefit dynamic and explore different 
situations that benefits outweigh costs and vice versa.
This study also suggests that managers should consider more factors in the 
syndication decision making process. In addition to the potential partner per se, its 
network can also be a source o f opportunity for the VC firms. Previous collaborations of 
the VC firms in different markets that constitute their network are to a considerable 
extent available now in different databases. Analyzing the potential partner’s network and 
determining its different features can help managers to improve the partner selection 
process especially when they invest abroad and syndication decision is more difficult and 
critical due to the lack of familiarity with the local firms. However, in some cases, there 
might be a trade-off between the quality o f a potential partner for a specific investment 
and its network features. In other words, while a VC firm may be qualified for
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syndication in a specific venture, its network may not have the advantages that the focal
firm seeks. Future research can assess where the optimal trade-off point lies.
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2.7 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 2.1: Motivations to Form International Alliances
Study Context Motivations
Context-related Business-related
Raveed & US & General knowledge o f  the local Access to resources, technology,
Renforth, 1983 Costa Rica economy, politics, and customers, 
fast market entry, connection to the 
local networks, access to local 
markets, gaining political 
advantages, avoid political 
interventions
and managerial capabilities
Beamish, 1987 US, UK, & 
Canada
A ccess to local market knowledge Management
Yan & Gray, 
1994
US & China Providing local market knowledge 
and facilitating working with 
institutional and governmental 
agencies
Access to technology
Gillespie & US & Geographic market access, A ccess to technology,
Teegen, 1995 M exico geographic market knowledge, 
access to customers, access to 
regulatory permits
product/service knowledge, new  
product and markets, and capital 
assets
Dacin et al., 1997 U K &
Korea
Local market information Complimentary capabilities, 
financial health, unique 
competencies, technological 
capabilities, special skills such 
as managerial skills




Poland, &  
Romania
Access to local market knowledge Complimentary resources, 
access to tangible (e.g. 
financial) and intangible (e.g. 
managerial skills), technological 
capabilities
Kotabe et al., Brazil, Access to foreign markets, and Access to technological
2000 Chili, & 
Mexico
reducing the risk expertise, marketing expertise, 
financial resources
De Matros et al., US & General knowledge o f  the market, Access to resources, technology,
2001 Brazil customers, local networks, access 
to local markets, gaining political 
advantages
and know-how
Dong & Glaister, China & Market penetration, learning how to Maintaining market position,
2006 Foreign
partners




Table 2.2: Application of Social Network Theory in The VC Studies











IV Domestic (US) Value o f  structural holes increases with 






IV Domestic (US) Network position differentiate VC firms 





IV Domestic (US) No significant relationship between 
embeddedness and number o f  successful IPOs




IV Domestic (UK 
& Europe)
Positive relationship between centrality and exit 
rate o f a VC firm’s investments
Dimov et aL 
(2007)
VC firm Status IV Local (US) In high level o f  status, the negative relationship 
between financial expertise and proportion o f  
lower stage investments is stronger
Hochberg et 
al. (2007)
Venture Centrality IV Local (US) Ventures backed with better networked VC 
firms have better performance
Kogut et al. 
(2007)
VC firm Repeated ties IV Local (US) Repeated ties increases the likelihood o f 
syndication


















IV Local (US) Diffusion o f  information through network leads 










VC firm Status IV International
(US)
Home status leads to foreign expansion
Hochberg et 
al. (2010)
VC firm Network density IV Local (US) Density leads to fewer new entrants to the VC 
market




Fewer industry experiences leads to network 
expansion with new partners/more industry 
experience leads to network expansion with 
existing partners




Syndication leads to better network position




DV Local (US) Previous centrality leads to future 
centrality/resource endowment substitutes the 





IV Local (UK) When the agency risk is low, network 








Industry concentration is negatively associated 
with network expansion
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Figure 2.1: Focal VC Firm Motivation and Attractiveness for Syndication with 
Local Firms at Different Levels of Social Status
Business motivation: Low 
Context motivation: High 
Business attractiveness: High 
Context attractiveness: Low
Business motivation: Low  
Context motivation: Low 
Business attractiveness: High 
Context attractiveness: High
Business motivation: Low  




Business motivation: Low  




Low Host country social status o f developed country High
VC firm
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Figure 2.2: Focal VC Firm Motivation and Attractiveness for Syndication with VC 
Firms from Home/another Developed Country at Different Levels of Social Status
Business motivation: Low  
Context motivation: Low  
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Context attractiveness: Low
Business motivation: Low  
Context motivation: Low  
Business attractiveness: High 
Context attractiveness: High
Business motivation: Moderate 




Business motivation: Moderate 








ESSAY II: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STATUS ON INTERNATIONAL 
VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS SYNDICATION AND ITS PERFORMANCE 
IMPLICATIONS: A SET THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
3.1 ABSTRACT
Syndication o f venture capital firms has been prolifically studied in the literature. 
However, there is inconsistency among motivations introduced by prior studies for 
syndication. There are two major tenets in the literature. According to some studies, 
syndication is almost always expected to add value to the investment. As such there is a 
“natural proclivity” towards syndication among venture capital firms. On the other hand, 
other studies discuss the problems associated with syndication and advocate a 
“contingency approach” towards syndication among venture capital firms. According to 
this perspective venture capital firms base their syndication decision on their own and the 
venture’s characteristics and the fact that whether they are able to handle the investment 
alone. To disentangle this issue, I study first round investments of U.S. venture capital 
firms in China to explore the nature o f syndication in international investments. The 
results lend more support to “natural proclivity” argument. Even highly capable venture 
capital firms tend to syndicate their investments. Performance implication of syndication 
and venues for future studies are discussed.
69
3.2 INTRODUCTION
Venture capital (VC) investments are made by professional investors in high- 
potential private companies with the goal to exit successfully from the venture (in the 
form of public offering or merger or acquisition) and earn a profit (Aizenman & Kendall, 
2012; Brander, Amit, and Antweiler, 2002). In addition to providing the capital, VC firms 
add value to ventures through managerial inputs (Hellmann & Puri, 2000,2002). The 
performance o f VC firms in pioneer countries (such as United States) and their 
contribution in supporting innovative private firms, facilitating entrepreneurship, and 
consequently job creation and wealth distribution (Lemer & T&g, 2013), have encouraged 
individuals and governments in other countries to pursue VC investments (Delloitte, 
2006). It has also attracted the attention o f scholars and led to the development o f a 
vibrant stream o f research on VC industry.
Prior studies on VC firms have examined their different micro and macro level 
impacts including economic growth and innovation (Heilman & Puri, 2000; Kortum & 
Lemer, 2000; Lemer, 2009; Lemer & T&g, 2013), and performance o f the investee 
ventures (Clarysse, Bobelyn, & del Palacio Aguirre, 2013; Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & 
MUller, 2013; Vanacker, Collewaert, & Paeleman, 2013). Focusing on the VC firms, 
previous studies have examined issues such as: factors affecting decision making 
mechanisms in VC firms (Petkova, Wadhwa, Yao, & Jain, 2013), structure and 
governance o f the VC firms (Sahlman, 1990), investment monitoring and staging by VC 
firms (Gompers, 1995), and factors influencing raising fund by VC firms (Gompers & 
Lemer, 1998).
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From a strategic management perspective, one of the major decisions that VC 
firms engage in is syndication. Syndication is a strategic decision in which VC firms have 
to make a choice about whether to co-invest with other partners) and whom to partner 
with in a venture (Brander et al., 2002). Due to its central role in VC industry, prior 
research has studied different aspects o f the syndication decision among VC firms 
(JaSskelainen, 2012). Some issues that have been addressed in the literature are 
syndication motivations (Lockett & Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2006), VC firms’ 
different strategic approaches to syndication (De Clercq & Dimov, 2010), structure and 
dynamics o f the syndication (Guler, 2007; Tykvova, 2007; Wright & Lockett, 2003), and 
its performance implications (Brander et al., 2002; Fleming, 2004; Mason & Harrison, 
2002).
There are several studies concentrating on cross country comparison o f VC 
industry; however, to-date, VC firms’ behaviors in international investment settings 
remains an under-researched area in the literature (e.g. Black & Gilson, 1998; Cumming, 
Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2006; Jeng & Wells, 2000; Makela & Maula, 2008;
Manigart, 1994; Megginson, 2004). Despite the vast literature on VC firms’ syndication, 
international activities o f the VC firms in general, and their syndication behavior when 
they invest abroad specifically, are yet to be explored in the literature (Wright, Pruthi, & 
Lockett, 2005).
To address this gap and respond to the call for more research on the VC firms 
when they cross borders (MakelS & Maula, 2008; Wright et al., 2005), this study 
examines the factors that cause VC firms to syndicate their international investments. I 
particularly focus on the VC firms from developed countries investing in emerging
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markets because despite the growth in such investments (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008), 
this phenomenon has remained under-studied. The primary question that this study seeks 
to answer is: under what conditions do VC firm s syndicate when they invest abroad? I 
draw on prior studies to identify the VC firm and venture characteristics that influence 
the decision to syndicate. Including both the characteristics o f  VC firm s (e.g., social 
status) and the characteristics o f  ventures (e.g., risk) allows to address the gap in the 
literature about the relative importance o f these factors (Jaaskelainen, 2012). Specifically, 
I address the following questions in this study: What are the factors leading the VC firms 
to engage in syndication? How does the VC firms’ social status in their home and host 
countries influence their syndication behavior? How does interplay between syndication 
with different partners and social status contribute to the investment performance?
I primarily use social network theory to disentangle different perspectives about 
the nature o f the syndication. I examine whether the social status o f the developed 
country VC firms in both home and host countries impacts their syndication decision in 
emerging markets. In essence, this study examines whether social status serves as a 
substitute for the need to syndicate (contingency perspective) or complements the 
benefits o f the syndication (natural proclivity perspective). Thus, the objective o f this 
paper is to explore whether syndication has an intrinsic value (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & 
Lu, 2011; Lemer, 1994), or it is contingent in nature (Jaaskelainen, 2012). To strengthen 
and develop a more comprehensive line of arguments in support o f my propositions, I 
also utilize insights from institutional and signaling theories.
In sum, the present study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I 
address calls in the literature for more research on international VC firms (Makela &
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Maula, 2008; Wright et al., 2005) from a strategic management point o f view. Second, I 
apply social network theory to explore the antecedents o f the syndication decision. More 
specifically, I introduce VC firms’ social status in both home and host countries as 
influential factors in syndication behavior in emerging markets. Third, I also address the 
debate in the literature about the nature o f the syndication as an absolute or contingent 
strategic decision. Fourth, putting together the venture and VC firm’s characteristics, this 
paper examines the relative importance o f these factors in the syndication decision 
(Jaaskelainen, 20102). Fifth, as the methodological contribution, I use Fuzzy 
Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis (FS/QCA) as my analytic technique. Grounded in 
the set theory, this approach results in configurations o f causal conditions that lead to a 
specific outcome (Ragin, 2000). This is the first paper applying Fuzzy technique in the 
VC syndication literature. Considering the reliability o f this method for combining 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, it is an appropriate technique similar studies in 
this research stream. Finally, I also examine the performance implication o f syndication. 
Considering the stalled and fragmented literature on the contribution o f the syndication in 
performance o f the investment (Jaaskelainen, 20102), this study seeks to contribute to the 
development o f a more comprehensive understanding o f the relationship.
This essay is organized as follows. First, I describe the evidence o f the VC firms 
internationalization. Next, I discuss different motives of the VC firms syndication. This 
discussion is followed by an analysis o f contingencies impacting syndication decision 
and performance leading to the propositions. Next, I discuss the data, methodology and 
results. Finally, I discuss the implications o f the results and directions for the future 
research.
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3.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND PROPOSITION 
DEVELOPMENT
Internationalization of VC Firms
VC industry was originated in the United States (U.S.) in the mid-1940s. While 
VC industry has grown and flourished in the U.S. since then, it did not have much of a 
presence in other parts o f the world untill the mid-1990s (Aizenman & Kendall, 2012). 
The late 1990s saw the international expansion of the U.S. VC industry to U.K. and other 
western countries, and the rise o f domestic VC activities in other countries (Wright et al.,
2005). The technology bubble centered in the U.S., at the time, attracted newly formed 
VC firms from other countries to the U.S. market (Aizenman & Kendall, 2012).
Since then, internationalization o f VC firms -  especially developed country VC 
firms’ investment in less developed and emerging markets -  has been increasing due to 
two factors: i) the saturation o f developed markets, and ii) reforms undertaken by the 
emerging market governments making them more attractive for VC firms from developed 
countries (Gompers & Lemer, 1998). The ability o f the developed country VC firms in 
bridging the ventures in countries with less developed financial markets to developed 
countries with more opportunities for successful exits (e.g. public offering) brings them 
more investment opportunities in such countries (Maula & Makela, 2003). Further, the 
great impact of VC industry in the U.S. economic growth has encouraged governments in 
emerging and transitional economies to facilitate the inflow of VC funds to their 
countries (Wright, Lockett, & Pruthi, 2002).
VC firms’ Syndication: Different Perspectives
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Syndication has been defined as a situation in which two or more VC firms 
participate in a particular round of investment in a certain venture. However, the 
investment o f different VC firms in a venture even in different rounds has also been 
considered syndication in the literature (Brander et al., 2002). Syndication has been 
identified as one o f the most common strategies in VC industry (Lemer, 1994). Using 
different theoretical perspectives, prior studies have identified different motivations for 
VC firms’ syndication (e.g. Bygrave, 1987; Lemer, 1994; Jaaskelainen, Maula, & Seppa,
2006).
Some studies have mentioned reasons other than the actual investee and VC firm, 
itself, for syndication. Access to deal flow is a common example. Based on this view, 
access to more potential deals is very important for VC firms (Lockett & Wright, 2001). 
Greater access to the deal flow brings them a variety o f investment options from which 
they can select the most promising deals to invest in. According to this rationale, VC 
firms sometimes invite other counterparts to their investment in a venture hoping for their 
reciprocation in the future deals (Wright & Lockett, 2003).
On the other hand, some other studies have argued that syndication stems from 
the risk inherently involved in investing in the entrepreneurial ventures. According to 
this view -  also called risk sharing perspective -  VC firms syndicate their investment to 
reduce and share its risk (Lockett & Wright, 2001). The risk o f the investment stems from 
two sources: unique risk which derives from a specific investment, and market risk which 
is associated with a wide span of variables in the market (Ruhnka & Young, 1991). VC 
firms may participate in multiple syndicates to diversify their investment portfolio and 
reduce the market risk (Wilson, 1968).
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The unique risk associated with investment can be combined with the insights 
from resource based view (RBV) o f the firm. From this perspective, there is either some 
specific risks associated with the specific venture or VC firms perceive that they lack 
required competencies to decide about selecting an investment and they syndicate to 
neutralize either o f these specific risk factors (De Clercq & Dimov 2004; Lemer, 1994; 
Manigart et al. 2006). Therefore, syndication in this view, depends on the venture and VC 
firm’s attributes (Brander et al., 2002; Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Hopp & Rieder, 2011; 
Jaaskelainen, 2012; Meuleman, Wright, Manigart, & Lockett, 2009).
One of the exclusive features o f the VC investments is that they help the venture 
in their management, operation, and administration in addition to providing funds (Steier, 
1998). Some examples o f the value adding services that VC firms provide are: serving on 
the venture’s board, providing strategic and managerial consults, supervising and 
monitoring their operation and performance, and connecting the potential customers and 
suppliers to the venture (Macmillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; Timmons & Bygrave, 
1986). In essence, one motivation for the VC firms to syndicate may be bringing more 
VC firms to help in value adding process by creating a resource pool with other 
counterparts and using their expertise in managing the venture in a more productive way 
(Busenitza, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004; Sapienza, 1992).
In this study, I examine how different attributes o f the venture riskiness and the 
VC firms capabilities configure together and result in syndication. Further, I explore 
which of these factors (venture riskiness or VC firms capabilities) are more influential in 
syndication decision, a question that remains unanswered in the literature.
Venture Characteristics and Syndication Decision
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At the venture level, considering the risk perspective o f syndication, there are 
some factors that may affect the syndication decision by increasing the investment risk 
perceived by the VC firms. The age o f the venture is one o f the factors that can determine 
the riskiness o f the investment (Bygrave, 1987). The younger the venture the higher the 
risk perceived by the VC firms (Hopp & Rieder, 2011). That is because the failure rate 
among younger ventures is greater due to the liability of newness (Freeman, Carroll, & 
Hannan, 1983). Further, younger ventures have shorter or no track record that VC firms 
can use in their selection process as the basis o f their evaluation. The stage o f venture at 
the time o f investment also has similar impact on the venture riskiness. At the investment 
time, a venture can be at different levels o f development, such as: seed, startup, 
expansion, or bridge financing (Gompers, 1995). Ventures in early stages lack the proven 
track record and their products or services are far from commercialization, that makes 
them more risky investments for the VC firms (Gompers & Lemer, 2002). In such cases, 
VC firms have to rely on entrepreneurs’ assertion and information. Thus, considering the 
VC firms’ lack o f insider information compared to the entrepreneurs, younger and earlier 
stage ventures bear a distinct type of risk for the VC firms. I call this type o f risk which is 
directly related to the actual venture itself, “information asymmetry risk”.
The type of the industry in which the venture operates can also imply the risk that 
venture bears. Investments in high-tech ventures assume much more uncertainty about 
the return and success than other industries (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). The risk o f 
commercializing the ideas or prototypes of high-tech ventures is high specifically in 
countries with weak institutional environment which lack copyright or other exclusive 
licensing supports (Ruhnka & Young, 1991). The intangibility and firm specificity o f the
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high-tech ventures also increases the risk of investment in such ventures and raises the 
information asymmetry between the VC firm and the entrepreneur (Carpenter & Petersen, 
2002; Gompers, 1995). I call the risk arising from the nature o f the venture’s industry 
“technical complexity risk". Figure 1 illustrates the overall framework of the paper.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
When investing abroad, especially in emerging markets such as China, VC firms 
face even more o f aforementioned risk in their investments. The sources o f the 
information that VC firms use to evaluate the ventures and their reliability vary in 
different countries (Manigart et al., 1997; Manigart et al., 2000). This variation stems 
from the institutional environment o f the countries. In developed countries such as U.S., 
due to the strong and reliable regulations, the VC firms have more confidence to rely on 
the information -especially financial information- expressed by the entrepreneurs 
(Manigart et al., 2000). However, because emerging markets lack such reliable 
institutions, the problem of information asymmetry between the foreign VC firms and the 
entrepreneurs is more pronounced and consequently obtaining accurate information about 
the entrepreneurs is more difficult (Lockett, Wright, Sapienza, & Pruthi, 2002). The weak 
institutional environment makes the information provided by the venture less reliable and 
requires the VC firms to engage in more due diligence and seek insider information 
(Lockett et al., 2002). Reliability o f the information is even lower for the younger and 
lower stage ventures due to their short track record. The information gap as well as lower 
level o f industrial and financial development o f the emerging markets also aggravate the 
technical complexity risk in high-tech ventures.
VC Firms Characteristics and Syndication Decision
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Social status and syndication
Networks o f external contacts are one o f the most important aspects of the 
organizational environment (Gulati, 1998) because firms do not operate in a vacuum 
without any interactions with others (Granovetter, 1985). Realizing the increasing 
importance of the networks in any businesses including VC industry, scholars have 
adopted social network perspective in the VC research. Some have examined the 
networks per se as the dependent variable o f their research. For instance, some have 
focused on the structure o f the VC firms’ networks and the quality o f their relationships 
(Bygrave, 1987, 1988). There are other studies that have treated the VC network as an 
exogenous phenomenon and explored the impact of the networks on different aspects of 
the VC firms operation. Hochberg et al. (2007) is an example of this stream. They 
examined the performance implication o f the VC firms’ network and found that “better- 
networked” VC firms outperform others significantly. Echols and Tsai (2005) and Abell 
and Nisar (2007) came up with the same positive effect o f the network embeddedness of 
the VC firms on their performance.
One o f the most common underlying rationales among all o f the studies arguing 
for the positive impact o f the networks on the VC firms performance is that networks are 
reservoirs o f information, knowledge, and other resources (Powell, Koput, Smith-Doerr, 
& Owen-Smith, 1999). For instance, Echols and Tsai (2005) found that network 
embeddedness enhances the performance of the VC firms investing in niche markets 
because it facilitates obtaining reliable knowledge and information necessary for 
developing unique products in their investee ventures. Walker (2008) described how the 
VC firms syndication networks contributed in ecommerce industry evolution by diffusing
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investment information among VC firms. Jaaskelainen et al. (2008) found a positive 
relationship between syndication and financial performance, relying on the role of 
syndication networks on enlarging the pool o f investments for the VC firms.
Prior research on networks has identified different features o f the networks that 
can determine the quality o f the network’s impacts on different actors: network 
composition and network structure. Network composition includes characteristics such as 
density and diversity (Coleman, 1988; Phelps, 2010) and network structure refers to the 
arrangement o f different actors’ relationship and standing inside the network (Guler & 
Guillen, 2010). Actor’s social status in the network is one of the structural proxies 
frequently used in prior studies applying social network theory (Checkley et al. 2010; 
Hopp, 2008; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Also known as network centrality and network 
position, social status implies the extent to which the focal firm is involved and 
embedded in its network (Guler & Guillen, 2010). The focal firm’s direct and indirect ties 
plus the level o f embeddedness o f those ties constitute the social status o f the focal firm 
in the network (Ahuja, 2000; Bonacich, 1987; Houston et al., 2004).
Prior studies have shown the positive relationship between firm’s social status in 
the syndication networks and its performance (Abell & Nisar, 2007; Freeman, 1999; 
Hochberg et al., 2007; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The underlying argument of 
establishing such positive link is the advantages that social status can provide the focal 
actor. Actors in central positions have superior access to the deal flow in the network and 
gain more capabilities in adding value to the venture (Jaaskelainen, 2012; Keil, Maula, & 
Wilson, 2010). Further, they enjoy favorable access to different resources flowing in the 
network such as information, financial, and human capital resources (Guler & Guillen,
2010; Podolny, 1993). Thus, social status is a reflection o f the magnitude and quality of 
the resources that a firm has access to in its network (Hoang & Antocic, 2003). The more 
the firm is connected to others the more likely it is to obtain required resources from the 
network (Wang & Fang, 2012). Relying on these implications, I examine how social 
status in the home and host countries may impact developed country VC firms’ 
syndication behavior.
Similar to other international firms, when VC firms invest abroad specially in 
emerging and less developed countries, weak institutional environment and lack of 
familiarity with local market increase the risk of their investments (Cumming, Schmidt,
& Walz, 2010). As indicated by international alliance studies, the main motivation of 
developed country firms to ally with local counterparts in emerging markets is access to 
different regional markets, customer and market information, and dealing with 
institutional environment and governmental regulations (Dacin, Hitt, & Levitas, 1997; 
Dong & Glaister, 2006; Gillespie & Teegen, 1995; Yan & Gray, 1994). However, for 
local firms in emerging markets, alliances with developed country firms is an 
organizational learning context and a way to access resources and technologies that are 
scarce in local market (Hitt et al., 2000). Considering the similarities between syndication 
and alliances (Wright & Lockett, 2003), plus the long history and maturity o f the VC 
industry in developed countries (e.g., U.S.) compared to emerging markets, it seems 
appropriate to hold the same the assumption for the international VC firms. Due to the 
differences between developed and emerging countries in terms of development and age 
o f the VC industry (Wright et al., 2005), local VC firms in emerging markets are not 
expected to bring much value to the table in syndication with developed country firms
other than mitigating the liability o f  foreignness (LOF). Information asymmetry between 
local and non-local investors is even deeper when the cultural and spatial distances 
between home and host countries are greater (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). Hence, in 
distant host countries, foreign VC firms have more information disadvantage which can 
be neutralized by partnering with local firms. However, research has shown that when the 
major value that local partner creates is providing the host country information and 
connections, foreign firms would lose motivation to partner with them as soon as they 
can establish goodwill with local government and other regulatory authorities and master 
the host market (Child, Faulkner, & Tallman, 2005). As discussed earlier, social status in 
the host country can bring this advantage to the developed country VC firms.
The central VC firms in the host country network have the most access to the deal 
flow information and other resources existing in the network including direct contacts 
with local government agencies and other VC firms that can act as the intermediaries 
(Hochberg et al., 2007). These intermediaries can provide the foreign VC firms with local 
and governmental connections necessary for successful operation particularly in 
emerging markets. Further, they can help the foreign VC firms to communicate with local 
entrepreneurs and evaluate the investment proposals more efficiently (Lu & Hwang, 
2010). Taken together, I argue that advantages o f a high social status in the host country 
network enable VC firms to cope with LOF by increasing their access to more resources, 
information, and connections. This decreases the perceived venture-specific risk by VC 
firms. According to international alliance literature, once firms recognize that they can 
accomplish their investments alone, they do not tend to share the return on investment 
with a partner that cannot bring a noticeable value to the alliance (Brander, Amit, &
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Antweiler, 2002). Further, the contingency view o f syndication claims that syndication is 
to compensate for the focal firm’s lack o f required resources and capabilities and to 
mitigate the risk of investment (Bygrave, 1987). Consequently, based on this view, one 
can argue that the host country status reduces the motivation o f syndication by decreasing 
the perceived information asymmetry risk as the motivation of syndication.
I use signaling theory to describe the alternative effect o f the social status on 
syndication according to the natural proclivity perspective o f syndication. Signaling 
theory is a suitable perspective when analyzing the relationship between two parties in 
the presence o f the information asymmetry (Spence, 2002). It highlights the impacts of 
the signals sent and received by each party on their decisions regarding different 
relationships that they may have (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011). The 
information asymmetry among the partners is an important and common challenge in the 
international alliances making it difficult to find out the true quality o f a partner (Hamel, 
199; Zacharakis, 1997). Thus, anything that contributes to reduction o f information 
asymmetry can increase the likelihood o f forming and lasting the alliances. Networks 
consist o f different actors interacting with each other. For that, they can frequently serve 
for sending and receiving different signals by actors. Firms sometimes enter networks 
and alliances just to signal the quality o f their resource endowments (Marciukaityte, 
Roskelley, & Wang, 2009). The central network position resulting from previous 
alliances has been identified as a proxy o f quality and trustworthiness o f the firm 
(Podolny, 2001). It positively impacts the perceptions o f the other firms in the network 
about capabilities and performance of the focal firm (Guler & Guillen, 2010).
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Further, high status VC firms in their network can bring other important players to
their investments which increases the likelihood o f venture’s success, especially in the
VC investments characterized by high risk and uncertainty (Gompers & Lemer, 2000;
Hochberg et al., 2007; Piskorski, 2004). Based on these advantages, the VC firms central
in their networks are able to close the deal with the entrepreneurs with more favorable
conditions (Guler & Guillen, 2010). Difficulty o f obtaining a high social status in a
foreign country (host country) with completely different institutional infrastructure and
business environment makes the central foreign VC firm even more attractive to other
counterparts as a signal o f its quality and capabilities (Baum, Cowan, & Jonard, 2010).
That can lead other VC firms to propose more attractive syndication offers and enhance
the syndication likelihood between them and the focal VC firm. Combining these
arguments with the perspective that advocate natural proclivity towards syndication, one
can alternatively expect that a higher social status in the host country would increase the
likelihood of syndication for foreign VC firms. Thus, two competing propositions can be
stated as following based on these different perspectives:
Proposition la: The combination o f  low host country social status and high 
information asymmetry risk is associated with syndication o f  developed country 
VC firm s in their emerging market investments, but the combination o f  high host 
country social status and high/low information asymmetry risk will not be 
associated with syndication.
Proposition lb: A t high levels o f  the host country social status, the developed 
country VC firm s tend to syndicate independently o f  the information asymmetry 
risk in their investments in emerging markets.
As discussed earlier, another factor that may lead VC firms to syndicate is the 
technical complexity. Operating in high-tech industries increases the uncertainty and 
information asymmetry between the venture and VC firm (Gompers, 1995). It also
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requires more resources and connections to succeed in these industries (Kakati, 2003). 
International alliance literature has found that developed country firms are usually 
responsible for providing advanced resources, experiences, and technologies in alliances 
between developed and emerging market firms (Dacin et al., 1997; Dong & Glaister, 
2006; Gillespie & Teegen, 1995; Yan & Gray, 1994). The reason is the technology gap 
between emerging and developed countries (Svetlicic & Rojec, 1994). Whereas 
developed country firms have access to sophisticated resources and technologies (which 
are sometimes country-specific), firms in emerging markets are less resource-endowed 
due to the young age of many industries (Hitt et al., 2000), including VC industry in 
those countries (Wright et al. 2005). That is why in the investments in high-tech 
industries, the developed country firms can contribute more.
According to implications o f the high social status described earlier, for the 
developed country firms, the position in their home country network shows the level of 
their access to the advanced resources available in their country and industry. Further, the 
developed country VC firms have the advantage o f providing more exit options for high- 
tech firms. A well-established financial market (including stock market) is necessary for 
VC firms to lead a venture towards a successful exit, especially for the high-tech 
industries (Black & Gilson, 1998). Efficient financial market in developed countries such 
as the U.S. gives the international VC firms from these countries the option to exit the 
venture in their home market through initial public offering (IPO) (Wright et al., 2005). 
Further, existence o f more high-tech incumbent firms in developed markets increases the 
chance o f the VC firms from these markets to exit their emerging market investments 
through mergers and acquisitions in their home country. A high social status in the home
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country intensifies all o f these advantages for a developed country VC firm. The previous 
experiences o f investing in the home country and the connections that a VC firm with a 
high social status has in its developed home market increase the likelihood of its high- 
tech investments success in an emerging country.
According to the contingency view of syndication, VC firms’ characteristics can 
influence the decision to syndicate. Combining this perspective with the advantages of 
the high social status in the home country, a central network position can reduce the 
developed country VC firms’ motivation for syndications which are due to the technical 
complexity risks. Network centrality in the home country (as a developed country) can 
provide the values that the VC firms seek when they partner with other firms in under the 
condition o f the high technical complexity risks.
Alternatively, if  according to the natural proclivity perspective, one can argue that 
the home country social status may even intensify the likelihood o f syndication rather 
than substituting it. Similar to the argument made for the host country network, centrality 
in a developed home country (e.g. U.S.) makes the focal VC firm more popular and 
visible to other VC firms. Further, the VC firm’s reputation makes it easier for the firm to 
benefit from others’ tangible and intangible resources even without syndicating with 
them (Guler & Guillen, 2010) since they would hope for focal firm’s reciprocation in the 
future. This makes the VC firms with higher social status more desirable partners (Stuart, 
Hoang, & Hybels, 1999). Similar to the entrepreneurs who may agree on a discount to a 
high status investor (Hsu, 2004), desirability o f the high status VC firm can have the 
same impact on the other VC firms and result in offering more attractive syndication 
proposals. Thus according to this alternative perspective, it can be expected that the home
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country status can increase the syndication likelihood reaching us to such competing 
propositions as:
Proposition 2a: The combination o f  developed country VC firm s ’ low home 
country social status and high technical complexity risk is associated with 
syndication in their emerging market investments but high home country social 
status is NOT associated with syndication even in presence o f  high technical 
complexity risk.
Proposition 2b: At the high level o f  home country social status, the developed 
country VC firm s tend to syndicate independently from  the technical complexity 
risk in their emerging market investments.
Performance Implication
The value of any strategic decision is evident by its performance implication 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). As a critical strategic decision, the effect of the 
syndication on performance has been extensively examined in the VC literature. Among 
those that have argued for a positive impact, there are different perspectives why 
syndication leads to the superior performance. Some have argued that syndicated deals 
perform better because o f the value added by other VC firms involved in the deal 
(Brander et al., 2002). Another explanation is derived from improved selection 
hypothesis which refers to the fact that syndication leads to better performance because it 
improves the selection process and results in selecting more promising ventures to invest 
in (Hege et al., 2009). According to this view, second opinion resulting from syndication, 
improves the due-diligence process in the deal selection and consequently by selecting 
better ventures, the ultimate performance of the investment will be guaranteed.
Further, prior studies have also claimed that the positive impact o f the syndication 
on the investment performance is due to the pool o f corporate contacts (Giot & 
Schwienbacher, 2007). In the syndicated deals, involvement o f several VC firms expands
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the pool o f corporate contacts necessary to find a buyer to acquire the venture. Pooling 
required resources such as specific knowledge and expertise required in the venture’s 
industry is another explanation mentioned in the literature for the positive relationship 
between syndication and the deal performance (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008). This includes 
the VC partners’ capabilities in participating in the post investment activities such as 
providing managerial consultations (Jaaskelainen et al., 2008), and in monitoring the 
venture after initial investment (Kotha, 2008).
Increased legitimacy of the venture is another mechanism through which 
syndication may enhance the performance. According to this perspective, the reputational 
capital o f the venture is increased by the number o f the VC firms investing in it 
(Megginson & Weiss, 1991). This affiliation with multiple VC firms enhances the 
legitimacy o f the venture which in turn increases the likelihood o f success (Higgins & 
Gulati 2003). Further, the fact that multiple VC firms have invested in a venture certifies 
the quality and accuracy o f the price during the exit period and increases the return o f 
investment by reducing the discount resulting from the information asymmetry between 
buyers and venture (Jaaskelainen, 2012).
Despite the fact that several studies have found a positive relationship between 
syndication and investment performance, there are also some studies that have come up 
with different results. Guler (2007) revealed the coercive pressure existing in the 
syndications that can lead the VC firms to end up with loss. Although, the focal VC firm 
may realize that the decision to invest in a venture has been problematic, other co­
investors may exert coercive pressure on the focal firm to continue with the status quo by 
imposing contractual sanctions. This can cause the focal VC firm to end up with more
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losses which could be prevented. Fleming (2004) also found a negative relationship 
between syndication and performance o f the investments made by Australian VC firms. 
He stated one plausible explanation can be the fact that sometimes VC firms syndicate 
just to “window dress” their investment portfolio and to show an exit record. Similar to 
this study, Mason and Harrison (2002) found no significant relationship between 
syndication in an investment and the performance of the venture. In sum, the literature on 
performance impact of the syndication remains inconclusive about the nature of the 
impact and the contingencies that can determine how syndication influences 
performance.
International investments which are the setting o f this study are more susceptible 
for the disadvantageous syndications. High information asymmetry between firms from 
distant cultures and different institutional environments makes the cooperation among 
them more difficult (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). Further, VC firms from different 
countries operate and manage their investments in different ways and through different 
philosophies (Brophy & Guthner, 1988; Mason & Harrison, 2002). This can also impede 
an efficient cooperation among partners from different backgrounds in an international 
market and consequently reduce the likelihood o f high performance.
When investing abroad, the nationality o f a potential partner can imply 
advantages as well as disadvantages and potential problems that may occur in syndicating 
with that partner. Local firms can provide local market information and connections and 
thereby mitigate the LOF for the foreign VC firms (Lu & Hwang, 2010). They can also 
function as a communication channel between the foreign VC firms and the local 
entrepreneurs in the cases where information asymmetry risk exits. Therefore, partnership
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with them would be valuable since both o f the mentioned problems (LOF and 
information asymmetry between VC firms and entrepreneurs) have been identified as 
failure factors in the international investments (Gompers, 1995; Zaheer, 1995). However, 
due to the differences in investment philosophy including different ways o f selection, 
screening, and exit preferences (Mayer, Schoors, & Yafeh, 2005), VC firms from 
different backgrounds may not get along well together. Further, the relationship between 
the co-investors in a syndicated investment is also subject to information asymmetry 
among them (Lemer, 1994). The information asymmetry between local and non-local 
investors is aggravated by higher cultural and spatial distances between the home and 
host country (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001). This means that in the distant host countries, 
the foreign VC firms have more information disadvantage compared with the local VC 
firms which also creates higher level o f distrust among them (Baum et al., 2010).
I discussed earlier how the type o f the industry can impose risk to the VC firms. 
The capabilities o f the VC firms in supporting the high-tech ventures may be different 
depending on their country o f origin. VC firms from developed counties have longer 
record and more experiences in investing and dealing with ventures in the high-tech 
industries. For instance, the political economy of the U.S. has encouraged the VC firms to 
invest in the high-tech industries such as biotechnology and telecommunication since 
early 1980s (Casper, Lehrer, & Soskice, 1999). That has evolved those industries and 
empowered the VC firms in investing in such high risk ventures. However, it has not 
been the case in most o f the emerging markets due to the governmental policies (Wright 
et al., 2005).
In addition to the higher capability o f the developed country VC firms in 
managing the investments in high-tech industries (Black & Gilson, 1998), they have 
greater access to the advanced resources required in these industries. The advances of the 
high-tech industries in developed countries make tangible and intangible resources 
necessary for the new ventures’ success more accessible for the VC firms (Guler & 
Guillen, 2010). Access to the advanced resources creates competitive advantage for the 
VC firms from developed countries and enhances the likelihood o f success in their high- 
tech investments (de Jong, Phan, & van Ees, 2011). The developed country VC firms also 
provide more exit options for high-tech ventures. A well-established financial market 
(including stock market) is necessary for the VC firms to lead a venture towards a 
successful exit, especially for the high-tech industries (Black & Gilson, 1998). Having 
efficient financial market in the home country, the VC firms from developed economies 
also enjoy the option o f exiting their ventures in their home country market through IPOs 
(Wright et al., 2005). Further, existence of more high-tech incumbent firms in the 
developed markets increases the chance o f the VC firms from these markets to exit their 
investments made in emerging countries through mergers and acquisitions in their home 
country. Despite the mentioned advantages that another developed country firms can 
bring to the deal and consequently contribute to the performance o f the venture, co­
operation problems are still likely to exist even in syndications among the VC firms from 
the same country (Lockett & Wright, 2001).
In sum, in terms of the impact of the syndication on investment performance there 
are different opinions in the literature: First, syndication bears an intrinsic value 
regardless o f the capabilities o f the single focal VC firm in managing the investment
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alone. From this perspective, syndication contributes to the performance because it 
always enhances the legitimacy o f the venture and helps the VC firms to gain more return 
at the time of exit from the venture by assuring the buyers (in stock market or in a merger 
and acquisition) about the reliability and accuracy of the suggested price. In this case, 
capabilities of the VC firm can complement the positive effect o f the syndication on 
performance. Thus, despite the advantages that social status provides the VC firm it may 
not substitute for the positive effect o f syndication. However, one can expect syndications 
formed by VC firms with higher social status will perform even better compared to those 
by VC firms with lower social status. This is because o f the extra advantages that social 
status provides the VC firms.
Second, syndication is positively related to performance because it compensates 
for what a VC firm may lack to succeed in an investment. This can be in form of the 
capability in selection decision or tangible and intangible resources that the venture 
requires after the initial investment. In syndication with different partners in an 
international investment, partners from different countries may have different 
functionality in terms o f the value that they create and the contribution that they have in 
the investment performance. Local partners and those that have more similarity and 
proximity to the host country can help the performance of the developed country VC 
firm’s investment when the information asymmetry risk is high. They can communicate 
more efficiently with the entrepreneurs. Also, they can provide more reliable evaluation 
o f the information provided by the entrepreneurs. Other VC firms ffom home or other 
developed countries can mitigate the technical complexity risk which consequently leads 
to a superior performance. In the investments made in high-tech industries, developed
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country partners can bring more advanced resources, connect the venture with their 
advanced market at home, and provide more exit options for the venture. Finally, the 
third perspective maintains that syndication with other counterparts can even be 
detrimental to the investment and hurt the performance due to the co-operational and 
agency problems between the VC partners and the potential differences among them with 
regard to their investment philosophy.
Combination of the second and third perspectives on the syndication-performance 
relationship suggests that the positive effect o f syndication is contingent upon the 
contextual conditions and the VC firm’s characteristics. In other words, syndication has 
its own costs and is advantageous when the focal VC firm does not possess the required 
resources and capabilities for venture’s success. If this perspective bears more credibility, 
then it can be expected that some of the VC firm’s characteristics substitute the need for 
syndication. The social status with its mentioned implications can provide the advantages 
that syndication is supposed to deliver to the VC firm. The host country social status can 
mitigate the information asymmetry risk. Hence, it can substitute for the syndications 
made to solve this problem. The focal VC firms syndicate with other developed country 
firms because they have access to the valuable resources and connections that are 
available in developed countries and scares in the emerging markets. However, the focal 
VC firm’s home country social status increases its access to advanced resources, 
information, and knowledge available in home country. Accordingly, it may deliver the 
same positive contributions that syndication with other developed country firms does to 
the investment performance.
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Taken together, the above arguments lead to the following propositions regarding
the performance effect o f the developed country VC firms’ syndication in different
venture conditions (information asymmetry/technical complexity risk), by different
partners (local/other developed country VC firms), and in different levels o f the social
status (high-low/home country-host country):
Proposition 4a: Syndication is a necessary condition fo r  the developed country 
VC firm s to achieve superior performance in their emerging market investments.
Proposition 4b: For the developed country VC firms, either syndication or lack o f  
syndication may be associated with high performance in their emerging market 
investments. High social status in the host country will substitute fo r  syndication 
due to the information asymmetry risk fo r  high performing VC firms. Similarly, 




The context o f this study is the international VC firms from developed countries 
investing in emerging/less developed markets. Since the U.S. is the dominant player in 
the international VC market, I chose U.S. VC firms as the sample o f the developed 
country firms. The U.S. VC industry has the greatest share in the international VC 
investments (Aizenman & Kendall, 2008). Furthermore, China has become the largest net 
importer o f the VC funds (Wang & Wang, 2011). Hence, for this study, I draw the 
sample from the investments made by U.S. VC firms in China.
I used the VentureXpert database to compile data for the U.S. VC firms’ 
investment in China. This database is a property o f Venture Economics, a division of 
Thomson Financial. Venture Economics gathers quarterly reports from the VC firms and 
other major investors about their portfolio and provides data on their investments.
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VentureXpert provides daily information regarding the VC firms’ investments from 1960 
to date. This database has been extensively used by the prior studies on the VC industry 
(Dimov, D., & Milanov, H. 2010; Guler & Guillen, 2010; Hochberg et al., 2007, 2010; 
Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sahlman, 1990; Shane & Stuart, 2001).
The initial sample consisted o f 257 first round investments made by the U.S. VC 
firms during 1995 to 2005.1 choose first round investments because the goal is to 
examine the impact o f the interplay between different risk factors and social status on the 
U.S. VC firms’ syndication decision. By focusing on the first round investments, I 
control for the factors beyond the U.S. VC firms’ control that influence their decision to 
syndicate. Including investments in which the U.S. VC firms had joined in later rounds 
creates a sample bias because by accepting to join in a later round of investment, VC 
firms have automatically entered into a syndication and have not had the option to invest 
alone in the venture1.1 selected 1995 as starting year for collecting data because the 
database’s coverage for earlier years is poor and there are few investments by the U.S.
VC firms in China before 1995. Prior studies have considered different time lags o f four 
to six years to examine the performance of the VC firms’ investment (Gompers & Lemer, 
2000a, 200b; Hochberg et al., 2007, 2010; Mason & Harrison, 2002). Further, a survey 
on the VC firms’ executives by Macmillan, Siegel, and Narasimha (1985) found that the 
most of them expected to earn a substantial return from their investments between 5 to 10 
years after the initial investment. Taken together, I measure the performance eight years 
after the initial investment. Hence, I included performance data for 2013. After deleting
1 This theoretical sampling, to just include the initial investments, has used by prior studies (Cumming, 
2008; De Clercq & Dimov, 2008; Giot & Schwienbacher, 2007).
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the observations with missing data, the final sample consists of 212 investments made by 
111 different U.S. VC firms involving 154 Chinese ventures.
Measurement
Dependent variable. There are two dependent variables associated with the 
propositions in this study. For propositions 1 to 3, the dependent variable is syndication 
decision. I use a binary variable for syndication, which is equal to 1 for cases in which 
the U.S. VC firm has at least one other co-investor at the first round of investment and 0 
if  the VC firm has invested alone in the first round. For proposition 4, the dependent 
variable is the investment performance. Following prior studies (Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 
2012; Gompers & Lemer, 2000; Hochberg et al., 2007,2010; Jaaskelainen et al., 2006), 
performance of the investment is based on whether the venture successfully exited 
through an EPO or Merger and Acquisition (M&A). Performance of the VC firms’ 
investment can also be measured by return on investment. However, there are some 
problems associated with this measure: first, the data related to VC firms’ actual profit is 
not available. Second, service nature o f this industry makes it difficult for an outsider to 
assess the performance based on such data even it available (Jaaskelainen et al., 2006). In 
other words, in addition to the money that VC firms invest in a venture they spend a lot 
of their time (one o f their most important assets) which cannot be monetized to accurately 
calculate their profit. In this case, using the exit information can be a reliable measure 
since a successful exit can fairly represent an acceptable return on investment for VC 
firms (Hochberg et al., 2007). Thus, performance variable in my analysis would be equal 
to 1 if venture has been able to exit through IPO or M&A by 2013 and 0 otherwise. As 
mentioned, to avoid any biases in the sample, the way that performance is measured
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allows VC firms to exit the venture within an eight year period, which is even slightly 
more than the time considered by prior studies (e.g. Gompers & Lemer, 2000a, 200b; 
Hochberg et al., 2007,2010; Mason & Harrison, 2002).
Causal conditions. I examine the impact o f two groups o f variables on 
syndication decision: VC firm  and venture characteristics. From the venture perspective,
I measure the information asymmetry and technical complexity risks. Following prior 
studies to measure the information asymmetry risk, I use two proxies: venture age and 
venture stage at the time of investment. Age of the venture has been identified to 
influence the perceived risk by VC firms (Hopp & Rieder, 2011). The younger the 
venture is the shorter its track record would be. Thus, VC firms have to rely more on 
what entrepreneur claims (Bygrave, 1987). The gap between the VC firm and the 
entrepreneur in terms o f access to the accurate information about the venture’s business 
increases the information asymmetry problem. VentureXpert provides this information 
for most o f the cases. For the cases that data was not available through the VentureXpert 
dataset, I retrieved the information through companies’ websites. I measured the age of 
the venture based on the number o f months that they have been in the business since 
inception up to the first round of investment.
Ventures can be in different stages at the time o f investment. The development 
stage o f the venture can range from seed, start-up, and early stage to later stage, 
expansion, and acquisition (Sahlman, 1990). Ventures in earlier stages lack the history to 
prove their legitimacy and sometimes their products and services are far from the 
commercialization (Gompers & Lemer, 2002). This imposes a risk to the VC firms 
intending to invest in the venture. VentureXpert database also provides the stage o f the
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venture at the time o f investment which has been used by prior studies (e.g. Dimov, 
Shepherd, & Sutcliffe, 2007). I coded the stage variable as 1 if the venture is in seed, 
start-up, or early stages and 0 for later stages that are considered less risky. The industry 
membership o f the venture is used to determine technical complexity risk. VentureXpert 
classifies the ventures based on the SIC and NAIC codes. Based on that information, it 
also categorizes the ventures into “high-tech” and “non-high-tech” industries. Some 
examples o f high-tech industries are Biotechnology, Semiconductor, and Medical 
industries. Retail, Fabric Manufacturing, and Food industries are examples o f the 
industries categorized as “non-high-tech”. Technical complexity is coded 1 for the “high 
technology” ventures and 0 otherwise.
In terms o f the VC firms’ characteristics, the main constructs are the home and 
host country social status. Following prior studies, I used Bonacich’s (1987) eigenvector 
centrality to measure social status (Dimov et al., 2007; Guler & Guillen, 2010; Podolny, 
2001; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). The advantage of this measure is that it not only 
considers the ties formed by the focal actor but also takes into account the social status o f 
the actors to which the focal actor is connected (Guler & Guillen, 2010; Jensen, 2003).
To capture the previous social status o f the VC firm on its current syndication decisions 
in year t, I measured the centrality based on the information for years (t - 1), (r - 2), and (t 
- 3). The data on the inter-firm links o f the VC firm i in the home and host countries was 
used to calculate the centrality score for the home and host country social status 
respectively. The centrality score for the VC firm i in year t was calculated as follow:
C, = o£B  f a
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Where a  is the reciprocal o f an eigenvalue and B is the adjacency matrix 
indicating the existing ties between VC firms i and j .  In this setting, the centrality o f the 
VC firm / is a function o f the centrality o f the other VC firms with which it is connected. 
For the VC firms that did not have any relationship with others, I assigned 0 for the 
centrality measure.
I also put the VC firm’s age in the model as a proxy of its general experience in 
the VC industry. This measure has been used before in the literature and indicates the 
accumulated capabilities o f the VC firm in managing the investments (Abell & Nisar, 
2007; Lee & Wahal, 2004; Nahata, 2008; Wang & Wang, 2011). Prior experiences o f the 
VC firm in handling different investments can make the firm capable o f managing 
standalone investments in the future and consequently influence their syndication 
decision. Prior investments o f the focal VC firm in the host country may also create 
special expertise and skills required for success in that specific context1. Thus, I defined a 
variable called ‘prior deals ’ that captures past experience. It is measured by the number 
o f deals prior to the investment date in which the focal VC firm has invested2.
Analytical Technique
To address the research questions and test the credibility o f the propositions, I 
employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). The premise o f fsQCA is 
that causality in the social sciences has a conjunctural nature often times (Ragin, 2008).
In essence, combination of multiple conditions leads to an outcome in most cases (Crilly, 
Zollo, & Hansen, 2012). Built on this rationale, fsQCA allows scholars to explore certain 
configurations o f causal conditions leading to an outcome variable (Ragin, Drass, &
1 This can be regardless o f  whether prior investments have been in collaboration with others (enhancing the 
social status) or have been made alone by the focal firm.
2 It includes both standalone and syndicated investments.
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Davey, 2006; Ragin, 2000). Using Boolean algebra, it handles the causal complexities by 
describing the cases (i.e. investments) as configurations o f different causal conditions 
rather than focusing on each individual independent variable’s impact on the outcome 
(Fiss, 2011). This is the main advantage o f fsQCA making it different from other 
techniques such as regression (Ragin, 2008). Different cases can have different 
membership associations (full member, partial member, or full non-member) to each 
causal condition (Fiss, 2011). Thus, the membership does not have to be binary allowing 
for more meaningful grouping (Crilly et al., 2012).
The fsQCA is not based on the normal distribution assumption which makes it 
more capable of handling the samples with small size, outliers and without normal 
distribution (Fiss, 2011). Another advantage o f fsQCA which makes it even more 
appropriate for this study is that it allows for testing o f equifinality (Ragin, 2008). Based 
on how causal conditions combine in different cases, fsQCA can result in different 
configurations o f causal conditions represented by the cases that lead to high or low level 
o f outcome variable (Fiss, Cambre, & Marx, 2013). While initially, fsQCA was used for 
small samples, recently researchers have adopted it for large samples similar to one used 
this paper (Greckhamer, Misangyi, & Fiss, 2013).
Consistency and Frequency Thresholds
In my analysis, I only included configurations that had at least two representative 
cases. This decision was made due to my relatively large sample (212 observations) and 
to avoid potential outliers or one-time occurrences o f a configuration. This criterion is 
also aligned with previous studies utilizing FsQCA with large samples (e.g. Garcia- 
Castro, Aguilera, & Arifto, 2013). According to Ragin (2008), frequency threshold should
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be determined such that at least 75 percent o f the cases are used in the analysis in order to 
insure that the sample’s integrity is not damaged or skewed by excluding important data 
points. A cutoff point o f two retained 89 percent o f the sample for my further analysis. 
Next step o f the analysis is to calculate whether the outcome is sufficiently exhibited in 
remaining configurations. In FsQCA, a consistency score is utilized to in order to make 
this decision. The consistency score measures the extent to which membership in a given 
configuration is indeed a subset o f membership in the outcome. A coverage score is also 
used to describe the relevance o f a condition or a set o f conditions to a particular 
outcome. There are two major formulas for calculating fuzzy consistency and coverage 
statistics o f the causal conditions (X) for the outcome (Y) as follows (Ragin, 2008: 134): 
Consistency (Xi < Yi) = S[ min(Xi,Yi)]/ E(Xi)
Coverage (Xi < Yi) = £[ min(Xi,Yi)]/ I(Y i)
According to Ragin et al. (2006), minimum recommended consistency threshold is 0 .75 .1 
follow Bell, Filatotchev, & Aguilera, R. (2013) and use 0.80 as the consistency threshold, 
which is above the recommended minimum.
Calibration
The first step in performing fsQCA is calibrating the raw data to membership 
scores [0,1]. A value o f 0 indicates complete non-membership and 1 shows the full 
membership. Although relying on the existing theory and scholarly expertise is the 
preferable approach in calibration, this might not be always possible. In many cases, 
calibration must be done according to the way that data structures. In instances of 
continuous data that does not cluster, a continuous calibration technique can be applied. 
Since major variables o f my study exhibited such structure (i.e. centrality scores, age,
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etc.), fsQCA calibration function was utilized. I specified a full membership point, a 
crossover point above which a condition is determined to be mostly a member and a 
complete non-membership point. To choose these three points, I followed Fiss (2011) 
recommendation and procedure in selecting the 75th percentile for each variable as the 
full membership threshold, the mean o f each condition as the crossover point, and the 
25th percentile as the complete non-membership point.
3.5 RESULTS
To test the propositions, I conducted two sufficiency tests. The results o f the 
sufficiency test for propositions la, lb , 2a, and 2b are illustrated in Table 1. For this first 
set o f propositions, the outcome condition is syndication. There are five configurations 
presented in Table 1 which are all sufficient for forming syndication between focal VC 
firms and other counterparts. Since the sample to a great extent represents the population 
o f the US VC firms in China, the results in this table are based on the complex solutions. 
The complex solutions (comparing with the parsimonious and intermediate ones) are the 
most complicated solutions where there is no simplifying assumption based on different 
counterfactuals1. In fact, these solutions only report the patterns in the data (extracted 
from the actual VC firms activities) and does not include any mathematical 
simplifications. In the table, I denote the general presence o f a causal condition with the 
black circles (“• ”) indicating high level o f that condition and conversely the general
1 There are two types o f  counterfactuals that fsQCA procedure applies to simplify the complex 
configurations between causal conditions: easy and difficult. Fiss (2011) defines these two types o f  
counterfactuals as follow: “Easy counterfactuals refer to situations in which a redundant causal condition is 
added to a set o f  causal conditions that by themselves already lead to the outcome in question. In contrast, 
“difficult” counterfactuals refer to situations in which a condition is removed from a set o f  causal 
conditions leading to an outcome on the assumption that this condition is redundant.” Based on the 
inclusion o f  these counterfactuals, the fsQCA generates three types o f  solutions: 1) parsimonious which 
includes both easy and difficult counterfactuals 2) intermediate which only includes easy counterfactuals 3) 
complex which includes neither easy nor difficult simplifying assumptions.
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absence o f a causal condition (or low level o f the condition) is indicated with circles with 
a cross-out (“ ® ”). Blank spaces in a solution are “do n ’t care” situations where the 
causal condition may be either present or absent (high or low level o f the condition may 
exist).
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Configurations presented in the Table 1 demonstrated the consistency of 0.80 and 
the coverage o f 0.40. The consistency statistics imply the extent to which cases (i.e. 
investments made by the VC firms in the Chinese ventures) that assemble these causal 
conditions experience the outcome (i.e. syndication between focal VC firms and other 
counterparts). One o f the best analogies to the consistency statistics would be the t-score 
for the coefficients in OLS regression. The coverage statistics imply the empirical 
relevance and importance o f the solutions (configurations) which is roughly analogous to 
the r-squared in the regression (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). In other words, it shows 
the extent to which the presented solutions are inclusive regarding the subsample o f the 
syndicated deals.
Raw coverage scores in the table show the portion o f the syndication decision that 
is contained in the indicated configuration, and unique coverage shows the portion o f the 
syndication decision that is exclusively covered by the indicated configuration and no 
others. Since syndication is a strategic decision that can be influenced by several factors, 
the coverage score obtained here is consistent with other previous studies (e.g. Crilly, 
2010; Fiss, 2011; Garcia-Castro et al., 2013). In sum, the results describe that considered 
venture and VC firms characteristics together explain syndication decision by the VC 
firms in their investments.
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Propositions la  and lb  are competing arguments. In essence, the major question 
here is whether social status in the home and host countries (considering their practical 
implications) could compensate for the syndication stemming from technical and 
information asymmetry risk factors. In other words, the question is whether VC firms 
with high social status in the home (host) country do not syndicate their investment even 
if there is a technical (information asymmetry) risk involved because the advantages o f 
social status make them so confident that they would prefer avoid problems o f partnering 
with other firms or sharing a potential profit with them. In solutions 1, 2, and 5 in Table 
1, information asymmetry exists since at least the venture is always in the primary stage 
o f development. However, at the same time, VC firms also have high host country status. 
This means that at least, social status in the host country do not compensate for the 
information asymmetry risk factor. In solutions 3 and 4, information asymmetry is 
considerably low (both age and stage o f the venture are high) and the VC firms with both 
high host status (C3) and low host country status (C4) have preferred to syndicate even in 
the low level o f the information asymmetry. In sum, these results (particularly solution 4) 
support the first part o f the proposition la  that asserts the combination o f low host 
country social status and high information asymmetry is associated with syndication. 
However, the overall solution lends more support to the proposition lb  that claims at high 
level o f the host country social status, VC firms still engage in syndication regardless o f 
information asymmetry evident by solutions 1, 2, 3, and 5.
Propositions 2a and 2b state competing arguments about the relationship between 
the home country social status and technical complexity. As Table 1 shows, all five 
solutions include ventures in high-tech industries. Thus, technical complexity is always
104
present in the solutions and because o f that there is no configuration with low technical 
complexity and high home country social status to examine how the focal VC firms 
decide about syndication in such situations. Solutions 2 and 4 support the first part o f the 
proposition 2a that states the combination o f low home country social status and high 
technical complexity is associated with syndication. However, the second part o f the 
proposition (high home country social status is not associated with syndication even at 
the presence o f the high technical complexity) is not supported. Overall, these solutions 
give overall support to proposition 2b that claims VC firms with high home country 
social status tend to syndicate regardless o f the technical complexity.
Second set o f the propositions (3a and 3b) discuss the performance implication of 
the syndication and social status. To test these propositions, I conducted another 
sufficiency analysis with performance being the outcome condition. I also added two new 
causal conditions: 1) Chinese and Chinese-similar partners indicating partnering with 
local VC firms or VC firms from countries culturally and spatially close to China (i.e. 
Taiwan and Hong Kong) 2) US and US-similar partners including other developed 
countries (i.e. UK, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Israel). These conditions not only 
capture the syndication but also the type o f partner with which the focal VC firms have 
syndicated in different situations. Table 2 demonstrates the results for the performance 
analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, sufficiency analysis resulted in two major solutions. The overall solution 
consistency is 0.91 and the overall solution coverage is 0.20 which is acceptable 
considering the fact that there are many other factors influencing the investment
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performance (i.e. IPO or M&A). The major competing arguments stated in propositions 
3a and 3b are whether the syndication is highly associated with performance of the 
investment in a way that we will find high performers to be mostly syndicated ones or 
VC firms can achieve high performance if they have the required competencies (i.e. the 
home and host social status and experiences) based on the investee conditions (i.e. the 
information asymmetry and technical complexity factors). As demonstrated in Table 2, 
both solutions include partnering with both groups o f partners: local/similar to local and 
US/other developed country partners. To gain more specific insights about the impact of 
the syndication on performance compared to that of VC firms internal competencies 
(following the discussion in the second set o f propositions) and also to clarify which sets 
o f conditions (venture or VC firms) more significantly determine the syndication decision 
(following the discussion in the first set of propositions), I further conducted necessity 
test.
Necessity Analysis
Necessity test is to further analyze the causal conditions in order to determine 
whether each set (venture vs. VC firms characteristics) are necessary for syndication and 
whether syndication is a necessary condition for performance. Necessity measures the 
degree to which an outcome is a subset o f a given causal condition (Ragin, 2006). A 
causal condition is “almost always necessary” for an outcome if its consistency is greater 
than 0.90 (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010). First, to examine which set 
o f variables are more influential to syndication decision, I conducted a necessity test for 
the venture stage, venture age, and venture industry versus the VC firms’ home and host 
social status, age, and prior experience in the host country. Table 3 demonstrates the
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result o f this test. As shown in this table, the VC firms characteristics do not reach to the 
0.90 threshold o f consistency which is required for necessity test. The venture 
characteristics have a consistency score o f 0.91 which make them a necessary condition 
for the syndication. Also, the coverage score for the venture traits is 0.66 which shows 
these results cover the syndicated cases to a great extent. In sum, it is fair to argue that the 
venture characteristics are more important in syndication decision than the VC firms 
capabilities and competencies.
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
I did a similar test to examine whether the syndication is a necessary condition for 
performance. For this test, I conduct the necessity test for two causal conditions that I 
added in my performance analysis: Chinese/Chinese-similar partners and US/US-similar 
partners. According to the results demonstrated in Table 4, syndicating with either group 
o f partners is not a necessary condition for high performance. However, lack o f the 
partners is a necessary condition for low performance. This roughly means although 
syndication does not guarantee the performance o f investment, investing alone would 
significantly decrease the likelihood o f success in emerging markets (i.e. China).
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The major goal of this study is to clarify the nature o f the syndication among VC 
firms especially in their international investments. More specifically, I seek to explore 
whether syndication has more of a contingency nature and it depends on the venture and 
VC firms attributes or VC firms have a natural tendency towards syndication regardless 
o f specific conditions that they face in each particular investment and their own
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capabilities. Considering the implications of the social status and what it takes for a VC 
firm (in terms o f capabilities) to reach to a high social status, firms with high status are 
among the bests in terms o f having experience o f successftilly managing an investment 
and having access to resources and connections required for success when investing in an 
entrepreneurial venture. I introduce the home country social status of developed country 
VC firms as a proxy o f having access to advanced resources, technologies, and human 
capital required in high-tech investments. Further, status in the host country is introduced 
as a sign o f foreign VC firms’ familiarity with the host country and capability o f handling 
the investments in a quite different institutional and business setting.
Therefore, if  syndication is contingent upon the problems stemming from the 
venture itself which are aggravated due to the underdeveloped institutional infrastructure 
o f emerging markets and unfamiliarity o f the VC firms with such markets, then high 
status in the host country can mitigate such problems and need for syndication. In other 
words, one could expect to see some cases where VC firms with high social status in the 
host country have preferred to invest alone and skip the discussed problems associated 
with syndication. The same logic applies to the risks associated with high-tech 
investments and advantages of having a high status in the home country (i.e. a developed 
country) which can mitigate such perceived risks and ultimately reduce the motivation for 
syndication for the VC firms.
My fsQCA analysis revealed five different solutions. Each solution consists of a 
configuration o f the VC firms and venture attributes that are associated with syndication 
in the investment cases. Solutions 1, 3, and 5 are cases in which the VC firms have high 
social status in both home and host country. Among these configurations, there are cases
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where the information asymmetry is low (C l) and the VC firms with high home country 
status have still preferred to syndicate. In other words, it seems that high level of social 
status in home does not substitute for the need for syndication. This situation is similar 
for home country social status and technical complexity risk. However, as Table 1 shows, 
technical complexity is present in all o f the configurations. Thus, I cannot make any 
assertion about the cases where technical complexity is low. In other words, high-tech 
industry is a core causal condition for syndication. In general, these results lend more 
support to the view that VC firms tend to syndicate their foreign investments in emerging 
markets even when they seem to be capable o f handling the investment alone. However,
I, by any means, do not assert that this is a completely generalizable argument for the VC 
investments considering the sample being limited to the US VC firms’ investments in 
China.
Another important question that this study seeks to answer is “which one is more 
influential in syndication decision: venture or VC firms attributes?” To answer this 
question, I conducted a necessity test to pit the venture and VC firms attributes against 
each other in terms o f their importance in syndication. The results show that while the 
venture attributes (riskiness) are necessary condition for syndication, the VC firms 
characteristics (including status in the home and host countries, prior experience in the 
host country, and age) are not necessary conditions for syndication. Further, I tested 
whether lack o f these characteristics (which imply their capabilities) in the VC firms is a 
necessary condition for syndication. Results demonstrated a negative answer to this 
question. In other words, lack o f internal capabilities does not necessarily lead the VC 
firms to syndicate their investment. However, as solution 4 (C4) shows, even VC firms
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without any o f aforementioned attributes could also join syndicated deals which is worthy 
o f research in the future to explore the motivations o f other VC firms co-investing with 
such counterparts.
Performance o f the investment is the next part of this study. In fact, the major 
question for this section is whether syndication can, most o f the time, help the 
performance or considering the potential problems o f partnership, the VC firms with high 
capability and experience can successfully exit the investment without syndication with 
others. The sufficiency analysis revealed two major solutions for high performing cases 
in both o f which the VC firms had syndicated with developed country and local/close to 
local partners. However, the coverage score o f 20% is not considerable enough to make 
any strong argument based on the result which is predictable since there are a lot of 
different internal and external factors influencing the IPO process. What can be 
interpreted from the results regarding the performance analysis is that investing in the 
ventures in more advanced stages, and partnering with VC firms from developed 
countries (which can bring business-specific resources and experiences to the deal) and 
local/close to local firms (which can mitigate the information asymmetry) are associated 
with superior performance. Further, the analysis did not generate any solutions in which 
VC firms with high capabilities (i.e. high status in home and host countries) could 
achieve high performance without syndication.
Further, I also conducted a necessity test to explore whether syndication is a 
necessary condition to achieve high performance. According to the results, syndication is 
not a necessary condition for high performance. However, interestingly, the absence of 
syndication is a necessary condition for poor performance. In other words, while
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syndication does not guarantee the performance o f investment, deciding not to partner 
with other firms can significantly reduce the likelihood o f success in emerging market 
investments made by the developed country VC firms.
Theoretical Implications
Syndication is a common strategy in managing the investments in the VC industry 
which makes this industry highly social and interactive (Lemer, 1990; Guler & Guillen, 
2010). However, previous studies have mentioned different motivations for syndication 
as well as difficulties and problems associated with syndication. Some of these arguments 
seem to treat syndication mostly as a strategy that regardless o f the investee and investor 
characteristics has some inherent advantages. Access to deal flow, future reciprocation, 
increased legitimacy of the venture, enhanced perceived accuracy o f pricing at time of 
exit, and diversification o f the investment portfolio by the VC firms to reduce the overall 
risk are examples o f syndication motivations that can exist regardless o f the VC firms and 
venture characteristics (Higgins & Gulati 2003; Jaaskelainen, 2012; Lockett & Wright, 
2001; Megginson & Weiss 1991; Wilson, 1968; Wright & Lockett, 2003). I called this 
approach “natural proclivity” towards syndication.
On the other hand, there are other studies that have linked syndication to the 
attributes o f the venture (mainly riskiness) and VC firms capabilities to select the 
investee, manage the investment, and add value to the venture to make a successful exit 
from it (Brander et al., 2002; Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Hopp & Rieder, 2011; 
Jaaskelainen, 2012; Meuleman, Wright, Manigart, & Lockett, 2009). 1 called this 
perspective “contingency approach” towards syndication.
I l l
Considering the nature o f the VC industry (a social industry) and significantly 
positive influence o f the VC firms’ status on the process and outcome o f their 
investments evident in previous studies (Abell & Nisar, 2007; Echols & Tsai, 2005;
Guler & Guillen, 2010; Hochberg et al., 2007; Jaaskelainen et al., 2008), and the 
advantages o f social status in the inter-firm networks in general (Gulati, 1998; Powell et 
al., 1999), I introduced the social status as a proxy of the VC firms competencies and 
capabilities and I coupled it with the general and host country experiences to pit these 
two approaches against each other. In essence, if  the contingency approach has more 
merit that natural proclivity, then one could expect to see configurations in which VC 
firms capabilities have enabled them to deal with the riskiness o f the venture leading 
them to invest alone. However, my results show that VC firms’ capability is associated 
with syndication even when the risk o f the investment is not high.
Although I am very cautious in generalizing my results due to the sample 
limitation (US VC firms’ investments in China) and my coverage score (40%), my results 
lend more support to the natural proclivity approach. Internal competencies, proved by 
high status, which makes VC firms capable o f handling their investments (even risky 
ones) more effectively does not impact their motivation for syndication. Therefore, the 
real incentive from syndication may come from the sources discussed earlier in natural 
proclivity approach (e.g. deal flow, reciprocation, portfolio diversification, venture 
legitimacy). Further, since the context o f this study is the international investments, 
another viable reason for syndication for the foreign VC firms may come from after 
investment and monitoring activities which are difficult for them especially those that do 
not have local offices and employees.
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The results o f necessity test take us even further and show that the main driver of 
syndication decision is the venture characteristics as oppose to the VC firms attributes. 
Thus, scholars who believe in a contingency nature for syndication are encouraged to 
explore more venture-related factors that can impact the VC firms’ perceived need for 
syndication. For instance, prior experience and characteristics o f the founder 
entrepreneurs and current managers (if different from founders) are viable venues for 
future research as they have been proved to impact the performance o f the venture (e.g. 
Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994; Stuart & Abetti, 1990).
In sum, although social status has been recognized by prior studies to be highly 
advantageous for the VC firms but according the results o f this study, it cannot substitute 
the advantages that syndication provides in spite o f the potential conflicts and problems 
present in a partnership. The social status makes firms more attractive to get into better 
deals and partner with more qualified partners but does not reduce their motivation for 
syndication.
In terms of the performance implication, both solutions generated from the 
analysis include syndication. To have a closer look at the syndication phenomenon and its 
performance implication, I divided the partners into two major categories: 1) local partner 
and those that are from countries spatially and culturally close to China (i.e. Taiwan and 
Hong Kong) 2) US partners and those from other developed countries. The reason behind 
this classification is that these different types o f partners can deliver different values to 
the deal. While local/close to local partners can mitigate the information asymmetry and 
LOF because o f their cultural proximity and local connections, the latter could help the 
focal firms with technical complexity o f the venture because they have more experiences
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in VC investments and they have access to more advanced resources through their home 
country required in high-tech ventures.
Interestingly, the results revealed that VC firms can achieve superior performance 
in their investment regardless o f their social status in both home and host countries and 
their general and host country experiences. However, both solutions include partners 
from both groups. Since the coverage score is 20%, I am again very cautious about 
making any strong argument. But, at the very least, in this sample having partners from 
both host country/close to host country and home/other developed countries is associated 
with high performance. The necessity test revealed even more interesting results: having 
either o f these groups of partner is not a necessary condition for achieving high 
performance in the sample but lack o f syndication with them is a necessary condition for 
low performance. In other words, syndication does not guarantee the performance but 
lack o f it may significantly hurt the performance. This result may be the greatest take 
away for the practitioners. To achieve success in emerging market investments, VC firms 
need to partner with others (from host and other developed countries) with potential to 
add exclusive values to the venture. Thus, stand-alone international investments have a 
higher likelihood o f failure. However, to increase the likelihood of success managers 
have to be very delicate about the partners that they choose to work with.
For the scholars, the theoretical take away is that despite the similarities between 
syndication in the VC industry and alliances in other industries, certain norms of alliances 
may not exactly apply in the VC firms syndication context. The international alliance 
literature introduces the inter-firm alliance as an entry mode into an international market 
to mitigate the LOF. Prior studies on international alliances argue that as soon as foreign
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firms from developed countries can stand on their own feet and grow their own roots in 
the host country, they will not need local partners and they lose their motivation to form 
alliance with such counterparts (Child et al., 2005). However, it may not hold for the VC 
firms. As my results show, VC firms with highly established network and high general 
and host country experiences still tend to syndicate and that can help them in their 
performance. Scholars in the VC industry field are encouraged to explore the 
phenomenon o f the partnership and syndication more delicately in the VC industry. For 
instance, the fact that syndication is not a necessary condition for performance but lack o f 
syndication is significantly associated with failure gives legitimacy to the arguments in 
the literature discussing the potential problems in syndication such as coercive pressures 
and different investment philosophy among VC firms (Fleming, 2004; Guler, 2007). 
Future studies can explore more about the factors which can create a sustaonable fit 
between partners. Also, potential detrimental problems that VC firms may encounter in 
their syndications are worthwhile to study particularly using primary data from the actual 
managers involved in the international deals.
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Figure 3.1: Theoretical Framework
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Table 3.1: Sufficiency Test for Syndication
Causal Conditions
Syndication
C l C2 C3 C4 C5
Venture Stage • • <8> <8>
Venture Age <8> <8> <8>
High-Tech Industry • • • • •
VC Firm Age <8> <8> <8)
VC Firm Prior Deals in China • <8> <8> <8> (8)
VC Firm Home Country Status • <8> • (8) •
VC Firm Host Country Status • • • (8) •
Consistency 0.86 0.80 0.81 0.76 0.79
Raw Coverage 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.14
Unique Coverage 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.00









Venture Stage • •
High-Tech Industry • •
Venture Age
VC Firm Prior Deals in China • <8>
VC Firm Home Country Status •
VC Firm Host Country Status • <8>
Developed Country Partner • •
Local/Similar to Local Partner • •
Consistency 0.89 0.91
Raw Coverage 0.08 0.16
Unique Coverage 0.04 0.12
Overall solution consistency
0.91
Overall solution coverage 0.20
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Table 3.3: Necessity Test for Syndication
Presence (or High Levels) of
Necessary for Syndication
Consistency Coverage
Venture Stage (low) OR High-Tech Venture OR Venture Age 
(Low)
0.91 0.66
VC Firm Home Status OR Host Status OR Age OR Host 
Experience
0.51 0.63
Necessary for the absence 
of Syndication
VC Firm Home Status OR Host Status OR Age OR Host 
Experience
0.53 0.37
Note: “OR” in this table is a logical or which implies the presence o f each individual 
causal condition or a combination o f some o f the causal conditions. Low levels of venture 
stage and age have been considered here as a proxy of venture riskiness which may lead 
to syndication.
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Table 3.4: Necessity Test for Performance
Presence o f (or High 
Levels)
Necessary for High 
Performance
Necessary for Low 
Performance
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
Developed Country Partner 
OR Local/Similar to Local 
Partner
0.77 0.36 0.71 0.64
Absence of (or Low Levels)
Developed Country Partner 
OR Local/Similar to Local 
Partner
0.50 0.23 0.90 0.77
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CHAPTER 4
ESSAY III: VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS CROSS-BORDER SYNDICATION 
AND PERFORMANCE: DOES HOST COUNTRY MATTER?
4.1 ABSTRACT
Venture capital investments have become an increasingly international phenomenon. 
However, the process o f the venture capital firms’ investments overseas remains under- 
studied. Identifying the factors at different levels that impact the investment behavior o f 
the venture capital firms can significantly contribute to this research stream and shed 
light on the internationalization process o f venture capital firms. Thus, I aim to fill this 
gap by examining the role o f the host country as determinant o f the syndication decision 
and performance o f the foreign venture capital firms. As the first step in this stream, I ask 
the question whether and to what extent the host country explain the variation in the 
syndication and performance o f the foreign venture capital firms. I investigate these 
issues by studying the international expansion o f the US venture capital firms into 53 
different countries in 2005. The results indicate that the host country effect significantly 
explains a partial variation in both syndication and performance. The fine-grained 
findings and implications for future studies are discussed.
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4.2 INTRODUCTION
Venture Capital (VC) investment has become an international phenomenon in 
recent years (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2004; Gompers & Lemer, 2003; Wright, 
Pruthi, & Lockett, 2005), and cross border investments by VC firms have become 
increasingly common (Makela & Maula, 2006). Such investments are defined as 
“investments made by venture capital investors in portfolio companies located in other 
countries than the country from which the investment is managed” (Makela & Maula, 
2008: 237). The significant contribution o f VC investments in supporting 
entrepreneurship and innovation has made them an important driver o f economic 
development and their internationalization worthy of research for scholars (Guler & 
Guillen, 2010a).
Despite the increasing trend o f VC firms’ internationalization, literature on 
international VC investments is in the early stages o f development (Makela & Maula, 
2008). For the most part, prior literature is two-fold: first, there are several studies 
undertaking cross-country comparisons o f the VC industry within various countries (e.g., 
Jeng & Wells, 2000; Li & Zahra, 2012; Manigart et al., 2000, 2002). Second, there are 
other studies focusing on the drivers o f international VC investments (e.g., Guler & 
Guill&i, 2010a; Hall & Tu, 2003; Maula & Makela, 2003). While these studies help us 
understand the variations o f VC practices across different countries and determinants of 
cross country investments, they do not provide a clear understanding of the actual process 
o f cross border investments by VC firms. Thus, international activities undertaken by VC 
firms and factors influencing those activities remain under-researched (Meuleman & 
Wright, 2011).
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Syndication is one o f the most important strategic decisions among VC firms 
(Lemer, 1994). It occurs when two or more VC firms jointly finance a particular venture 
(Brander, Amit, & Antweiler, 2002). However, similar to other VC activities, the 
majority o f prior studies’ focus has been on syndication among domestic firms (Bygrave, 
1987; Brander et al., 2002; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007; Lemer, 1994; Manigart et 
al., 2006), and there are very few studies looking at crossborder syndications and factors 
influencing them (e.g., Makela & Maula, 2006; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). The 
strategic importance o f syndication in VC firms’ success in their investments (Brander et 
al., 2002; Walske, Zacharakis, & Smith-Doerr, 2007), in addition to VC firms’ 
undeniable role in entrepreneurship, innovation, and supporting internationalizing 
ventures in any country they invest (Hursti & Maula 2007; Makela & Maula, 2008), 
evoke more scholarly attention to the phenomenon of cross border syndication.
Prior studies have mentioned risks associated with a specific venture as one o f the 
factors leading VC firms to syndicate with other counterparts to share the risk and 
increase the likelihood of success (Brander et al., 2002; Lemer, 1994; Lockett & Wright, 
2001). In addition to the venture itself, VC firms encounter other risk factors when 
investing abroad. Investing in other countries is often problematic due to cultural, 
institutional, and special distances (Makela & Maula, 2008). It creates market level risk 
and uncertainty for VC firms (Ruhnka & Young, 1991), which is also aggravated by 
liability o f foreignness (LOF) that VC firms experience particularly when they are new in 
the host country (Lu & Hwang, 2010). Cultural and institutional distances create 
substantial information asymmetry between foreign VC firms and local entrepreneurs
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(Wright et al., 2005), which increases the investment risk and reinforces the risk sharing 
motivation behind syndication.
One solution to mitigate LOF is partnering with local firms and learning how to 
do the business in the host country (Zaheer, 1995). However, that can also be 
problematic. The same factors that create information asymmetry between VC firms and 
entrepreneurs and hence, stimulate them to syndicate (i.e., cultural and institutional 
distances), also make it difficult and risky for them to partner with local firms. Having 
different cultural norms and institutional practices creates barriers against cooperation 
among firms from distant countries and accordingly may lower the performance o f inter­
firm cooperation (Michailova & Ang, 2008; Hitt, Tyler, Hardee, & Park, 1995; Rao & 
Schmidt, 1998; Sirmon & Lane, 2004). To develop a clear understanding o f this dilemma 
and open plausible venues for future research on cross border syndication, the first step 
would be to examine whether and how host country characteristics influence VC firms’ 
syndication behavior in their cross border investments. In other words, how much o f the 
variation in syndication decision is explained by host country factors as opposed to 
venture and VC firms attributes (e.g., venture riskiness and VC firm’s capabilities).
To answer this question, I conduct a variance decomposition analysis on U.S. VC 
firms’ investments in 53 countries during 2005. As explained, the primary research 
question o f this study is: does host country influence international VC firms’ decision to 
form syndication? If yes, how much is that impact compared to venture and VC firm’s 
characteristics. To create a deeper understanding, I conduct separate analyses to compare 
the influence o f host country on syndication formation between foreign-local VC firms 
and foreign-other home country VC firms. Such analysis can contribute to the
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aforementioned dilemma where from one side, differences between home and host 
country drive foreign VC firms to syndicate with local firms and on the other side, the 
same factors hinder successful cooperation between them and local VC firms. I examine 
whether partnering with home country firms with more similarity and familiarity is the 
solution to this dilemma. In other words, whether host country explains more variance in 
syndicating with home country counterparts compared to that with local firms.
Undoubtedly, the importance of syndication is due to its role in the performance 
o f VC firm’s investments (Brander et al., 2002; Lemer, 1994). Therefore, it is critical to 
investigate whether host country also plays a significant role influencing the performance 
o f foreign VC firms’ investments. Accordingly, I examine the amount o f variance in 
investment performance explained by host country. To provide a more fine-grained 
picture, I further examine whether the variance explained by host country is different 
between syndicated and stand-alone investments. Further, to examine whether having 
different partners (from host versus home country) contributes differently in various 
countries, I investigate and compare the variation o f performance explained by host 
country when foreign VC firms syndicate with local versus other home country firms.
By focusing on international investments, this study contributes to the VC 
literature in several ways. First, the process o f VC firms’ internationalization and more 
importantly the ways they manage their international investments has been neglected in 
the literature (see Jaaskelainen, 2012; Wright et al., 2005). This study provides insights 
into this phenomenon by focusing on syndication behavior o f international VC firms in 
various countries. Considering the infancy o f literature on cross border syndication 
(Makela & Maula, 2006; Meuleman & Wright, 2011), this study attempts to investigate
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to what extent host country matters in syndication formation. This can clarify whether 
investment context is worthy of research for future studies on VC firms syndication.
Second, by providing more fine-grained results comparing the impact o f host 
country on syndication with local versus home country firms, the present study seeks to 
contribute in resolving the dilemma o f syndication with local firms in distant markets. In 
essence, unfamiliarity with host country leads foreign VC firms to partner with local 
firms to mitigate LOF and information asymmetry with entrepreneurs (Lu & Hwang,
2010). Nevertheless, due to the same rationale, such partnerships might be problematic 
(Hitt et al., 1995). Thus, does it motivate foreign VC firms to partner with other firms 
from home country to share the investment risk and lower the risks associated with 
partnering with a local partner? My analysis reveals whether the host country explains 
more o f syndication with local or home country firms and helps to answer this question. 
Results o f such analysis provide the domain where there is more merit for future studies 
to focus.
Finally, by examining the share o f host country in explaining the variation in 
performance o f foreign VC firms’ investments, first, I answer the question whether the 
host country has a significant influence on performance. If yes, it makes it very relevant 
and worthwhile for future research to explore specific country level factors that creates 
such influence. Second, by breaking the analysis down to the performance of different 
investments regarding the syndication status (syndicated versus stand alone and 
syndicated only with local firms), I provide researchers a more comprehensive picture 
helping them identify where to focus and what to explore in future studies. For
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practitioners, such results provide insights on to what extent they have to adjust their 
syndication strategies investing in different countries.
CROSS BORDER VC FIRM S SYNDICATION 
Due to its frequency and popularity in the VC industry, syndication has become 
one o f the defining characteristics o f this industry and drawn much attention among 
scholars in this research stream (Jaaskelainen, 2012). Syndication arises when VC firms 
jointly invest in a venture (Brander et al., 2002). The decision to syndicate an investment 
is a multilevel phenomenon that depends on different factors. Prior studies have focused 
on exploring factors from two different levels -  venture and VC firms -  as drivers o f 
syndication among VC firms.
According to Jaaskelainen (2012), antecedents for syndication related to VC firms 
can be categorized into two major groups. First, there are functional antecedents which 
are related to the actual intermediary role o f VC firms and how they perform that role.
VC firms’ role in their relationship with entrepreneurial ventures in which they invest 
goes beyond solely providing money. They also undertake several value-adding activities 
(e.g., administrative, managerial, and marketing) to help the venture grow (Cumming, 
Fleming, & Suchard, 2005). Thus, one o f the common underlying motivations for VC 
firms to form syndication is to share resources and skills to improve those activities 
(Brander et al., 2002; Lemer, 1994). Additionally, syndication with other VC firms 
enhances prescreening and evaluating investment proposals that VC firms receive and 
helps to select the best and the most promising ventures (Wright & Lockett, 2003). That 
is because VC firms tend to specialize in their operation in terms o f the industry they 
invest in, the stage o f the venture, and the location or geographical region of the deals
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(Lockett & Wright, 2001). Therefore, they can benefit from others’ opinions when there 
is an appealing opportunity out o f their domain of expertise.
Second, VC firms sometimes engage in syndication due to strategic motives. 
Window dressing is one o f the common strategic motives. In this case, VC firms join a 
syndication to enjoy the benefits o f being associated with an event (e.g., successful exit 
o f the venture) to improve the external perceptions about them (Lemer, 1994). They can 
also attract attention and enhance their social status among other peers via affiliation with 
other high-status VC firms in a syndicated deal (Guler & Guillen, 2010b; Podolny, 2001). 
Thus, such incentives can exist independently regardless o f the venture characteristics.
At the venture level, there are also some attributes that create the motivation for 
VC firms to form syndication. Jaaskelainen (2012: 448) briefly describes those 
characteristics:
“Depending on the resources o f the VC firm, it may need to: (1) resort to 
evaluations o f other VCs to ensure a robust selection; (2) access the 
expertise and contacts o f other VCs in order to augment its own resources 
to ensure sufficient contributions to the development o f the venture; and 
(3) limit its exposure to the venture-specific financial risk by reducing its 
share o f the required investments.”
Further, information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and VC firms also creates 
risk which leads VC firms to enter syndication in order to share that risk. Information 
asymmetry stems from the fact that the entrepreneur is more informed about the nature o f 
her business and risks and uncertainties involved (Cumming & Johan, 2008; Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2004).
As briefly explained, prior studies have explored factors driving the syndication 
decision among VC firms at venture and VC firm levels. However, this stream neglects 
the increasing trend o f internationalization o f VC investments (Wright et al., 2005). With
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growing VC firms’ cross border investments, the magnitude and likelihood of 
collaboration between firms from different countries is increasing (Meuleman & Wright,
2011). Investing in a foreign country and partnering with firms from other countries bring 
country level factors to the forefront. However, by neglecting cross border syndications, 
prior studies do not provide much insight about the potential impact that host country 
may have on syndication behavior o f the firms and have mostly focused on syndication 
among local VC firms (Brander et al., 2002; Hochberg et al., 2007; Lemer, 1994). Even 
those that have looked at cross border syndications do not discuss whether host country 
impacts the decision to form syndication in general nor whether more specifically it 
influences the likelihood of syndication o f foreign firms with local versus home country 
counterparts. For instance, Makela and Maula (2006) explored the factors that can 
influence VC firms’ commitment to the investment portfolio when they are engaged in 
international syndications. In another study, Makela and Maula (2008) examined how 
having a local investor helps entrepreneurs attract other foreign investors and benefit 
from such syndications. Finally in a recent study, Jaaskelainen and Maula (2014) 
investigated the role o f cross border syndications and indirect ties with foreign investors 
on preferred type and location of exit o f the venture.
While all o f these studies enhance our understanding o f VC firms’ international 
investments from different perspectives, they do not answer the basic question that I aim 
to address in this study: does host country impact the syndication decision o f 
international VC firms in general? If yes, does it impact such decisions differently with 
respect to the type o f partner (i.e., local versus home country partners)? Further, does host
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country play a significant role in international VC firms’ achieving successful exit from 
their investments? If yes, would such a role vary for syndicated investments?
Answering these questions sheds light on potential venues for future research and 
determines where future studies examining cross border VC investments and particularly 
cross border syndications need to focus. In the following, I first explain why one can 
potentially argue that country level factors can influence the syndication pattern of 
international VC firms and develop some testable hypotheses accordingly. Then, relying 
on the data from cross border investments o f the U.S. VC firms in 53 countries, I present 
my empirical investigation answering the research questions and testing the hypotheses.
4.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Host country and Syndication Formation
VC investments are subject to two types of risks: venture risk and market risk 
(Lockett & Wright, 2001). Venture risks are those directly associated with a specific 
venture in which a VC firm invests. I briefly described how specific requirements o f an 
investment may impose non-systematic risks to the investors (i.e., VC firms). 
Additionally, context o f the investment (i.e., host country) can also significantly impact 
the risks and uncertainties associated with VC investments. According to Wright and 
Robbie (1998), VC investment activities usually include the following steps after fund 
raising: access to deal flow and receiving investment proposals, selecting the most 
promising and relevant deals, structuring the deal, monitoring and value adding activities, 
and finally exiting the venture as an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or merger and 
acquisition (M&A). Macro country level factors such as institutional environment can
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closely impact each of these activities and alter the risk o f investment at each stage and 
consequently influence the likelihood o f syndication for foreign VC firms.
The first requirement in VC investments is for the VC firm to have access to deal 
flow. Having access to more investment deals provides VC firms with the opportunity to 
select from a wider variety o f ventures and invest in the most promising ones considering 
the qualifications o f both VC firm and venture (Lockett & Wright, 2001). Having 
contacts and relationships in the local market is extremely important at this stage since 
VC firms “cultivate a deal flow based on networks o f contacts and relationships” 
(Sahlman, 1990: 500). Similar to any other international firms, foreign VC firms initially 
suffer from liability o f outsidership (LOO). That is defined as the lack o f position in a 
relevant network and due to the relationship based nature o f the VC industry can be 
indeed “the root o f uncertainty” (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009: 1411). Thus, international 
VC firms in a foreign country face the risk o f missing a great part o f deal flow. One of 
the common strategies to deal with LOO is developing a local network and improving the 
firm’s position in that network (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Syndication is the common 
way to achieve this goal. Due to reciprocation, syndication assures VC firms that they 
will have access to future deals even if they are not the originator (Bovaird, 1990). 
According to Manigart et al. (2006: 134), “having a strong syndication network increases 
the status and visibility o f a VC firm, increasing its likelihood of being invited into a 
syndicate network.”
After receiving investment proposals, the next step for VC firms is to screen the 
investment opportunities and select the most promising ones to invest in. The major 
problem at this stage is the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors
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which creates agency problems because entrepreneurs are more informed about the 
venture and its state than VC firms are (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Sahlman, 1990; 
Trester, 1998). Information asymmetry and consequent agency problems are likely to be 
systematically different and exacerbated in different countries given institutional, 
cultural, and geographical differences that exist among countries (Wright et al., 2005).
Cultural distance between foreign VC firms and entrepreneurs in emerging 
markets aggravates the information asymmetry problem which commonly exists between 
these two parties in VC investments (Wright et al., 2005). Further, weak institutional 
environment and investor protection in emerging markets reduce the reliability of 
information provided by the entrepreneurs (Pruthi, Wright, & Lockett, 2003; Manigart et 
al., 1997; Manigart et al., 2000), which in turn increases the risk o f the VC firm’s 
investment and evokes more due diligence in deal selection (Lockett, Wright, Sapienza,
& Pruthi, 2002). Investor protection laws’ availability and more importantly enforcement 
vary to a great extent among different countries (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003). That 
changes the reliability o f the information available to VC firms through the entrepreneurs 
in each country and determines the severity o f information asymmetry and agency 
problem (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Hitt et al., 2000). Cultural differences and 
dissimilarities in business practices and norms (normative and cognitive pillars o f the 
institutional environment) also hinder effective communication and trust formation 
between foreign investors and local entrepreneurs and hence are an important part o f VC 
firms’ perceived risk associated with their investment (Bruton, Fried, & Manigart, 2005).
Syndication has been recognized as one of VC firms’ common strategies to deal 
with information asymmetry and making better informed decisions at the selection stage.
148
With syndication, VC firms benefit from having other partners’ opinion on the 
investment, improving their due diligence, and exploring hidden problems that otherwise 
they would have neglected on their own (Lemer, 1994; Lockett, Wright, Sapienza, & 
Pruthi, 2002).
Post-investment value adding activities in addition to close monitoring distinguish 
VC firms from other investors such as banks in the sense that they have a more hands-on 
approach helping entrepreneurial ventures grow and ultimately prepare them for a 
successful exit (Sapenza, 1992). These activities include sharing their expertise with 
entrepreneurs in different areas such as finance, marketing, strategic planning, and 
administrative processes (Cumming et al., 2005). They also introduce customers and 
resources owners to the venture and help them in both resource and customer acquisition 
(Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2004). VC firms actively monitor their portfolio companies -  
their internal processes and operating performance. That is so vital and important that VC 
firms devote a significant proportion of their time -  as much as half o f their operating 
time - to monitoring activities (Barry, 1994; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Despite their 
importance, monitoring and value adding activities become problematic when VC firms 
invest abroad.
Spatial, cultural, and institutional distances make such activities more difficult to 
perform for foreign VC firms. Due to the nature o f VC investments and their vital role in 
the investments’ success, monitoring and value adding activities require substantial time 
and effort from VC firms (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989). Accordingly, geographic distance 
remains a substantial determinant o f costs and feasibility of VC firms active and close 
monitoring and value adding activities (Cumming & Dai, 2010). Further, VC firms from
different countries develop their own style o f monitoring and value adding activities that 
are accustomed to their culture (Pruthi et al., 2003). When investing abroad, those styles 
may not entirely fit the host country’s culture and business norms which govern the 
relationship between entrepreneurs and investors (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). Such misfit 
can seriously endanger the success o f the investment considering the vital role o f such 
activities. As such, depending on the host country’s different characteristics, VC firms 
may encounter significant risks in their post-investment plans. Again, one common 
remedy to such problems is partnering with other firms. Syndication provides the 
opportunity to benefit from a partner’s cultural and spatial proximity in communicating 
with local entrepreneurs (Dai, Jo, & Kassicieh, 2012). Plus, having other partners on a 
deal, VC firms have the opportunity to share the time-consuming tasks o f monitoring and 
pool required resources for the venture’s success which in turn mitigates the 
aforementioned risks.
Finally, prior studies have mentioned providing more options and adding to a 
venture’s legitimacy at the time of exit as another incentive for syndication among VC 
firms. Joining an investment, each partner brings its own contacts and reputation that 
increases the likelihood o f exit for the venture (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). The fact that 
a venture has been able to attract multiple investors signals the quality of the company 
and enhances its legitimacy in the eyes of potential buyers (Higgins & Gulati, 2003). 
Further, according to Jaaskelainen (2012: 452), “the syndicates provide increased 
reputational capital which helps to certify the quality and correctness o f the pricing 
during the exit process, thus reducing the discount resulting from asymmetric information 
and enhancing the returns on the investment”. The major exit options for VC firms are
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stock market (i.e., IPO) and M&A (Cumming, 2008; Cumming & Macintosh, 2003a). 
Particularly, a well-developed financial market and IPO are among the strongest factors 
increasing the likelihood o f VC investments in each country (Black & Gilson, 1998). 
Thus, the ability o f a VC partner to contribute to a successful exit o f a venture is partially 
a function o f its country’s stock market quality. Nonetheless, countries vary in terms of 
development o f their financial markets and different industries where there are 
opportunities for M&A as an exit vehicle for VC investments (Jeng & Wells, 2000). That 
systematically alters the incentives o f foreign VC firms for syndication due to their plan 
for exit (type and location) according to the host country’s conditions and the capability 
o f potential partners in adding value which partially stems from their country o f origin 
where they have the most activities.
In sum, from these arguments, it is evident that country can play a significant role 
in altering foreign VC firms’ incentives for syndication. Host country where international 
VC firms invest can impact different stages o f the VC firms’ investment cycle. Country 
level factors at each stage interact with underlying motives o f syndication and 
consequently can alter the likelihood o f syndication for foreign VC firms. Thus, I argue:
Hypothesis I: International VC firm s ’ decision to form  syndication varies
systematically with differences in host country characteristics.
Host country and Type of Partner
VC firms form syndication and select the appropriate partners corresponding to 
specific needs and motivations (Brander et al., 2002). As discussed, in the context o f 
international investments, there are country level factors beyond the specific investment 
posing risk to foreign VC firms and impacting their decision to form syndication. Here, I
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argue that in addition to the general decision to form syndication, host country 
characteristics also influence the type o f partner VC firms select to syndicate with.
Similar to any other firms when investing abroad, VC firms face liability of 
foreignness (LOF) (Lu & Hwang, 2010). Regardless o f their capabilities and successful 
experiences, international VC firms do not initially possess local knowledge and 
information (Hall & Tu, 2003). They also lack local connections which is a significant 
weakness given that the o f VC industry is heavily network based and dependent on inter­
firm links (Guler & Guillen, 2010b). As described in the previous section, these 
disadvantages can cause problems at different stages o f investments and ultimately hurt 
the performance o f the investment for foreign VC firms.
The international business literature suggests that there are two common strategies 
that multinational firms can apply to mitigate LOF: first, they can utilize firm-specific 
advantages that they have grown in their home country to succeed in international 
operation consistent with the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Miller & Parkhe,
2002). However, this strategy might be problematic due to differences in business norms 
and practices as well as institutional environment across different countries (Lockett & 
Wright, 2002). The second approach is to learn and mimic successful practices in the 
local market (Lu & Beamish, 2001), which can be achieved through partnering with local 
firms. Domestic firms are the best source for foreign investors to learn and follow best 
practices in local market and gain access to local knowledge and connect to local 
authorities (Hitt et al., 2000; Yan & Gray, 1994). This is also a relevant strategy for VC 
firms given the similarity between syndication in the VC industry and alliance and joint 
venture in other industries (Wright & Lockett, 2003).
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Thus, the level o f institutional and cultural distances between host and home
countries determines the magnitude o f LOF that foreign firms experience. In the context
of VC firms’ investment, the LOF particularly rises from information asymmetry
between foreign investors and entrepreneurs (Lu & Hwang, 2010; Wright, Lockett, &
Pruthi, 2002). That is because foreign VC firms lack in-depth knowledge related to the
local market and their local network is weak compared to domestic peers (Eriksson,
Johanson, Majkard, & Sharma, 1997; Li, Lin, & Arya, 2008). Having a domestic partner
can tremendously help alleviate the communication barriers between foreign investors
and local entrepreneurs (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Yeh, 2004). Accordingly, I argue that since
country level factors directly influence perceived LOF by foreign investors, it will
consequently impact their motives to partner with local partners as well. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2a: International VC firm s ’ decision to form  syndication with 
domestic firms in the host country varies systematically with differences in host 
country characteristics.
Despite the role that domestic VC firms can play in alleviating the information 
asymmetry between foreign VC firms and local entrepreneurs, their relationship with 
foreign firms can be problematic. The same information asymmetry problem may arise in 
syndication between foreign and domestic VC firms (Portesa & Rey, 2005; Sahlman, 
1990). That increases the risk o f exploitation o f such asymmetric information by 
domestic VC firms (Lockett & Wright, 2001). As Bell, Filatotchev, and Rasheed (2012:
112) mention, such problems can “diminish the commitment o f venture capitalists in 
foreign markets”.
Further, another motivation for VC firms to form syndications is access to future 
deals with partners’ reciprocation (Lemer, 1990). According to Tykvovaa and Schertler
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(2011), cross border investments are also subject to this argument. In other words, 
syndicating with local firms, foreign VC firms can enhance their access to local deal 
flow. However, Lu and Hwang (2010) found that compared to domestic firms, foreign 
VC firms receive fewer investment offers from their local network. They argue that is 
because ties between foreign and local VC firms are mostly weak compared to that 
between local investors. Weak tie and subsequent lack o f mutual trust make introducing 
deals to foreign VC firms risky for domestic firms because “gains from a successful deal 
only signal goodwill but the loss from a failed deal may be the end of the relationship due 
to the lack o f mutual trust” (Lu & Hwang, 2010: 85). Therefore, the fact that local 
partners may not function well with respect to introducing new deals and connecting 
foreign VC firms to local deal flow reduce the attractiveness o f forming such 
syndications for foreign investors.
Moreover, standard and preferred practices that VC firms usually develop at the 
home country can be different across countries (Wright et al. 2005). The way that VC 
firms structure their deals, manage their investment, and perform in different stages o f the 
investment cycle constitutes an investment philosophy for them which can be different 
across countries according to different business and institutional norms (MacMillan, 
Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989; Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993). For instance, Wright et al.
(2002) found that foreign VC firms perform significantly different from domestic firms in 
India in terms o f their emphasis on product market factors and accountants’ reports and 
use o f information and its type in assessing risk o f investment. In another study on India, 
Pruthi et al. (2003) also addressed differences between foreign and domestic firms in 
their monitoring activities.
154
In sum, information asymmetry and differences between foreign and domestic VC
firms make the syndication among them susceptible to conflicts which could reduce the
attractiveness o f using this strategy for foreign VC firms to alleviate LOF that they face
in their international investments. Indeed, such differences arise from country level
factors that influence business practices o f VC firms and shape the institutional
environment of each country.
I argue that since syndication with domestic firms may be subject to such risks
and difficulties (depending on the country o f investment), VC firms may turn to other
firms from their own home country to share the risk of international investment, pool
resources, and benefit from their opinions in selection and management o f those
investments. Alliance with firms from the same country removes the problems that are
due to cultural and institutional distances and brings more familiarity which in turn
enhances the trust between partners, an essential ingredient for success in any inter-firm
collaboration (Baum, Cowan, & Jonard, 2010). Additionally, VC firms from the same
country share similar investment philosophies to a great extent which reduce the
likelihood o f operational conflict between partners managing investments overseas
(Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; Pruthi et al., 2003). Thus:
Hypothesis 2b: International VC firm s ’ decision to form  syndication with home 
country firm s varies systematically with differences in host country 
characteristics.
Host Country and Investment Performance
The VC firms’ decision to invest in a venture is significantly driven by the exit 
potential o f the venture (Cumming, 2008). Common forms o f exit from an investment are 
offering venture’s share in stock market (IPO) or selling the venture to an incumbent firm
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in the form of M&A (Amit, Brander, & Zott, 1998; Wright & Robbie, 1998). My primary 
question in this section is whether country level factors can impact the international VC 
investments’ performance. Here, I describe the major requirements for VC firms to be 
successful in their investments and explain how host country can influence those factors.
One o f the major vehicles for VC firms to successfully exit from their investments 
and make profit is offering the venture’s shares in stock market in the form o f IPO. 
Compared to M&A and company buy-backs1, IPOs have higher return and as such are 
more attractive for VC firms (Black & Gilson, 1998). In fact, VC firms might offer their 
high quality ventures in public offering to obtain reputation and that is why exits through 
IPO are more profitable (Amit et al., 1998; Megginson, 2004). However, the availability 
and accessibility o f such an exit route depends directly on the vitality and development 
level o f the stock market in each country (Black & Gilson, 1998). Jeng and Wells (2000) 
compared VC activities in 21 countries and found that efficiency of stock market and 
particularly IPO varies in different countries and that it is the most influential factor 
determining the level of VC funding. Similarly, Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006:
1700) argue that “the existence o f viable exit markets for venture investments also 
increases the expected return to investors and entrepreneurs”. Subsequently, they found 
that countries are different with regard to “policies which result in the creation o f stock 
markets suitable for listing entrepreneurial companies” and that directly impacts VC 
activities across different countries.
1 Buy-back refers to situations that VC firm sells its stock in the company back to entrepreneurs and 
managers o f  the venture (Cumming & Macintosh, 2003).
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M &A1 which refers to selling a startup company to an incumbent firm is another 
popular exit vehicle for VC firms (Jeng & Well, 2000). Thus, M&A requires incumbent 
firms that are willing to invest in products and services that entrepreneurial ventures have 
to offer. Availability o f such incumbent firms also varies across countries (Pruthi et al.,
2003), because it requires an active industry in which the venture operates and countries 
are different in terms of different industries’ activities and development stage (Hitt et al., 
2000; Wright et al 2002).
Further, institutional environment may cause inconsistencies in VC investments 
across countries. Formal institutions are important in the VC industry because they reflect 
factors such as transaction costs and level o f property right protection in a country (Li & 
Zahra, 2012). High transaction costs necessitate well-specified contracts between VC 
firms and entrepreneurs (Sahlman, 1990). However, it is almost insurmountable to 
include all contingencies in a contract particularly when one side is an entrepreneurial 
venture which by nature bears high risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity (Heilman & Puri, 
2000). Plus, effective enforcement o f contracts is highly correlated with the strength of 
the legal system which is an important element o f formal institutions in any country 
(Bergara, Henisz, & Spiller, 1998). That also in turn impacts the performance of VC 
investments. For instance, Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher (2006) studied VC 
firms’ exits in 12 countries and found that IPOs are more likely in countries with a higher 
Legality index. A weak legal system and consequently high transaction cost and 
asymmetric information lead to opportunistic behavior and conflict between VC firms 
and entrepreneurs and that can reduce the likelihood o f success (Sahlman, 1990).
1 It is also known as trade sale (Jeng & Well, 2000).
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Property right protection is also highly influential in VC firms’ performance.
Since VC firms often invest in innovative and high-tech ventures (see Florida & Kenney, 
1988), lack o f property right protection can significantly damage the performance o f such 
ventures and thus, they might not survive long enough for a successful exit. Prior studies 
have shown that countries significantly vary in terms o f having and more importantly 
enforcing effective property right protection laws (Cumming et al., 2006; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).
Finally, high information asymmetry, a byproduct o f a weak institutional 
environment, can significantly affect VC firms’ ability to exit. In such an environment, 
relatively uninformed individual investors are reluctant to buy a venture’s shares in the 
stock market and the situation might be the same with regard to potential acquirer 
companies (Amit et al., 1998).
In sum, my argument here is that countries are different regarding availability and 
viability o f stuck market and IPOs, potential acquirer companies, institutional 
environment and its elements including information availability and costliness, legal 
system, and property right protection. These factors are crucial for VC firms to be able to 
lead their investment to a successful exit. Thus, when VC firms invest overseas, their 
performance is at least partially dependent on the characteristics of the host country. As 
such, I argue:
Hypothesis 3: International VC firm s ’ performance in their international
investments varies systematically with differences in host country characteristics.
Local Partners and Investment Performance
I discussed the advantages o f syndicating with local firms; particularly, when host 
country is distant spatially, institutionally, or culturally. Similar to any other industries,
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firms in the VC industry suffer from LOF when investing abroad (Lu & Hwang, 2010). 
One way to overcome the LOF that they face is partnering with local firms because they 
are familiar with the market and business norms (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Partnering 
with local firms can help foreign VC firms and enhance the likelihood o f success in their 
investments. Local firms can make tangible and intangible resources in the host country 
more accessible and help foreign VC firms prevent idiosyncrasies that they may 
particularly face due to an unreliable institutional environment (Bruton et al., 2005). 
Additionally, local VC firms can reduce information asymmetry that exists between 
entrepreneurs and investors which is much more pronounced for foreign firms (Bruton et 
al., 2004). Reduced information asymmetry leads to fewer opportunistic behaviors and 
higher collaboration among entrepreneurs and investors which directly relates to a 
venture’s performance and eventually the VC firms’ investment performance (Sahlman, 
1990). Further, local direct ties “serve as a channel for the transfer of rich information, 
reducing the problems of investor quality assessment, and consequently facilitate IPO 
exits” (JaSskelainen & Maula, 2014: 704).
Thus, with contributions that a local partner might have on a deal, one can argue 
that syndications with local partners are more likely to succeed for foreign VC firms. 
However, there is another side to this story. Countries are different in terms of their 
institutional, legal and cultural environment and as a result their common corporate 
governance systems (Moerland, 1995; La Porta et al., 2000). That implies differences in 
business norms and conduct in various countries (Wright et al., 2002). With regard to 
venture capital, prior studies have underlined differences among VC industries across 
differing countries (Manigart, 1994; Sapienza et al., 1996). VC firms have different
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approaches to the investment cycle and different preferences as to how manage their 
investments (Li & Zahra, 2012; Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2001). The same 
information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs also exists between foreign 
and domestic VC firms (Lu & Hwang, 2010; Wright et al., 2005).
Further and even more closely related to the actual performance, prior studies 
have illustrated differences among firms from different countries with respect to their 
preferred method o f exit, timing and duration o f exit stage, and partial or full exit from 
the venture (Cumming et al., 2006; Cumming & Macintosh, 2003a; Jaaskelainen & 
Maula, 2014; Megginson, 2004; Schwienbacher, 2002). Such differences hold even 
between seemingly very similar countries such as the United States and Canada 
(Cumming & Macintosh, 2003b).
By and large, there are significant differences among VC firms from different 
countries which can directly influence the performance of an investment where VC firms 
from various countries have co-invested together (i.e., syndication). That is the case when 
VC firms syndicate with domestic counterparts depending on the extent to which their 
countries are different. Given these arguments, I maintain that the performance of 
syndicated deals between foreign and domestic firms is a function of similarity between 
countries and therefore varies systematically for VC firms investments across different 
countries. Thus:
Hypothesis 4: International VC firm s ’performance in their international 
investments which are syndicated with domestic VC firm s in the host country 




The sample was drawn from the VentureXpert module in Thompson One Bankers 
database. VentureXpert provides daily VC investments information from 1960 up to the 
current time. Since VentureXpert provides rich and reliable data, it has been extensively 
used by prior studies in the VC literature (e.g., Dimov & Milanov, 2010; Guler &
Guillen, 2010; Hochberg et al., 2007,2010; Megginson & Weiss, 1991; Sahlman, 1990; 
Shane & Stuart, 2001; Yang, Narayanan, & De Carolis, 2014). To design the study and 
compile the sample I focused on first round investments o f VC firms from the United 
States in ventures around the world in 2005 for several reasons. My final sample 
comprises 490 observations which include investments o f 235 US VC firms in 406 
companies within 53 different countries. Table 1 shows the list o f countries that have 
been included in the sample.
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
First, I selected US VC firms because the United States is the largest, oldest and 
originator o f VC investments (Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007). Because of 
that, US VC firms were also pioneers in crossing borders and investing in ventures in 
other countries (Wright et al., 2005). Thus, choosing US VC firms as the foreign VC 
investors made the sample more inclusive in terms of the number o f countries included. 
Second, narrowing the sample to firms from a single home country (i.e., United States), I 
control for potential differences that VC firms across different countries have with 
respect to activities and preferences in investment cycle (Li & Zahra, 2012; Pruthi et al., 
2003; Wright et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2005). Third, focusing on first round investment1 
is an appropriate sampling strategy for my study because subsequent rounds are
1 First round o f  investment is when the fund is initially infused to the venture by VC firms and then if  the 
venture achieves some certain development millstones, VC firms may continue the funding in subsequent 
rounds (Gompers, 1995).
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qualitatively different from the first round and there are various other factors that can 
impact the VC firms’ decision about syndication (Dimov & Milanov, 2010). In other 
words, first round investments reflect the VC firms’ perception and consequently 
investment strategy more accurately. Plus, when a US VC firm joins a follow-on 
investment, it is already a part o f syndication. Thus, including follow-on investments 
would skew the sample towards more syndicated deals.
Finally, I collected investment data for year 2005 because I also examine the 
performance implications o f cross border investments. According to previous studies, the 
average time that it takes for successful VC firms to exit their investments is between five 
to ten years (Black & Gilson 1998; Dai et al., 2012; Macmillan, Siegel, & Narasimha, 
1985; Sahlman, 1990). I considered eight years as approximately the average and 
measured the performance of the investment in 2013.
Measurement
I have two dependent variables in my study. For the first two hypotheses, I 
examine the impact of host country characteristics on the international VC firms’ 
syndication decision. I define syndication as when there are two or more VC firms that 
sharing the round of investment (Brander et al., 2002; Jaaskelainen, 2012; Lemer, 1994; 
Lockett & Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2006; Meuleman & Wright, 2011). Thus, in my 
analysis o f the first hypotheses, I have a dichotomous dependent variable which is one if 
the deal was syndicated and zero otherwise. For hypothesis 2a and 2b, the syndication 
variable is one if there is at least one firm from host country or focal firms’ home country 
in the deal respectively and is zero otherwise.
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For hypotheses 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the performance o f the US VC 
firms’ investment (i.e., venture). There are two ways of measuring the VC firms’ 
performance: first, return on investment can be straightforwardly used to determine the 
performance. Second, VC firm’s performance also can be examined through the 
venture’s exit; that is, an investment is considered successful if  VC firm has been able to 
exit the venture through common vehicles such as IPO or M&A (Bygrave & Timmons, 
1992). Using return on investment to measure the performance for VC firms is 
problematic because most of the VC firms are private companies and access to their 
sensitive information such as their accurate profit is difficult for outsiders (Jaaskelainen, 
Maula, & Seppa, 2006). Plus, even if the information is available, it is hard to determine 
how much each VC firm has contributed in a syndication with respect to their time and 
other intangible resources to come up with an accurate return on their investment (De 
Clercq & Dimov, 2010). Further, VC firms most often realize the largest return when 
they exit the venture through IPO or acquisition (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992). Thus, 
following previous studies (e.g., Dai et al., 2012; Gompers & Lemer, 2000; Hochberg et 
al., 2007, 2010; Jaaskelainen et al., 2006), I measure the investment performance via VC 
firms success in venture’s exit. Accordingly, I coded the performance variable one if the 
venture had gone public or had been acquired by another firm by 2013 and zero 
otherwise.
Analytical Approach and Estimation Procedure
I adopted hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) as the primary technique to test my 
hypotheses. This technique was first introduced by McNamara, Deephouse, and Luce
(2003) to the strategy literature and since then has been increasingly used to analyze
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multi-level nested data (e.g., Castellaneta & Gottschalg, 2014; Jansen, Simsek, & Cao, 
2012; Nielsen & Nielsen, 2013; Short, Ketchen, Palmer, & Hult, 2007; Spencer &
Gomez, 2011). HLM allows for simultaneous calculation and separation o f variance- 
covariance components at different levels without direct measurement o f variables 
associated with each level (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann & Gavin, 1997). My 
data meets the basic HLM requirement which is that observations at a lower level must 
be nested in a higher level. In my sample, US VC firms’ investments (i.e., ventures) are 
nested within their country o f origin and may exhibit significant within-country 
homogeneity. Thus, HLM controlling for within-group effect, is well-suited for my 
analysis (Short et al., 2007).
There are other variance decomposition methods in the literature which are not 
necessarily inferior to HLM (e.g., Ayyagari, Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008; Bali, Demirtas, 
& Tehranian, 2008; Campbell, 1991; Chen, 2010). However, HLM provides direct 
estimation o f variance that each level in a multi-level data structure accounts for 
(Arcenaux & Nickerson, 2009), and that is the aim o f my study. Accordingly, Primo, 
Jacobsmeier, and Milyo (2007: 452) maintain that the procedures o f estimation in HLM 
“allow the researcher to estimate how much each level o f analysis is contributing to 
explanation in the model, and how much each level is contributing to the error. In other 
words, the researcher can assess whether the explanation is primarily macro-level or 
individual-level.” Therefore, given the aim of my study and the nested structure o f the 
data without specific predictors, HLM is appropriate to decompose variance across 
different levels (i.e., venture and country) (Short et al., 2007).
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In sum, I utilized two-level modeling with the HLM 7,01 software (Raudenbush 
et al., 2011), to examine how much o f the variance in syndication decision (i.e., HI and 
H2) and performance o f investment (i.e., H3 and H4) is accounted for by venture/VC 
firm and host country. In the unconditional model, namely one with no specified 
predictors, each level’s constant is decomposed into a fixed portion and a variance 
component as follows:
Level-1 Model (for HI):
Prob(Syndicationy=l |Pj) = 7iy
l0 g [7 I ji /( l  -  Tty)] =  T|ij
Hij =  Po,
Level-2 Model (for HI):
Poj -  Y oo+  uoj
where Poj is the intercept for the jth country, and log (7 tjj/(l -  Tty)) is the mathematical 
function that links the expected value o f the dichotomous outcome Syndication^ to the 
predicted values for variate qy (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989). I selected the logit link 
function, which is the natural logarithm (i.e., log) o f the odds that Syndication = 1 (ny) 
versus Syndication = 0 (i.e., solo-investment: (1 -  7ty)). There are other choices available 
but the logit is the most common function for dichotomous outcomes (Heck et al., 2014). 
r|y represents the predicted values o f the transformed continuous outcome (i.e., in my 
analysis, the natural logarithm of the odds Syndication = 1) resulting from the multiple 
regression equation, which in the first model only consists o f the intercept (Heck et al., 
2014).
The level two model indicates that there are two parameters to estimate: the 
intercept (yoo) and the between-organization variability, or deviation, from the intercept 
(u o j). The estimated intercept is considered a fixed component, and the between-group 
variation in intercepts is considered the random effect.
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I used a similar model for the other hypotheses. The only difference is in the 
dependent variable which is the likelihood o f syndicating with domestic VC firms (for 
H2a), the likelihood of syndicating with other US VC firms (for H2b), and the likelihood 
of success or achieving high performance (For H3 and H4). Therefore, interpretation of 
elements in the model should be adjusted according to the dependent variable o f any 
particular model corresponding to each hypothesis. Since that is the only difference I do 
not explain other models to avoid redundancy.
4.5 RESULTS
In the first hypothesis, I argue that the US VC firms’ decision to form syndication 
varies systematically with the host country characteristics in which they invest. To test 
this hypothesis, I look at variance in syndication formation by US VC firms investing in 
different countries (i.e., 53 different countries) and examine whether a significant 
proportion o f that variance is explained by host country which is at level two in my HLM 
analysis. If there is significant variation in syndication formation at level two, that would 
lend support to my argument in hypothesis 1 (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Short et al., 
2007). My dependent variable here is a binary variable which is 1 if  US VC firms have 
syndicated the investment and 0 otherwise and I use the full sample to test hypothesis 1.
Since the dependent variable (i.e syndication decision) is a binary variable, I run 
the HLM analysis using the Bernoulli distribution. In this case, there is no variance 
component estimated at level 1. That is due to constraints of logistic regression which 
makes it impossible to estimate both the coefficients and the error variance (Hedeker, 
2007). Thus, in logistic regression models the error variance at level 1 is always fixed to 
the same number which according to Heck, Thomas, and Tabata (2012) is:
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7t2 / 3 = 3.29
Then, the variance explained by level 2 is calculated by the following formula (Anderson, 
Kim, & Keller, 2013):
T_, „  i _  Variance Component a t level 2I L L -----------------------------------------
(Variance Component a t level 2+ (— ))
I used the same procedure for the other hypotheses to calculate the variance 
explained by host country. For hypothesis 2, the dependent variable is whether US VC 
firms have at least one local VC firm (H2a) or US VC firm (H2b) syndicated on the deal 
and I used the full sample in my analysis. Table 2 reveals the variance component and 
percentage o f variance explained by host country for each form of syndication. Results 
show that all variance components are statistically significant. Host country significantly 
explains variation in syndication formation. In general, country effect accounts for 14% 
of the variance in syndication formation by US VC firms. Interestingly, host country 
characteristics account significantly greater for syndication with other US VC firms 
(38%) compared to syndication with domestic firms (10%).
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are articulated towards US VC firms’ performance. 
Therefore, the dependent variable for these two hypotheses is a dichotomous variable 
which is 1 if the venture has gone public or was acquired by 2013 and 0 otherwise. There 
is a major difference in testing hypothesis 4. Since this hypothesis is formulated to 
examine the variance of US VC firms’ performance when there is a domestic firm 
involved in the syndication, I used a sub-sample o f all investments by US VC firms that
' ICC is “a measure o f  within-cluster homogeneity and equals the proportion o f  variance due to between- 
cluster differences” (Anderson et al., 2013: 494).
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had been syndicated with at least one domestic partner. This sub-sample consists o f 92 
observations in 19 countries. Table 3 shows the countries included in this sample.
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
The same procedure is used to calculate the variance in performance as it was for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. Table 4 shows the results for performance of the US VC firms’ 
investments. Country effect significantly explains variation o f the US VC firms’ 
performance and accounts for 16% of the variation. However, it is not significant in the 
analysis in the sub-sample o f syndicated deals with domestic firms (variance component 
is almost 0). Accordingly, one can argue that performance o f syndicated deals with 
domestic firms is not systematically different across different countries. However, 
another plausible explanation can be drawn from methodological factors and the fact that 
the sample size for this sub-sample is not large enough (92 observations) to create 
required power and thus, this test might suffer from type II error (Bryk, & Raudenbush, 
1992; Hofmann, 1997).
[INSERT TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE]
Robustness Tests and Supplemental Analysis
I conducted several robustness and additional tests to examine the stability o f the 
results and present some other related findings. For the first two hypotheses, first, I ran 
the same analysis for a sub-sample o f the data. I extracted all syndicated deals and 
created a sub-sample. Then I analyzed this sub-sample to examine the effect o f the host 
country on syndication with domestic firms and other US firms. I found that host country 
is similarly a significant predictor o f syndicating with domestic and other VC firms. For 
syndication with domestic firms, country effect accounts for 24% of variation which is
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significantly stronger that the effect in the full sample (10%). For syndication with other 
US firms, country effect accounts for 29% of variation.
Second, instead o f using syndication as a dichotomous dependent variable, I used 
the number of partners as the dependent variable in an additional test. I found similar 
results to my original analysis for syndication with other US firms: country effect 
accounted for 37% of variation in the number o f US partners in deals. However, it is not 
significant at 0.05 level for syndication with domestic firms. That combined with my 
original analysis implies that country characteristics only explain variation o f the actual 
decision to partner with domestic firms and they do not explain the number o f domestic 
firms that US VC firms partner with once they make their decision.
I used the sub-sample o f syndicated deals to examine the robustness o f the 
original results for performance in hypothesis 3. This sub-sample includes 221 
observations (investments) in 33 countries. Host country effect significantly accounts for 
16% of variance in US VC firms performance in their overseas investments which is 
identical to what I found for the full sample (16%). For Hypotheses 4 , 1 organized a sub­
sample of deals that had been syndicated merely with domestic firms. In other words, this 
sub-sample consists o f co-investments between US VC firms and domestic VC firms in 
each host country and there is no other partner in the deals. I did so because I believe the 
fact that host country was not a significant predictor in performance o f syndicated deals 
with domestic firms in my original analysis could partially be due to other partners in the 
deals (e.g., from US). Having other partners, particularly from home or other developed 
countries with more similarity to US VC firms, may help them neutralize host country 
impacts on performance that I discussed in hypothesis 4. Results from analyzing this sub­
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sample show that host country effect is significant at 0.10 level and accounts for 26% of 
variation in performance o f US VC firms’ co-investments with only domestic firms.
Table 5 summarizes the results o f the robustness tests.
[INSERT TABLE 4.5 ABOUT HERE]
Moreover, I analyzed the variation o f performance in a sub-sample o f stand-alone 
investments to examine whether country effect significantly explains any variance o f the 
performance when VC firms had not syndicated their investments. This sub-sample 
includes 207 investments made by 112 VC firms in 45 countries. Result revealed that 
host country does not have any significant explanatory effect on the performance of 
stand-alone investments. Interestingly, in this sub-sample only 25 (12%) investments led 
to high performance (IPO or M&A).
Finally, I retested the hypotheses after taking the countries dominating the number 
o f observations out o f the sample. UK, Canada, and China were the ones with the highest 
number o f observations with 87,65, and 62 observations respectively. This new analysis 
yielded in the same results for the most part with regard to supporting the hypotheses.
4.6 DISCUSSION AND IM PLICATIONS 
This study seeks to extend previous research on the VC industry by studying the 
internationalization process o f VC firms. Despite the plethora o f studies on VC firms’ 
domestic activities and cross country comparison o f VC industry, the actual 
internationalization o f VC firms and the phenomenon o f cross-border syndication remain 
neglected (Meuleman & Wright, 2011; Wright et al., 2005). My overarching research 
question in this study was whether host country characteristics impact syndication 
behavior and performance o f  international VC firms. Asking this question, I take an
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important step towards opening the black box of the internationalization process o f VC 
firms. In doing so, I am able to specify the relative importance o f country determinants of 
cross-border syndication formation and its performance and open viable venues for future 
research.
Utilizing two-level HLM analysis o f 490 observations which include investments 
o f 235 US VC firms in 406 companies within 53 countries, I found that country has a 
significant impact on the syndication decision and performance o f VC firms. Several 
interesting findings emerge from my analyses which I believe have important 
implications for VC research.
First, prior studies focusing on domestic behavior o f VC firms have argued that 
syndication is a common practice among VC firms particularly in the United States 
(Jaaskelainen, 2012; Jaaskelainen et al., 2006), that is the research context in this study. 
Interestingly, my empirical results reveal that differences among the countries where VC 
firms invest induce these firms to alter their syndication strategy. Thus, when investing 
abroad, VC firms change their commonly practiced strategies. This finding reinforces the 
need for research to find specific factors that make VC firms change their strategies and 
practices.
Second, I found that the impact o f the host country varies for syndication with 
domestic firms versus firms from the focal firms’ home country. Interestingly, host 
country effect is greater for the latter. I believe that this finding sheds light on the 
paradox o f information asymmetry. As I explained before, syndication can be a 
response to the risks arisen by information asymmetry between focal foreign VC firms 
and entrepreneurs in the host country depending on the extent to which the host country
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is culturally and institutionally distant (i.e. underdeveloped) from their home country (Lu 
& Hwang, 2010; Wright et al., 2005). It becomes a paradox when one enters the potential 
information asymmetry between foreign and domestic VC firms into the equation 
(Michailova & Ang, 2008; Hitt et al., 1995; Rao & Schmidt, 1998). The info asymmetry 
may increase the likelihood of opportunistic behavior from domestic firms and likely hurt 
the performance o f VC firms (Dimov & De Clercq, 2006; Manolova, Manev, &
Gyoshev, 2010). Thus, the question becomes which risk VC firms are more willing to 
take: risk o f partnering with local firms or dealing with local entrepreneurs 
independently?
Result shows that host country explains more variation in syndication with home 
country partners compared to that with domestic firms. This might be a plausible strategy 
for foreign VC firms facing the mentioned dilemma: syndicating with other home country 
partners. VC firms from the same country have much more in common with respect to 
philosophy and activities during the investment cycle (Brander et al., 2002; Guler & 
Guillen, 2010; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Therefore, partnering with home country firms 
might be a viable strategy to mitigate the risk o f overseas investments. Home country 
partners can enhance the focal firms’ due diligence in selecting domestic partners, 
monitoring their activities, and weigh their interests against potential conflicting interests 
o f domestic partners (Lemer, 1994). Nevertheless, my analysis is not specific enough to 
make any strong assertion. Thus, more research on this topic is warranted. For instance, 
future studies can explore specific variables at the country level that determine foreign 
VC firms’ decision to syndicate with home country partners. In other words, under what 
conditions do foreign VC firms prefer to partner with their home country firms instead of
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domestic firms? Which one is more influential: formal or informal institutions? Do they 
substitute home country partners with domestic partners or do they use home country 
partners as a complementary strategy to alleviate the risk o f partnering with domestic 
firms? Answering this last question specifically helps untangle the dilemma of 
information asymmetry between foreign firms and both domestic entrepreneurs and VC 
firms. When facing such a dilemma, do foreign VC firms prefer not to syndicate with 
domestic firms or as suggested, do they use other strategies to handle this double-edged 
sword situation?
My further analysis revealed that when replacing the likelihood of syndication 
with the number o f partners as dependent variable, country effect is not significant for 
domestic partners. That combined with my results from the original analysis (with 
likelihood as dependent variable) implies host country does not influence the number of 
domestic partners. In other words, host country merely explains a part o f variation in the 
decision as to foreign VC firms either partner with domestic firms or not and once 
foreign VC firms decide to syndicate with domestic firms, the host country does not 
explain any variation in the number o f domestic partners. This finding might to some 
extent challenge the notion that the likelihood o f opportunistic behaviors such as free­
riding1 increases with a larger number o f partners (Dimov & De Clercq, 2006; Hochberg 
et al., 2010). At least, the VC firms’ perception regarding this argument does not 
systematically vary with differences in the countries in which they invest. Future studies 
can more closely focus on this topic and examine whether the number o f partners 
influence detrimental behaviors such as free-riding differently in different countries.
1 Dimov and De Clercq (2006: 219) define a VC firms’ free-riding as “to trade o ff  its own effort with the 
potential effort undertaken by the others”.
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Third, I also examined whether the performance o f foreign VC firms investments 
varies due to the host country characteristics. According to the results, host country 
accounts for 16% o f variance in VC firms’ performance. In articulating my argument for 
hypothesis 3 ,1 introduced some plausible explanations such as differences among 
countries in availability o f a well-developed financial market, development o f various 
industries, and formal institutions (e.g., property right protection). My arguments are 
based on prior studies on domestic VC investments across different countries. My 
findings acknowledge my underlying assumption. However, future studies can examine 
whether and to what extent these factors influence the performance o f foreign VC firms 
compared to domestic investments. Exploring other influential factors is also warranted.
Although I did not find support for the hypothesis that performance o f syndicated 
deals in which there is at least one domestic firm, systematically varies across countries, 
my supplemental analysis revealed interesting results. I limited the sample to those deals 
that US VC firms had syndicated only with domestic firms and conducted an additional 
analysis. I found that country effect accounts for 26% of variation o f performance in that 
sub-sample. This finding intrigues some important questions that future studies are 
encouraged to investigate: first, while I found there is variation in performance of deals 
that are syndicated by US VC firms only with domestic counterparts, the type o f my 
analysis and the focus o f my study do not allow me to further examine the nature of 
variation; that is, what are the characteristics o f countries where foreign VC firms 
performance is lower when they only syndicate with domestic firms? According to 
insights from international alliance and VC literature, one can argue that the more distant 
the home and host countries, the greater dissimilarities between foreign and domestic VC
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firms. Consequently, potential dissimilarities lead to lack o f trust and professional 
common ground and negatively impact the performance o f the investment (Baum et al., 
2010; Lu & Hwang, 2010; Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2002). However, it needs to 
be empirically investigated before I can make any strong assertion. Second, as 
mentioned, when I include deals that US VC firms have both domestic and other partners 
(i.e., from home country and other developed countries) simultaneously, the variation of 
performance across countries disappears. One tenable argument could be having other 
partners protects US VC firms against the information asymmetry between them and 
domestic firms via enhanced due diligence and monitoring activities. Plus, having other 
partners with similar investment philosophy (e.g., from home country) makes the US VC 
firms’ position stronger against domestic partners and enable them to exercise more 
control to resolve the possible discrepancies stemming from differences in their 
investment approaches by providing them with the power o f final say (Utset, 2002). 
Qualitative studies (e.g., case studies) and those utilizing primary data can help validate 
the legitimacy of these arguments and explore other possible explanations.
Finally, I did not find any country level variations in the performance o f stand­
alone investments. While it might be due to the methodological artifacts (i.e., sample 
size), this finding can reinforce the notion that host country characteristics are more 
influential in foreign VC firms’ performance when they engage in syndication 
particularly with domestic firms. Future studies can first confirm my finding in more 
rigorous way (i.e., with a larger sample o f international stand-alone investments). Second, 
they can explore the processes by which the host country influences the foreign VC 
firms’ performance. On one hand, there are some host country attributes such as
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development o f the financial market and availability o f different exit options that more 
directly influence the later stages o f the investment cycle such as exit (Black & Gilson, 
1998; Jeng & Well, 2000). On the other hand, there are other attributes such as formal 
and informal institutions including business norms and legal system and protection that 
can impact the venture from very early stages of investment (Cumming et al., 2006). 
Future studies can examine the relative importance of these different characteristics and 
provide more fine-grained implication for both scholars and practitioners.
Limitations
Although I believe this study helps open potential research venues in nascent 
stream of VC firms internationalization, it is not without limitations. First, my results do 
not provide detailed information o f the processes as to how the host country impacts VC 
firms syndication behavior and performance. As the first step in this research stream, I 
show that host country matters and VC firms adjust their activities that used to be 
perceived as standard procedures in domestic investments (Jaaskelainen, 2012; 
Jaaskelainen et al., 2006), when they cross the borders. I believe that VC research can 
strongly benefit from more detailed studies introducing different influential factors at the 
country level and their relative importance.
There are some limitations in my sample that can be addressed by future studies 
validating my results. First, to effectively analyze the performance o f VC investments, I 
limited my sample to 2005 cross border investments. Country effect may vary over time 
with foreign VC firms becoming more experienced in the host country. Thus, 
longitudinal studies can examine whether the nature and strength o f the host country 
effect are different over time. Second, to control for differences among VC firms from
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different countries in managing their investments (MacMillan et al., 1989; Norton & 
Tenenbaum, 1993; Pruthi et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2005), I limit my sample to US VC 
firms. Although United States is the largest exporter of VC funds (Wang & Wang, 2011), 
which makes the sample more conclusive, the impact o f the host country might be 
different on firms from different countries with different homegrown characteristics (Lu 
& Hwang, 2010). Thus, examining the host country effect on foreign VC firms’ behavior 
from other countries and comparing the results might yield to significant implications for 
both researchers and managers. Finally, to avoid sample bias towards syndicated deals, I 
focused on first round investments. However, there are significant differences between 
early-stage investments (i.e., the context of this study), and later-stage private equity 
investments (e.g., buy-out investments) (Meuleman & Wright, 2011). As such, the 
magnitude, likelihood, and nature o f the host country effect might be different on 
investments at various stages which is a fruitful venue for future investigation.
Despite these limitations, this study offers new theoretical insights to VC 
researchers. Specifically, this is one o f the early steps identifying the relative importance 
o f the host country, and shows that it accounts for variance in VC firms’ cross-border 
syndication and performance. This study is an attempt to move the literature forward in a 
more systematic fashion on identifying the specific country level determinants o f VC 
firms’ strategic behavior and performance within the global market. As I decompose the 
variance o f this important strategic decision, the study provides insights that the host 
country matters in both the process o f  VC firm s ’ internationalization and the performance 
o f  investments that they undertake across different countries. As such, I hope that my
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study spurs more productive and convergent research looking into the internationalization
of VC firms.
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4.8 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 4.1: List of the Countries Hosting US VC Firms’ Investments
Angola Croatia Italy Portugal
Australia Czech Republic Japan Romania
Austria Denmark Lithuania Russia
Bangladesh Egypt Luxembourg Singapore
Belgium Finland Malaysia South Africa
Bermuda France Mexico South Korea
Brazil Germany Morocco Spain
Bulgaria Greece Netherlands Sweden
Cameroon Hong Kong New Zealand Switzerland
Canada Hungary Nigeria Taiwan
Cayman Islands India Norway Thailand
Chile Ireland Peru Ukraine
China Israel Poland United Kingdom
Congo
Table 4.2: Variance Decomposition Results for Syndication Decision













Country (Level 2) 0.55009 0.001 14 0.37125 0.043 10 2.03733
Investment (Level 1) 3.29 N/A 86 3.29 N/A 90 3.29
Total 3.84009 N /A 100 3.66125 N/A 100 5.32733
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Canada Ireland South Korea
China Italy Spain
Denmark Japan United Kingdom
France Nigeria
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Table 4.4: Variance Decomposition Results for Performance
Performance (H3) Performance of Syndicated deals 
with domestic firms (H4)
Level Variance
Component




p value Percentage 
of total
Country (Level 2) 0.63667 0.017 16 0.00005 0.387 0
Investment (Level 1) 3.29 N/A 84 3.29 N/A 100
Total 3.92667 N/A 100 3.29 N/A 100
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Table 4.5: Results for Robustness Tests
Syndication with domestic firms 
(sub-sample of syndicated deals 
only)
Syndication with US firms 








p value Percentage 
of total
Country (Level 2) 1.04952 <0.001 24 1.34577 <0.001 29
Investment (Level 1) 3.29 N/A 76 3.29 N/A 71
Total 3.92667 N/A 100 4.63577 N/A 100
Syndication with domestic firms 
(number of domestic partners as 
DV)
Syndication with US firms 
(number of US partners as DV)
Country (Level 2) 0.02411 0.075 0 0.32124 <0.001 37
Investment (Level 1) 0.41902 N/A 100 0.54778 N/A 63
Total 0.44313 N /A 100 0.86902 N/A 100
Performance (sub-sample of syndicated deals only
Variance Component p value Percentage of total
Country (Level 2) 0.61794 0.028 16
Investment (Level 1) 3.29 N/A 84
Total 3.90794 N/A 100
Performance of Syndicated deals with domestic firms (sub-sample of 
syndicated deals with domestic firms only)
Variance Component p value Percentage of total
Country (Level 2) 1.34157 0.084 26
Investment (Level 1) 3.29 N/A 74




The main purpose o f Essay I was to develop a theoretical framework explaining 
the antecedent role of the network characteristics of a) foreign VC firms and b) their 
potential partners, on their syndication behavior. I identified two factors that influence the 
focal firms’ willingness/attractiveness for syndication formation: context-related and 
business-related factors. I discussed how interplay o f these factors determines the 
likelihood o f syndication between VC firms. As the major theoretical contribution, I 
addressed the impact of the network structure (social status) and composition (density 
and diversity) on these factors and ultimately on the syndication likelihood.
In addition to the theoretical contributions, this dissertation is, and so is the Essay 
I, a response to the call for more research on the international VC firms and the process 
o f managing international VC investments. I specifically focused on the expansion of 
developed country VC firms into emerging markets because o f growing trend of such 
investments. I classified the prospect partners available to the developed country VC 
firms into three groups based on different values that they can deliver: domestic firms, 
firms from the home country/other developed countries, and firms from other countries.
In general, the theoretical framework suggests that there is a curvilinear 
relationship between the developed country VC firms’ social status and the likelihood of 
their syndication with potential partners. However, the advantages that a partner’s 
network has to offer due to the attributes such as density and diversity can change that 
dynamic by making the partner more attractive in the eyes o f the focal firm. Density 
reduces the likelihood o f opportunistic behaviors in the network. Hence, it makes the
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potential partner more attractive to the focal developed country VC firm before it 
establishes its network and when it suffers from the lack o f trust and familiarity with the 
local VC firms. On the other hand, a diverse network enables a potential partner to 
provide the focal firm with more than context-related benefits and therefore adds to the 
partner’s business-related attractiveness such that it will not diminish even after the focal 
firm’s reaching a high status in the host country.
This framework suggests that the level o f analysis should be expanded from firms 
to include their network as well. Networks have important resources and advantages to 
offer. Thus, in addition to the resources and capabilities that a potential partner itself has, 
its network o f connections might offer extra advantages. That can heavily influence the 
dynamic o f the relationship between VC firms. Therefore, scholars are encouraged to 
include different network characteristics when investigating the inter-firm relationship 
between VC firms.
For managers, the framework o f this study points to the need to consider more 
factors in their decision making process with regard to syndication. In addition to the 
potential partner per se, its network can also be a source of opportunity for the VC firms. 
Previous collaborations o f the VC firms in different markets that constitute their network 
are to a considerable extent available in different databases. Managers can use those 
records to analyze the potential partner’s network and determine its different features to 
improve the partner selection process especially when they invest abroad and syndication 
decision is more difficult and critical due to the lack o f familiarity with the partners.
In Essay II, the major goal was to clarify the nature o f the syndication among VC 
firms particularly in their international investments. More specifically, I sought to explore
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whether syndication is contingent upon the venture and VC firms attributes or VC firms 
have a natural tendency toward syndication regardless of specific conditions that they 
face in each particular investment as well as their own capabilities. To answer this 
question, I developed competing propositions pitting VC firms’ capability (measure 
through their social status at home and host country and their general and host country- 
specific experiences) against venture riskiness (information asymmetry and technical 
complexity). The purpose was to examine whether highly capable VC firms can handle 
the ventures (even risky ones) without syndicating with others (contingency approach to 
syndication) or even those VC firms would prefer to syndicate due to other advantages 
that syndication has to offer (natural proclivity approach to syndication).
I tested the propositions in a sample o f US VC firms’ investments in China 
through a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) which is a new technique in 
the VC literature. Results provide more support for the natural proclivity approach. In 
other words, I found that even firms with high status and rich experiences had preferred 
syndication over investing alone. That confirms broader advantages that inter-firm links 
have for the VC firms and the fact that high level o f social status and prior experiences do 
not substitute for the need for syndication.
Another goal o f this study was to examine the relative importance o f the venture 
and VC firms attributes in the syndication decision. Results show that while the venture 
attributes (riskiness) are necessary condition for syndication, the VC firm’s 
characteristics (including status in the home and host countries, prior experience in the 
host country, and age) are not necessary conditions for syndication. Further, 1 tested 
whether the lack o f these characteristics (which imply their capabilities) in the VC firms
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is a necessary condition for syndication. Results demonstrated a negative answer to this 
question. In other words, lack of internal capabilities does not necessarily lead the VC 
firms to syndicate their investment.
Further, I examined the performance implications o f syndication. Whether 
syndication is almost always a positive contributor to the performance or VC firms can 
rely on their own capabilities and achieve superior performance was the major question 
in this section. The sufficiency test revealed two major solutions for the high performing 
cases in both o f which the VC firms had syndicated with developed country and 
local/similar to local partners. However, due to the low coverage score any strong 
argument based on the result is warned. At the same time, the low coverage is 
understandable due to many different internal and external factors influencing the exit of 
the venture particularly through the IPO process. The overall findings imply that 
investing in ventures in more advanced stages, and partnering with VC firms from 
developed countries (which can bring business-specific resources and experiences to the 
deal) and local/similar to local firms (which can mitigate the information asymmetry) are 
associated with superior performance.
Further, I also conducted a necessity test to explore whether syndication is a 
necessary condition to achieve superior performance. Results indicate that syndication is 
not a necessary condition for high performance. However, interestingly, the absence of 
syndication is a necessary condition for poor performance. In other words, while 
syndication does not guarantee the performance of investment, deciding not to partner 
with other firms can significantly reduce the likelihood o f developed country firms to 
succeed their emerging market investments.
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These findings shed more light on the nature o f syndication in the VC industry. 
According to the results o f my analysis, future studies are encouraged to explore 
additional broad advantages that syndication creates as they seem to be more attractive 
for VC firms. Also the fact that syndication does not necessarily lead to superior 
performance and at the same time the lack o f it hurts the performance opens an 
interesting venue for future studies. Exploring specific factors that distinguish effective 
and detrimental syndications particularly in the context o f cross-border syndications is 
warranted.
For managers, my findings indicate that to achieve superior performance in their 
emerging market investments, they need to partner with others (from host and other 
developed countries) who are potentially able to add exclusive values to the venture. 
Stand-alone international investments have a higher likelihood o f failure. However, to 
increase the likelihood o f success managers have to be very cautious in the partner 
selection process and perform an efficient due diligence before entering into a 
syndication with other firms.
Finally, Essay III seeks to answer the question whether host country 
characteristics impact syndication behavior and performance of the international VC 
firms. Asking this question is an important step toward opening the black box of the 
internationalization process o f the VC firms. In doing so, the relative importance that 
country factors have in determining the formation of cross-border syndications and 
performance o f the international investments is specified. That opens viable venues for 
future research.
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Results reveal that differences among the countries where VC firms invest make 
these firms alter their strategies and namely syndication as one o f the major ones. Thus, 
when investing abroad, VC firms change their commonly practiced strategies. This 
finding reinforces the need for research to find specific factors that make the VC firms 
change their strategies and practices. Further, I found that the impact o f the host country 
varies for syndication with domestic firms versus firms from the focal firms’ home 
country. Interestingly, the host country effect is greater for the latter. I believe that this 
finding sheds light on what I call the paradox o f  information asymmetry. Syndication can 
be a response to the risks arisen by information asymmetry between the focal foreign VC 
firms and entrepreneurs in the host country depending on the extent to which the host 
country is culturally and institutionally distant (i.e. underdeveloped) from their home 
country. It becomes a paradox when one enters the potential information asymmetry 
between foreign and domestic VC firms into the equation. That may increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic behavior from domestic firms. Thus, the question becomes 
whether the foreign VC firms are more willing to take the risk o f partnering with local 
firms or that o f dealing with local entrepreneurs independently.
Result shows that host country explains more variation in syndication with home 
country partners compared to that with domestic firms. This might be a plausible strategy 
for the foreign VC firms facing the mentioned dilemma: syndicating with other home 
country partners. Nevertheless, my analysis is not specific enough to make any strong 
assertion. Thus, more research on this topic is warranted. For instance, future studies can 
explore specific variables at the country level that determine the foreign VC firms’ 
decision to syndicate with home country partners. In other words, under what conditions
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do foreign VC firms prefer to partner with their home country firms instead o f domestic 
firms? Do they substitute home country partners with domestic partners or do they use 
home country partners as a complementary strategy to alleviate the risk o f partnering 
with domestic firms? Answering this last question specifically helps untangle the 
dilemma o f information asymmetry between foreign firms and both domestic 
entrepreneurs and VC firms.
I also examined whether the performance o f foreign VC firms investments varies 
due to the host country characteristics. According to the results, host country accounts for 
a significant proportion o f variance in the VC firms performance. Further, the host 
country effect is significantly greater for the deals that the foreign VC firms syndicate 
merely with the domestic firms. One plausible reason for this finding is when the foreign 
VC firms have other partners beside the domestic ones, they would have a stronger 
negotiation power against domestic firms and that alleviates the potential problems that 
they might encounter in their relationship with domestic firms.
Finally, I did not find any country level variations in the performance of stand­
alone investments. This finding might be due to the fact that the host country manifests 
its impact through the inter-firm relationships rather than directly impacting the 
investment performance (e.g., because it lacks an active stock market). Nonetheless, since 
I do not directly address this issue, future studies are highly encouraged to examine this 
argument. Future studies can explore the processes through which the host country 
influences the foreign VC firms’ performance. On one hand, there are some host country 
attributes such as development o f the financial market and availability o f different exit 
options that more directly influence the later stages o f the investment cycle such as exit.
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On the other hand, there are other attributes such as formal and informal institutions 
including business norms and legal system and protection that can impact the venture 
from very early stages o f investment. Future studies can examine the relative importance 
o f these different characteristics and provide more fine-grained implication for both 
scholars and practitioners.
Despite its limitations, this dissertation offers some new theoretical insights to the 
nascent literature on international VC firms. Specifically, this is one o f the early attempts 
identifying the important factors at different levels (i.e., venture, VC firm, and host 
country) that influence the strategic behavior and performance of the VC firms when they 
cross the borders. This study aims to move the literature forward in a more systematic 
fashion to focus on the most influential factors and open the black box o f the VC firms’ 
internationalization. As such, I hope that this dissertation spurs more productive and 
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